VZCZCXRO9940
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0008/01 0591612
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 281612Z FEB 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0226
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0200
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0168
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0219

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD 
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM 
PARIS FOR WALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/28/2018 
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2008 IRANIAN MAJLES ELECTIONS 
 
REF: RPO DUBAI 0004 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000008  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns,  Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
 
 
 
1.(S) Summary: The results of the 2008 Majles elections in Iran 
will have little to no immediate bearing on Iranian foreign or 
nuclear policy, on which the Majles has little impact, but may 
foreshadow the likely result of the 2009 presidential election. 
Numerous contacts report that the Iranian public appears to have 
scant interest in the Majles elections and expects to see little 
change.  Although the Majles does have some institutional 
powers, these powers are largely limited to domestic policy. 
That said, the elections are a valuable barometer in the shaping 
of political alliances and pre-positioning for the 2009 
presidential elections, as well as a glimpse inside current 
power relationships.  Furthermore, cabinet members often are 
chosen from among the parliamentary leadership.  The reformers 
are unlikely to gain many seats, but the triumvirate of Ali 
Akbar Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karrubi appears to 
yield political influence.  End summary. 
 
2.(C) The March 14 Iranian Majles elections will not likely 
result in any significant immediate changes in the country's 
foreign or nuclear policy, as the Majles has limited impact on 
those areas.  In addition, numerous contacts have told IRPO that 
the Iranian public appears to have scant interest in the Majles 
elections and expects to see little change.  (Comment: This 
reportedly scant interest among the Iranian public in the 
elections does not necessarily translate into a low voter 
turnout.  The Islamic Republic has had voter participation 
numbers of 50-60% in most elections, and the Iranian government 
strongly encourages high turnouts, since it views voter 
participation as a reflection of systemic legitimacy.  End 
comment.) 
 
3.(S//NF) Oppositionist Ebrahim Yazdi (please protect), leader 
of the banned political party Freedom Party and former Islamic 
Republic of Iran Foreign Minister, told IRPO Febraury 20 that he 
attaches little importance to the Majles elections.  Despite the 
reinstatement of several hundred previously disqualified 
reformist candidates, he did not expect there would be 
competitive elections in most districts.  Yazdi added that 
although his Freedom Party registered some candidates for the 
elections, they were disqualified, as expected for a banned 
political party.  (Yazdi's views on US policy and Iran's 
political future are reported septel.) 
 
Political alliances 
 
---------------------- 
 
4.(C) The significance of these elections and all the 
politicking preceding them is largely in the shaping of 
political alliances.  Although the Majles has institutional 
powers, these powers are largely limited to domestic policy. 
The reformist-centrist triumvirate formed by former president 
Khatami, Expediency Council chair Rafsanjani, and former Majles 
speaker Karrubi has some influence, largely derived from the 
personal influence of the three leaders.  However, despite 
strenuous lobbying efforts by reformists and Rafsanjani for 
reversal of disqualifications, the reformists will not be able 
to field candidates in all constituencies.  Politically 
speaking, the reformist-centrist triumvirate is out-flanked by a 
conservative-pragmatist triumvirate of former National Security 
Council secretary Larijani, Tehran mayor Qalibaf, and former 
IRGC commander Rezaie.  The latter grouping is providing an 
alternative to the more hardline conservatives associated with 
President Ahmadinejad.  A coalition called the Broad and Popular 
Coalition of Principle-ists (BPCP, sometimes translated as the 
Comprehensive Coalition of Principle-ists) has been formed by 
Larijani, Rezaie, and Qalibaf, reportedly as a result of 
disagreements with the existing United Front of Principle-ists 
(UFP) which includes several conservative groups that are 
largely pro-Ahmadinejad.  There are also a few other smaller 
conservative groups, such as the Independent Principle-ists led 
by MP Ahmad Tavakkoli, and the Progressive Principle-ist Front 
led by former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian that remain 
separate from the UFP and BPCP. 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000008  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Vetting 
 
--------- 
 
¶5. (S//NF) Candidates were first examined by Executive Councils 
run by the Interior Ministry and subsequently by Supervisory 
Councils, which answer to the Guardian Council (GC).  Then, the 
Guardian Council itself examined the candidacies.  A majority of 
reformist candidates were initially disqualified, many for 
having "legal records," although it was reportedly not made 
clear to candidates what this meant.  Some were also 
disqualified because their adherence to Islam was in question. 
 
¶6. (S//NF) Khatami, Rafsanjani, and Karrubi found some unusual 
allies in lobbying to overturn the mass vetting of candidates by 
the Interior Ministry --  several prominent conservatives 
including Deputy Majles speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, MP Ahmad 
Tavakkoli, and Tehran mayor Qalibaf also publicly protested the 
vetting.  In one widely publicized case, a grandson of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Ali Eshragi, was disqualified after officials 
reportedly questioned neighbors about his personal life, 
including whether he prays, fasts, or smokes.  Eshragi was later 
reinstated following significant criticism over his 
disqualification.  Several incumbent Majles deputies were also 
disqualified, although most of those candidates were reinstated, 
including a reformist candidate who had earlier detailed to IRPO 
his anger in being vetted out.  (Reftel). 
 
