VZCZCXRO6996
RR RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0255/01 0320932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010932Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6346
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA BEGINS ONE-YEAR CONSCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
WHILE STRUGGLING WITH MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary.  Russia has adopted a multipronged approach 
to the professionalization of its military:  seeking to 
enhance the quantity and quality of its conscripts by 
reducing the numbers of exemptions and limiting the draft to 
one-year; shifting the balance of forces within the military 
between contract and conscript; and endeavoring to make 
contract service more attractive with increased pay and 
better quality of life conditions.  However, the 2006 law on 
military conscription which came fully into force on January 
1, 2008, fails to tackle adequately the continued problems of 
hazing, Russian demographics, and abysmal living conditions 
for enlisted men.  The overarching failure to make 
significant changes in Russia's military doctrine will 
continue to make it difficult for Russia to meet its manpower 
and professionalization goals.  End summary. 
 
One-Year Mandatory Military Service 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Following the Second Chechen War, Putin reportedly 
became convinced that a conscript army was ineffective to 
defend the country and to engage in new high-tech, 
rapid-reaction, counter-insurgency and counterterrorist 
operations.  In 2003, Putin and the military leadership 
reached a solution to develop a cadre of professional 
soldiers able to handle future regional conflicts, with the 
goal of having 70 percent contract and 30 percent conscript 
servicemen by 2010. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At the same time, Putin insisted on also cutting 
conscription service from two years to one year.  This 
decision  was opposed by the military leadership, but was a 
popular political move, and partially intended to help deal 
with the serious problem of hazing in the military.  In June 
2006, the Russian State Duma passed the law cutting the term 
of conscription from two years to 18 months in 2007, and then 
to one year in 2008.  Along with the cut in length of 
service, the new law also eliminated a number of exemptions 
from serving and imposed stricter requirements for 
registration of 17-year olds and for approval of exemptions. 
According to most estimates, up to 90 percent of draft-age 
men avoided service by taking advantage of the numerous 
exemptions, including for university or technical education, 
health, hardship, alternative service, and other reasons, and 
by paying bribes to officials to escape being drafted. 
Aleksandr Golts, Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the Weekly 
Journal, noted that "avoiding military service became the 
national sport." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vasili Smirnov 
claimed that the new regulations would double the number of 
conscripts.  Officials would be expected to approve fewer 
exemptions, to undertake greater efforts to identify and 
register 17-year olds and to make 18-year olds report for 
service, to enact programs to address health issues at an 
earlier age, and to ensure border guards scrutinized more 
closely the reasons young men were going abroad and refused 
exit to those who appeared to be dodging the draft.  Also, 
there would be more effort to enforce the requirement that 
those who received university and technical education 
exemptions served their term after they graduated. 
Then-Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said in 2005 that the 
military was made up of "workers and peasants," because so 
many Russians with access to education were obtaining 
exemptions.  Tatiana Parkhalina, Director of the Center for 
European Security, agreed that going to a one-year term would 
increase the percentage of those entering service, noting 
that one year was psychologically more palatable.  Golts 
disagreed, predicting that draft-age men would still seek to 
avoid service, by paying bribes to local officials, or 
emigrating abroad.  Both acknowledged, however, that Russia's 
demographics would make it very difficult for Russia to meet 
its manpower goals. 
 
Positive Impact on Hazing? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Ministry of Defense officials also contended that 
going to a one-year term for conscripts would help reduce the 
serious problem of hazing, and thereby eliminate one of the 
principal reasons young men sought to avoid service.  Some 
experts, including Parkhalina, and Aleksandr Belkin, Deputy 
Executive Director of the Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy, agreed, noting that most hazing was done by 
second-year conscripts of first-year recruits.  Others, 
 
MOSCOW 00000255  002 OF 003 
 
 
however, like Golts and Valentina Melnikova, Executive 
Secretary of the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee in 
 
SIPDIS 
Russia, argued that officers were increasingly carrying out 
the hazing, and they did not anticipate a significant 
decrease in the amount or severity of cases.  Golts noted 
that Russia did not have an effective Non-Combatant Officer 
(NCO) corps, and in its efforts to create one, it was simply 
forcing specialists to sign contracts as Sergeants.  With 
little supervisory experience, he argued, these new NCO's 
would continue to see hazing as an easy way to keep 
discipline. 
 
