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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 HONG KONG 000213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2033 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI HK CH
SUBJECT: HONG KONG: CHINA'S FIRST DEMOCRACY? 
 
REF: A. 07 HONG KONG 03118 
     ¶B. 07 HONG KONG 03103 
     ¶C. 07 HONG KONG 02949 
     ¶D. 07 HONG KONG 02855 
     ¶E. BEIJING 0206 
 
Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham; Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The December 29 National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision setting the timetable for 
implementation of universal suffrage has refocused the 
political debate in Hong Kong, deftly defusing the issue. 
The Hong Kong Government (HKG) appears confident that it has 
secured Beijing's backing and that the majority of the public 
accepts the decision.  In recent weeks, Chief Executive (CE) 
Donald Tsang has encouraged the Legislative Council (Legco) 
and the people of Hong Kong to "focus on what is possible, 
rather than what is not."  Secretary for Constitutional and 
Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam told the Consul General that the 
process of preparation, public consultation, and legislative 
approval of a new reform proposal for the 2012 CE and Legco 
elections could extend into 2010.  The pro-Beijing Democratic 
Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) 
also appears satisfied with the NPCSC decision and focused on 
preparations for the crucial September 2008 Legco election. 
DAB leaders believe Beijing's decision has defused the 
universal suffrage debate in Hong Kong considerably, leaving 
them free to focus on grass-roots socio-economic issues and 
to benefit from their strong advantages in financial and 
human resources.  Similarly, the pro-business Liberal Party 
(LP) has publicly endorsed the NPCSC decision as a "unique 
opportunity to be the first part of China to enjoy full 
democracy." 
 
¶2. (C) Summary, continued:  The pan-democratic parties, in 
contrast, are struggling to reconcile sharply disparate views 
on strategy and tactics.  Mainstream leaders continue 
publicly to demand full reform by 2012, but some privately 
acknowledge the pragmatic need to get the best deal possible 
for that year while also ensuring that "true democracy" is 
realized in 2017 and 2020.  More radical elements view the 
official legislative and policy process as increasingly 
useless and appear intent on shifting the battleground to 
public opinion and the media.  Democrats of all persuasions 
fear that the central and Hong Kong governments might 
carefully structure political reform to produce "fake 
democracy" in 2017 and 2020.  While continuing to work on 
constitutional reform over the next decade, however, the 
democrats also must focus on the more immediate and equally 
crucial issue of the September Legco elections.  If the 
"pro-Beijing united front" realizes a net gain of two or 
three seats, the democrats could lose their ability to block 
unacceptable amendments to the electoral procedures contained 
in the Basic Law. 
 
¶3. (C) Summary, continued: Several moderates with 
cross-factional ties, including Anson Chan and Allen Lee, 
have publicly encouraged the two sides to compromise and 
cooperate.  Others are working in private, behind the scenes, 
where any real discussion will have to take place.  Just 
prior to the NPCSC decision, Chan told the Consul General she 
believed real progress could be made by 2012, even if 
universal suffrage was excluded.  Since then, she has said 
she was prepared to accept some compromise on universal 
suffrage in the near term (i.e., 2012), if doing so could 
help forge a consensus for 2017 and 2020.  Lee worries that 
the fragmented democratic side, encumbered by their 
continuing distrust of the central government, might be 
unable to seize this opportunity for universal suffrage. 
Successful resolution of the reform debate within the NPCSC 
framework will require compromise, which in turn depends upon 
a degree of mutual trust among the concerned parties and the 
Hong Kong public that does not presently exist.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment:  In the two years since they triumphantly 
maintained a united front to block CE Tsang's previous 
proposal for political reform, which would have marginally 
improved the electoral mechanisms for the 2007 CE and 2008 
Legco elections, Hong Kong's pan-democratic parties have 
suffered from inter- and intra-party bickering over political 
strategies, candidate selection, and substantive policy 
issues.  In large part due to this often-public squabbling, 
as well as their general unwillingness to move much beyond 
their traditional focus on democratization and human rights, 
their public images also have suffered.  Faced with impending 
disaster, most of the democrats were able briefly to set 
aside their differences to support Anson Chan's successful 
run in the December 2 Legco by-election (ref c).  For the 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  002 OF 007 
 