7.(U) Following the loud criticism of the disqualifications, 
hundreds of candidates were reinstated by the Guardian Council 
and permitted to run.  The Guardian Council spokesman told 
reporters that of the nearly 7,600 people who registered their 
candidacies for the elections, over 4,500 have been approved to 
run.  Reformist officials have given the media varying estimates 
regarding how many seats they can contest, ranging from 90-120 
for the reformist coalition, and about 160 for the reformist 
National Trust (Karrubi's Etemad-e-Melli) Party, which is not 
part of the reformist coalition. It is clear, however, that 
reformists will not be competitive for all of the Majles seats. 
. 
 
8.(S//NF) Asked why the majority of the vetting of Majles 
candidates came from the Interior Ministry and not the Guardian 
Council as in prior elections, a former GC staff member 
indicated to IRPO that the change was only a cosmetic shift to 
improve the GC's  public relations; the GC has not ceded any 
real authority.  According to the source, the GC is trying to 
shift blame for vetting candidates away from itself, in the eyes 
of both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian public.  In the 2005 
presidential election, the Supreme Leader publicly rebuked the 
GC for vetting out all but one of the reformists running for the 
presidency, and the GC eventually reinstated two reformist 
candidates.  The source explained that there is little 
difference today between the Interior Ministry and the Guardian 
Council, unlike under the Khatami administration when the two 
entities had ideological differences, and in fact, the GC is 
currently represented in the Interior Ministry Executive 
Councils.  The contact explained that the 5th Majles (1996-2000) 
gave the GC the funds to extend its oversight of elections.  The 
GC has one representative in each Iranian province, who also 
sits on the Interior Ministry's Executive Council for the 
province, thereby exercising authority that should be limited to 
the Guardian Council. 
 
Beyond vetting - interference in elections 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9.(S//NF) Contacts expect to see interference on election day 
from the IRGC and the Basij, although it is not yet known how 
extensive the meddling may be.  It appears that the general 
public does not have confidence in the legitimacy of the 
process.  The Interior Ministry will also be testing new 
electronic voting technology during the Majles elections, 
although hand counting will still be done alongside.   (Note: 
This issue will be explored in more detail septel. End note.) 
 
Looking toward the presidential election 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000008  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
10.(C) The results of the Majles elections will be a good 
indication of whether the political trends are turning more 
toward the pragmatic and traditional conservatives 
(principle-ists) exemplified by Larijani, Qalibaf, and Rezaie, 
and away from the hard-liners associated with Ahmadinejad.  In 
the December 2006 municipal elections, pragmatic conservatives 
fared best, but it is too early to determine whether those 
elections were indicative of a trend.  However, if the trend 
continues in the Majles elections, it could carry through to the 
2009 presidential election.  Furthermore, cabinet members often 
are chosen from among the parliamentary leadership, which means 
the face of each parliament can shape politics for years to 
come.  It will also be interesting to see the degree of support 
the reform candidates get, although it is clear they cannot 
retake the parliament. 
 
11.(C) The Khatami-Karrubi-Rafsanjani and 
Larijani-Rezaie-Qalibaf alliances appear to have been created 
specifically to pool resources and coordinate strategies for the 
Majles elections. (Note:  Karrubi always stays somewhat 
independent.  End note.)  Whether they remain in place in the 
lead up to the 2009 presidential elections remains to be seen. 
Rumors abound that Khatami is considering running for the 
presidency again; it appears unlikely that Karrubi will run 
again, and it is unlikely that Rafsanjani will try to challenge 
the constitutional age limit of 75.  Many believe he has his 
sights set on the Supreme Leader position or at least a position 
on the council he proposes as a substitute.  On the conservative 
side, Larijani's candidacy for the Majles elections suggests 
that he does not have an eye toward the presidency in 2009. 
Some sources indicate that Rezaie doubts he could win an 
election and therefore will not run.  At this time, it appears 
that Qalibaf is the strongest potential candidate of the latter 
group. 
 
12.(C) However, Ahmadinejad apparently retains popularity with 
his core constituency, the religious poor, and could be 
re-elected.  One Iranian political science professor predicted 
-- with regret -- that Ahmadinejad would win re-election, 
despite the dire straits that his economic policies have brought 
upon ordinary Iranians.  Iranians, he said, are like people who 
keep buying lottery tickets, even though they have never won. 
Maybe this time, they say to themselves.  It is that sentiment 
that would see Ahmadinejad re-elected, the professor said. In 
any case, the Supreme Leader's view of Ahmadinejad in 2009 -- as 
an asset or liability -- will undoubtedly impact the outcome of 
the elections. 
BURNS