Demographics and Corruption Undercut Manpower Goals 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6.  (U)  The MOD declared its intention to cut the number of 
active servicemen from over 1.3 million in 2001 to 1.1 
million by 2011-2015, and to achieve 70 percent 
professionalization of the forces by 2010.  According to 
demographic statistics, the number of males reaching military 
age annually was 1.5 million in 2005.  Given current 
demographic trends, that number is expected to drop to 
roughly 840,000 by 2009.  To maintain the forces at the 
levels desired, Russia would need to draft approximately 
400,000 - 500,000 young men in 2009 (since all those drafted 
in 2008 would leave service after one year).  Even if the 
exemption rate dropped below 90 percent, the MOD would be 
hard-pressed to meet their conscript-level goals. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Similarly, the MOD has had to cut its anticipated 
number of sergeants and soldiers switching to contract duty 
from 144,000 to 100,000.  General Smirnov has acknowledged 
that 20 percent of contract positions remain vacant. 
According to Golts, the MOD was drawing most of its 
professional soldiers from the ranks of current short-term 
personnel, many of whom were being forced into signing 
contracts through the use of "deceit, fraud, psychological 
pressure, and violence."  He added that many of these 
contract soldiers were simply not returning from leave. 
Rather than seeking them out and forcing them to return to 
duty or face disciplinary action, he said, many commanding 
officers were not reporting their absence and pocketing their 
pay instead.  Additionally, MOD estimates were that only 
15-19 percent of contract servicemen were renewing their 
contracts upon expiration.  Golts estimated that only about 
50-75,000 of the reported 100,000 professional forces were 
actually available for service. 
 
Systemic Problems and Lack of Resources 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The MOD has taken a number of steps to improve 
quality-of-life conditions, including increasing pay and 
pensions, establishing educational benefits, and constructing 
thousands of new housing units for enlisted personnel, in 
order to make both conscription and contract service more 
attractive.  Vitaly Shlykov, Founding Member of the Council 
on Foreign and Defense Policy, noted that Defense Minister 
Serdyukov has made improving the quality of military housing 
and conditions a top priority. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) However, Shlykov, and other experts, noted that 
there was still a significant housing shortage and much 
existing housing was in very poor condition.  Furthermore, 
salary and pension increases, while substantial (pay 
increases were 15 percent in 2007), could not keep up with 
inflation rates in Russia (inflation has averaged 10 percent 
annually over the past five years).  Thus, perceptions among 
draft-age males were still of difficult living conditions, 
and insufficient remuneration and benefits.  These, coupled 
with the fear of being killed or seriously injured in hazing 
incidents, continued to make serving in the military 
unappealing to many young men. 
 
Doctrine Does Not Match Planning 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Finally, according to most experts, despite the 
announced goal of using professionalization to modernize the 
Russian military and make it better able to handle regional 
conflicts and insurgency and terrorist operations, the 
military brass continues to base its doctrine on the need for 
mass mobilization of the army, and sees conscription as the 
best way to get large numbers of cannon fodder into the field 
fast.  Thus, some experts, including Golts, predicted that, 
 
MOSCOW 00000255  003 OF 003 
 
 
in the face of significant manpower shortfalls beginning in 
2009, the military leadership could seek to reinstate the 
two-year draft. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The change to a one-year term for conscription and 
accompanying exemptions are likely to lead to a slight 
increase in the numbers of young males carrying out their 
military service, but systemic problems in the Russian 
military, such as hazing, low pay, poor living conditions, 
negative perceptions, and corruption will not disappear in 
the near future.  Similarly, while the Defense Ministry will 
(reluctantly) continue to carry out the Kremlin's edict to 
professionalize the army, its failure to overhaul its 
doctrine, coupled with inadequate defense spending and 
demographic trends, will make meeting its long-term goals 
increasingly challenging. 
BURNS