 
next eight months, however, the democrats must find a way to 
regain that common sense of purpose and work together for the 
September Legco election.  Lack of coordination and failure 
to address the concerns of Hong Kong's common citizens could 
lose them some of their 19 geographical constituency seats 
(they also hold seven functional constituency seats) to the 
pro-establishment camp, costing the democrats their one-third 
minority blocking power for new proposals. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment, continued:  By contrast, the HKG and the 
pro-establishment political parties appear content, for good 
reason, to project images of competence, rationality, and 
reasonableness to the famously pragmatic Hong Kong voters. 
On electoral reform, they feel they have plenty of time to 
devise achievable targets acceptable to Beijing and the Hong 
Kong people for upcoming elections in 2012 and beyond.  Anson 
Chan recently noted to the Consul General that she saw a 
tendency in both the HKG and the "left" (DAB and its allies) 
to aim for a system dominated by one party, somewhat like 
Singapore, which means eroding the democrats and pushing them 
into obstructionism, to which they (the democrats) already 
are prone.  At the same time the political parties, 
especially the DAB, will continue to work assiduously at the 
local and district levels to prepare for the September Legco 
election.  Their policy platforms likely will frame the 
political reform debate in their terms, while also 
publicizing well-developed positions on the full range of 
socio-economic issues - education, health care, environment, 
infrastructure, benefits for the elderly - that most voters 
care about, perhaps even more than democracy.  They 
accurately note that Beijing now has set the timetable for 
implementation of universal suffrage, albeit with some 
potential gaps, and it is Hong Kong's responsibility to 
produce a roadmap to reach that destination.  If Hong Kong 
fails to complete any of the various stages of that task, 
then the eventual achievement of full democracy in some form 
would be pushed further into the future.  In that case, the 
HKG, its political allies, and perhaps even the public would 
again blame the pan-democrats.  We belive many democrats, 
including leaders like Martin Lee, understand this dynamic, 
and are grappling with how to respond to both the challenges 
and opportunities created by the NPCSC decision.  End Comment. 
 
Timetable Set, Roadmap to Follow 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The December 29 NPCSC decision (refs a, b) authorizing 
limited electoral reform in Hong Kong for 2012, and some form 
of universal suffrage for the CE election in 2017 and the 
Legco election sometime thereafter (presumably 2020), has 
refocused the political debate in Hong Kong.  Although many 
pan-democratic leaders, supported by a significant minority 
of the public, continue publicly to demand full universal 
suffrage in 2012, most of them realize that the NPCSC almost 
certainly will not liberalize the schedule any further.  As 
Civic Party (CP) Secretary General Joseph Cheng recently told 
us, the democrats continue to hope for a "small miracle," 
perhaps through a leadership change in Beijing.  More 
realistic, however, are recent comments by NPC deputy, Basic 
Law Committee member, and former DAB Vice Chair Maria Tam, 
who said that "every single word" of the NPCSC decision was 
legally effective, and any lingering doubts about the 
decision's validity could only further delay implementation 
of universal suffrage.  As "South China Morning Post" (SCMP) 
columnist Frank Ching (a long-time supporter of democracy) 
wrote shortly after the decision was announced: "It is 
pointless, now, to continue insisting on dual universal 
suffrage in 2012: that is not going to happen." 
 
HKG Relaxed, Plans Consultations in 2008 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Given this clarity, the HKG now appears relaxed and 
confident, knowing that Beijing has set a timetable and has 
asked Hong Kong to produce a roadmap.  Secretary for 
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam likened the 
pressures the government felt in the run-up to the NPCSC 
decision to "cowboys being encircled in the wild west, where 
it is very important to stick to your guns and wait for the 
cavalry."   "In some ways," he told the Consul General on 
January 28, "the universal suffrage timetable is the 
cavalry."  According to Lam, the HKG plans to spend most of 
2008 "exploring more ideas" to produce a plan for 
implementation of universal suffrage according to the time 
frame set by the NPCSC, focusing on interim reforms for the 
2012 CE and Legco elections.  A task force under the 
Commission on Strategic Development (CSD) will begin meeting 
in February and by the fourth quarter of this year, Lam hopes 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  003 OF 007 
 
