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DE RUEHUB #0206/01 0602214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 292214Z FEB 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2953
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL PHUM CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: 3RD AND FINAL UPDATE ON 2/24 
 
REF: A. HAVANA 187 
     ¶B. HAVANA 201 
 
Classified By: COM: Michael E. Parmly: For reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Cubans and diplomats tell us Raul seems to 
be firmly in charge and Fidel's influence appears to be under 
control.  Cubans speculate on the possibility of small 
economic reforms ahead with no hope for political changes. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) USINT's Refugee Unit elicited reactions about 2/24 
from 70 refugee applicants during their interviews this past 
week.  Overwhelmingly, the responses reflected a conviction 
that everything will remain the same and could even get 
worse.  Consular officers interviewed repatriated migrants in 
eastern Havana, close to the edge of USINT's Havana limits. 
They found that young people born in the 1980s universally 
stated that the naming of Raul as president was a non-event. 
They saw no prospects for change, no possibility that the new 
government will act differently, and no change to their own 
lives. 
¶3.  (C) Poloff spoke with Angolan Counselor Carlos Alberto de 
Figueiredo: 
 
-- Figueiredo stated that Fidel Castro's mental state was 
rapidly deteriorating.  He cited the comments of Angolan 
officials that had firsthand, albeit limited, contact with 
Fidel while accompanying President Dos Santos during his 
visit to Havana in October 2007.  These officials, to include 
the Angolan Ambassador, reported that Fidel was unable to 
maintain a sustained, coherent conversation with anyone, and 
the meeting with Dos Santos was consequently limited to 
nothing more than a photo op.  Based on the comments of the 
Angolan delegation that accompanied Dos Santos, Figueiredo 
assessed that Fidel had 12-18 months to live and, due to his 
mental state, Fidel would have little to no influence on the 
large scale policy decisions in Cuba.  He doubted that Fidel 
himself was the true author of the "Reflexiones," and 
expressed confidence that a new PCC First Secretary would be 
named in the next year, replacing Fidel as Cuba's true leader. 
 
-- Figuereido confirmed that Machado Ventura was widely 
perceived as more loyal to Raul than any other official 
within the Cuban Regime.  He assessed that this loyalty was 
the primary factor in Machado's appointment, as Raul 
considers "internal stability and preservation of the status 
quo as his chief objectives in this period of transition, far 
more important than economic progress."  Figuereido claimed 
Raul and the "old guard" are not trusting of Cuba's younger 
generation, and postulated that they would cling to power as 
long as they could.  He opined that Raul's supposed favoring 
of Lage was overstated, and claimed that Perez Roque's only 
true ally in the regime is Fidel. 
 
-- According to Figueiredo, the GOC recently queried Angola 
on an oil-for-doctors/teachers deal, however, Angola had 
already committed all its oil to other countries.  Finally, 
he also said that the GOC was seeking to increase the value 
of the Cuban peso, but claimed to have no further specifics. 
 
¶4.  (C) Poloff met with Elizardo Sanchez, head of the Cuban 
Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation: 
 
-- Sanchez expects little change from Raul's government and 
was disappointed it did not show any indication of new 
directions.  He doubts Fidel will live out another year and 
feels that, as long as Fidel is alive, Raul will feel 
constrained about taking any substantial reforms.  Sanchez 
echoed the view that the older generation of leaders 
distrusts the younger generation.  He said Machado is loyal 
to Raul, and may not necessarily be a rigid hard-liner as 
some have described him. 
 
-- Sanchez prefers to "wait and see" if future appointments 
to the cabinet and the Political Bureau show an indication 
towards reform.  He thinks that the government will do some 
minimal reforms such as beginning to increase the value of 
the peso, easing a few of the rules around travel, as well as 
home and car ownership, and allowing more farmers to own 
their own land.  He expects that the human rights situation 
will not change significantly.  The number of political 
prisoners will slowly decrease through a combination of 
sentence completions and few token releases at the request by 
other countries or institutions.  The government will try to 
avoid new cases and, as in the past year, use short-term 
detentions. 
 