 
to have the HKG plan ready for another round of public 
consultations.  He dismissed as "too simplistic" any proposal 
to put the rejected 2005 plan back on the table for 
consideration.  "We need to get the various sectors and 
political parties interested in putting forth what they think 
would be in their interest to either expand the membership of 
the election committee or make changes to the electorate base 
so it would be even more representative compared to what we 
have now or what we proposed previously."  While Lam has said 
that the HKG would present its proposal sometime in 2009 to 
the Legco members, two-thirds of whom must approve it before 
submission to the NPCSC, he told the Consul General that the 
process easily could be pushed back to 2010.  If the NPCSC 
then concurs, Hong Kong could proceed with actual amendment 
of the Basic Law in time for the 2012 elections.  Lam made it 
clear that the HKG would prefer to push concrete work on 
electoral reform for the 2017 CE election until after the 
2012 election.  In other words, details for actual universal 
suffrage for the CE won't be hammered out within the next 
five years. 
 
¶8. (C) Since the NPCSC decision, CE Tsang has encouraged the 
people of Hong Kong to "focus on what is possible, rather 
than what is not."  On January 17, he urged Legco to accept 
the political reality of the NPCSC decision and to stop 
bickering over impossible demands.  He told the legislators 
that continuing skepticism of the sincerity of the central 
and Hong Kong governments was "uncalled for and 
unconstructive."  Tsang said the timetable established by the 
NPCSC decision was "unbreakable" and he urged the 
pan-democrats not to view the decision with suspicion.  The 
election of the CE in 2017 would be under a "one person, one 
vote" system in line with the principles of universal 
suffrage.  He divided the path to democracy into four 
inter-related steps: first, reform of the electoral systems 
for CE and Legco in 2012; second, further reform for the 2016 
Legco election; third, implementation of full universal 
suffrage for the CE in 2017; and fourth, universal suffrage 
for Legco in 2020.  Tsang acknowledged, however, that failure 
to realize universal suffrage for the CE in 2017 could delay 
full reform for Legco beyond 2020. 
 
Key Issues: CE Nomination, Legco Functional Constituencies 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The democrats complain that the NPCSC decision leaves 
some key issues unresolved.  They fear the central and Hong 
Kong governments might carefully structure political reform 
to produce "fake democracy" in 2017 and 2020.  For the CE 
election, their principal concern is what nominating 
mechanism would replace the existing Chief Executive Election 
Committee (CEEC), a complicated system under which various 
groups elect 800 members, who then select the CE by open 
ballot.  The democrats fear that a similar system, even with 
substantially broader participation, could be designed to 
"filter" potential candidates and exclude those whom Beijing 
would find unacceptable from even running.  As Martin Lee 
told the Consul General on January 19, the pan-democrats want 
a system under which an Alan Leong or an Anson Chan could run 
for Chief Executive - even if they could not win. 
 
¶10. (SBU) For Legco, the democrats continue to demand 
abolition of the functional constituencies (FCs), which 
currently elect half of Legco's sixty members, because they 
view them as fundamentally undemocratic.  In his December 12 
report to the NPCSC, CE Tsang noted that there was no 
mainstream view on resolution of this issue and offered 
several reform options, but most democrats continue to insist 
on complete abolition of the FCs.  Stoking the democrats' 
suspicions, Deputy Director Zhang Xiaoming of the State 
Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office recently opined 
that the FC seats were valuable because they represent 97 
percent of Hong Kong's gross domestic product. 
 
Polls: Majority Satisfied, Sizable Minority Persists 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Public opinion polls conducted since the NPCSC 
decision seem to support the HKG's growing confidence, 
although it is clear that a sizable minority of the people 
continue to prefer universal suffrage in 2012.  A Chinese 
University of Hong Kong poll conducted in early January found 
that 72 percent of respondents considered the NPCSC decision 
"acceptable," versus 21 percent who found it "unacceptable." 
Significantly, only 36 percent supported continuation of the 
fight for universal suffrage in 2012, while 69 percent 
believed the central government was "sincere" and responsive 
regarding universal suffrage for Hong Kong.  A few days 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  004 OF 007 
 
 
later, a survey by the Hong Kong Research Association found 
that 65 percent of respondents were satisfied with the NPCSC 
decision, up six percentage points since a poll by the same 
group at the end of December.  A third poll, commissioned by 
the pro-democracy "Apple Daily" newspaper and with questions 
framed somewhat differently, found that 43 percent continued 
to support universal suffrage for 2012. 
 
Pro-Establishment Parties Confident 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Like the HKG, the DAB appears confident and content 
to concentrate on preparations for the September 2008 Legco 
election.  Its leaders believe Beijing's decision has boosted 
their already strong prospects for that contest, because that 
decision has largely defused the universal suffrage debate in 
Hong Kong.  Relieved of much of the burden of defending and 
justifying Hong Kong's lack of progress toward democracy in 
the decade since reversion, the party and its allies can 
utilize their strong advantages in financial and human 
resources, and grass-roots organization, to mobilize their 
supporters for the election.  (Note: This is good news for 
the DAB.  In a story he related to Martin Lee just before the 
NPCSC decision, former DAB Chairman and key strategist Jasper 
Tsang Yok-sing said he had told Beijing officials: "If you 
 
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don't give us something positive in 2017, then you can run 
for re-election in Hong Kong, not me!") 
 
¶13. (SBU) The pro-business Liberal Party (LP) has publicly 
endorsed the NPCSC decision and urged other political parties 
to seize the opportunity to advance democratization.  In a 
January 22 "SCMP" column, LP Chairman James Tien 
characterized the situation as "a unique opportunity to be 
the first part of China to enjoy full democracy."  Hong Kong 
now had a "clear timetable for democracy and the chance to 
determine our own political future" that would include 
"positive change" for the 2012 CE election, followed by 
"expanding the base of FCs for the 2012 and 2016 Legco 
elections."  Separately, Tien told the "SCMP" on January 20 
that the FCs (of which his party holds eight, as well as two 
GCs) should be scrapped by 2020, a controversial statement as 
Tien's party is widely viewed as the greatest beneficiary of 
the FC structure.  Taking these steps would enable Hong Kong 
to realize universal suffrage in 2017, which Tien described 
as "an opportunity that is by no means guaranteed."  He also 
urged the democrats and 
the public not to focus excessively on details, such as 
whether the CE nominating committee had 1,200 or 1,600 
members, which he said would have no effect on the outcome of 
the election. 
 
Democrats Struggle to Respond 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Long before the December 29 decision, the democrats 
had struggled to maintain a united front for the December 2 
Legco by-election, in which pro-democracy independent Anson 
Chan defeated pro-government independent Regina Ip (ref c). 
In the months before that race, the various factions had 
argued over their choice of candidate, with the more radical 
members eventually agreeing to support Chan because she 
appeared to be the only one capable of defeating Ip, who 
benefited from strong support from the pro-establishment 
parties and, allegedly, the central government in Beijing. 
That sense of unity had grown stronger when the DAB and its 
allies soundly thrashed the democrats in the November 18 
district council election (ref d); the democrats, near panic, 
coalesced around Chan and energized enough of their 
supporters to turn out and elect her. 
 
¶15. (C) The post-election holiday for the pan-democrats was 
brief.  On December 12, CE Tsang culminated the extended 
"Green Paper" process with his formal request to the NPCSC 
for a decision on proceeding with political reform.  Although 
some democrats complained that Tsang had inaccurately 
conveyed Hong Kong's true public sentiment on 
democratization, most conceded he had told Beijing frankly 
that a majority of the Hong Kong people preferred to have 
full democracy as soon as possible.  By this time, the 
pan-democrats were clearly on the defensive, striving to 
maintain their unity and clarity of purpose in the face of a 
rapidly evolving situation. 
 
¶16. (C) Along with most of Hong Kong, the democrats were 
taken by surprise when the December 29 NPCSC decision 
essentially provided a full timetable for political reform, 
albeit with some significant areas of vagueness.  Some 
democrats criticized the decision's lack of detail as leaving 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  005 OF 007 
 
 
room for further postponements, but others acknowledged that 
the NPCSC clearly had put the burden on the people and 
government of Hong Kong to produce a reform package - or 
rather a series of packages for 2012, 2017, and beyond - that 
could gain the endorsement of the CE and at least two-thirds 
of Legco, before being returned to the NPCSC for final 
approval, as required by the Basic Law. 
 