¶5.  (C) COM Parmly met with British Ambassador John Dew: 
 
-- Dew was surprised by the uproar over Raul's assumption of 
the Cuban Presidency, as in his view nothing has really 
changed.  When it comes to actual policy decisions, Fidel has 
been out of the picture for some time, a reality Dew 
concluded was dictated by Fidel's irrevocable health 
deterioration.  Dew interpreted 2/24 as the formalization of 
the structure of power and lines of authority.  Dew thought 
Raul would indeed "consult" his brother regularly, but not in 
the sense of genuinely asking for advice. 
 
-- Dew thought Raul is in a somewhat vulnerable position, as 
evidenced by the sad state of the economy and the rise in 
popular demands for improvements in Cuban daily lives. 
Unlike Fidel, Raul lacks the absolute authority and must form 
alliances carefully. 
 
-- Dew opined the furor over Machado's appointment was off 
the mark, especially the angst over him being such a 
"hardliner."  Dew had only met Machado a few times in his 
four years in Havana, but he had speculated in an analytical 
piece to London a few weeks earlier about Machado being a 
good candidate for VP.  His reasoning was that Machado is an 
inveterate workaholic, regarded as someone to be feared, and 
profoundly loyal -- and thus not a threat -- to Raul. 
 
-- Dew was unsure of how quickly even minor reform steps 
would come.  He confirmed hearing many of the same rumors 
about possible upcoming changes, such as:  A revaluation of 
the Cuban peso; easing restrictions for Cubans to enter 
tourist hotels, to travel abroad, to buy a car, or to 
transfer property; allowing more private initiative on a very 
small scale; and introducing incentives in agriculture.  He 
thought at least some of those steps could come fairly 
quickly, including within a few weeks. 
 
¶6.  (C) Econoff met with EU economic officer Jordi Carrasco 
and separately with EU delegation head Javier Nino.  Carrasco 
opined that Machado will be Raul's "loyal bulldog," someone 
who commands everyone's respect and will faithfully, and 
ruthlessly, enforce Raul's agenda.  Nino revealed that EU 
Commissioner for Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and 
the Caribbean Louis Michel's scheduled visit to Cuba will 
consist of:  Arrival on Thursday, March 6; work Friday and 
Saturday; and departure on Sunday, March 9.  According to 
Nino, Michel's intent was to take the current "pulse" of the 
situation and evaluate whether it merits furthering the 
dialogue.  Carrasco confided that while Michel will privately 
exert pressure on the regime on the issue of human rights, we 
should not expect any public statement to that effect.  Nino 
doubted that Michel would make a pitch specifically for the 
release of political prisoners during his visit.  Nino 
reasoned, as had UK Ambassador Dew earlier, that Michel's 
missteps on the political prisoner issue in 2005 would make 
Michel more cautious this time. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  It seems there is an emerging consensus 
that the reason behind Machado being appointed as first VP, 
more than simply being a hard-line ideologue, is to be Raul's 
"chief of staff."  If Raul really intends to carry out 
"institutional reform" within the GOC, he will need someone 
like Machado who is simultaneously respected and feared, and 
can therefore, again simultaneously, enforce possible Raul 
changes and take on any vested interests that might try to 
resist them.  Cubans expectations were certainly raised about 
the possibility of some changes in the near term.  We expect 
some minor changes will be made public in the following 
weeks, but it remains to be seen whether they will be 
significant.  In the next two weeks, Cuba will host several 
high-profile visitors -- Ecuadorian President Correa, 
Bolivian President Morales, EU Commissioner Michel, and 
Mexican Foreign Minister Espinoza.  The EU and Mexico will 
likely pressure privately on human rights but, through their 
public silence may actually do more than a country like 
Bolivia -- which will not exert any pressure on human rights 
whatsoever -- to promote international acceptance of Raul's 
GOC. 
PARMLY