"Walk On Two Legs" 
------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) Civic Party Secretary General Joseph Cheng told us 
recently that the pan-democrats were encouraged and heartened 
by their January 13 demonstration, during which core 
supporters - led by Anson Chan, Martin Lee, other 
legislators, "Apple Daily" publisher Jimmy Lai, and Cardinal 
Joseph Zen - turned out in better-than-expected numbers 
(10-12,000), and also were "relatively generous" with 
financial contributions to the cash-strapped parties.  The 
"theme" of that demonstration was "persisting with dual 
universal suffrage in 2012, no fake democracy in 2017." 
Cheng admitted, however, that the pan-democrats remained 
divided and coordination among the parties was "difficult," 
so they had decided to pursue a "walk on two legs" strategy. 
This approach had become essential to accommodate the 
conflicting views of moderates and radicals and keep the 
fragile alliance together. 
 
¶18. (C) First, Cheng said the democrats would "fight very 
hard" and "not give an inch" - publicly - on their demand for 
dual universal suffrage in 2012.  As Democratic Party (DP) 
legislator Cheung Man-heung told CE Tsang during his January 
17 question-and-answer session at Legco, "to us, 2012 is 
still the best . . . we won't give up until it has become 
hopeless."  Second, they simultaneously would work to 
maximize the speed and scope of democratization within the 
framework established by the NPCSC decision, seeking to 
ensure genuine universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020.  For both 
"legs," the democrats will strive to influence public opinion 
through demonstrations and the media.  Cheng said that 
overall he was "slightly optimistic," in that he believed the 
Hong Kong public understood the importance of democracy as 
well as the "loopholes" left by the NPCSC, but he feared the 
media might lose interest, which would be "dangerous." 
 
¶19. (C) Leaders of the two main democratic parties revealed 
at a January 19 luncheon with Senate staffer Paul Grove at 
the Consul General's residence just how far apart they were 
on fundamental electoral strategy.  Alan Leong of the Civic 
Party insisted that the democrats had to offer more than just 
democracy to Hong Kong's common voters, particularly the less 
well-off: "They have to see they are benefiting materially 
from our platform."  Martin Lee, former chair and current 
moral leader of the Democratic Party, stated clearly that was 
not the DP's goal: "Our job is to fight to establish a truly 
democratic system in Hong Kong - that's what we stand for." 
 
¶20. (SBU) Several of the more moderate democrats, including 
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) Legco representative Lau 
Chin-shek and Association for Democracy and People's 
Livelihood (ADPL) acting chairman Bruce Liu, already have 
publicly called for compromise on electoral arrangements for 
2012, to pave the way for introduction of universal suffrage 
for the CE in 2017.  Lau called on all the political parties 
to avoid a repeat of 2005, when the democrats' blockage of CE 
Tsang's reform package left Hong Kong voters saddled with the 
 
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existing, unsatisfactory system.  Liu said the "NPCSC 
decision is a reality" and "more rallies and hunger strikes 
will not change it." 
 
Radicals Want Action 
-------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) The more radical democrats, led by the LSD, the Civil 
Human Rights Front, and The Frontier, are angry and seemingly 
have abandoned the legislative arena and consultation 
process.  LSD Chairman Wong Yuk-man has promised to sever 
ties with the other pan-democratic parties if they back away 
from their demand for universal suffrage in 2012.  Shortly 
after the NPCSC decision, LSD Legco member Albert Chan urged 
democrats to abandon their rational, non-confrontational 
approach, and instead vote against all government bills and 
proposals in Legco and boycott all elections, to attract 
international attention.  Chan told us recently that the 
democrats had been "too rational for twenty years," that the 
NPCSC decision was a "slap in the face," and that they should 
break the law if necessary to create international news. 
Chan said he and the LSD wanted to move the "battleground" 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  006 OF 007 
 
 
from Legco to Hong Kong society at large.  Another activist 
group, the "Democratic Development Network" led by Reverend 
Chu Yiu-ming, also has announced they would reject any HKG 
reform proposal for 2012 that would not pave the way to a 
genuine one-person, one-vote system for the CE in 2017 and 
Legco in 2020.  Chu questioned the recent opinion poll 
finding that more than 70 percent of Hong Kong residents 
accepted 2017-20 for implementation of full suffrage, opining 
that "people accept because they feel helpless," a situation 
he believed was "not conducive to governance."   (Comment: 
While the democrats' stubborn sticking to the demand for 
universal suffrage in 2012 - despite the clear NPCSC decision 
to the contrary - seems fruitless, even irrational, veteran 
political commentator Allen Lee told the Consul General the 
democrats fear that giving up this demand will split their 
ranks even further and alienate the minority core of their 
staunchest supporters.  Others believe that sticking on 2012 
with no sign of movement will reinforce the "obstructionist" 
image and lose moderate voters.  End Comment.) 
 
September Elections Crucial 
--------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Joseph Cheng of the Civic Party told us that for the 
next eight months, in addition to working for universal 
suffrage, the pan-democrats also must prepare for the 
"crucial battle" of the September Legco election.  If the 
"pro-Beijing united front" is able to gain two or three seats 
at the expense of the democrats, they then might be able on 
key issues to sway two or three democrats to switch sides, in 
which case the pan-democratic camp would be "marginalized," 
as it would lose the ability to veto and block new proposals. 
 At this time, however, it is not at all clear that the 
various groups within the pan-democratic camp will be able to 
field a coordinated slate of candidates.  If they fail to do 
so, they risk splitting the pro-democracy vote and losing 
seats to the pro-establishment parties, which are almost 
certain to work together to maximize their success. 
Recently, leaders of both the Civic Party and the LSD 
indicated publicly that the democratic parties already were 
finding it difficult to agree on joint candidates in some of 
the geographic constituencies, although the FCs appear less 
problematic. 
 
Who Can Mediate? 
---------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Several moderates with cross-factional ties, 
including pro-democracy independent Legco member Anson Chan, 
NPC delegate and former LP leader Allen Lee, and Executive 
Councilor Anthony Cheung, have publicly encouraged the two 
sides to compromise and cooperate.  Just prior to the NPCSC 
decision, Chan told the Consul General she believed real 
progress could be made by 2012, even if universal suffrage 
was excluded.  Since then, she has publicly challenged the 
HKG and the democrats to work together.  During a January 20 
talk show appearance, Chan said she was prepared to accept 
some compromise on universal suffrage in the near term (i.e., 
2012), if doing so could help forge a consensus for 2017 and 
¶2020.  She urged the HKG to listen sincerely to the views of 
different sectors in Hong Kong, then produce a universal 
suffrage proposal including a clear roadmap that would be 
acceptable to all political parties.  Lee worries that the 
fragmented democratic side, encumbered by their continuing 
distrust of the central government, might be unable to seize 
this opportunity for universal suffrage.  Cheung, 
acknowledging the public's strong demand for universal 
suffrage and its disappointment with the long timeframe set 
by the NPCSC, has urged all parties to reach a "historical 
compromise" and use 2012 as a "midway station," with a 
broader electoral base for the CE Election Committee and an 
increase in GC seats for Legco, on the way to full 
democratization in 2017 and 2020. 
 
Lack of Trust Impedes Compromise 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) Successful resolution of the reform debate within the 
NPCSC framework will require compromise, which in turn 
depends upon a degree of mutual trust that does not presently 
exist.  In a recent radio broadcast, CE Tsang observed that 
"political progress in Hong Kong is about building trust," 
which he said "takes much time and effort, and can be easily 
shattered."  The central government certainly does not trust 
most of the pan-democratic leaders, some of whom still are 
not allowed even to travel to the mainland.  Beijing also may 
be somewhat leery of CE Tsang and his team, most of whom were 
trained by and worked for the British colonial 
 
HONG KONG 00000213  007 OF 007 
 
 
administration.  The HKG, which is hampered by its own 
limited political power base, does not trust many of the 
pan-democrats, especially the radicals, whom it fears are 
intent on blocking anything short of immediate full 
democracy.  The DAB, the LP, and the HKG, although they 
cooperate on many issues including electoral reform, 
constitute an uncomfortable alliance due to their 
fundamentally different power bases and ideologies.  The 
pan-democrats do not trust the HKG, which they believe is at 
best excessively bureaucratic and resistant to change, and at 
worst completely subservient to the central government in 
Beijing.  Finally, the general public often views HKG 
officials as arrogant, inaccessible and divorced from 
reality.  One recent study found that many people viewed 
talking to officials like "talking to the wall." 
Cunningham