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RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0132/01 0441003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131003Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6250
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID MARR MD RO UP
SUBJECT: VORONIN: LOTS OF TALK, NO TRACTION ON TRANSNISTRIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On February 12, the Ambassador met with President 
Voronin and, separately, with Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan to 
discuss Transnistria (TN), Article 98, relations with Romania and 
Ukraine, and the upcoming Gagauzia parliamentary elections.  Voronin 
discussed Moldovan neutrality and agreed that the next 5+2 meeting 
could take place in Helsinki.  He did not seem energized about 
concrete steps to resolving the TN conflict.  The Moldovan government 
(GOM) seems ready to sign an Article 98 agreement with the USG; the 
timing of such a signing still needs to be resolved.  Relations with 
Ukraine seem to be improving, while those with Romania remain sour. 
Voronin is very supportive of USG efforts to provide assistance to 
average Moldovans.  He highlighted the importance of health and other 
social aid given directly to underprivileged Moldovans.  End summary. 
 
Transnistria:  Neutrality, Next 5+2 Steps 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) When asked about his recent Moscow discussions with President 
Putin, President Voronin said the two had talked for a long time 
about Moldova's neutrality.  Later, during the Sova-Tkaciuk 
discussions with their Russian interlocutors in Moscow, Russia had 
pushed for international guarantees of Moldova's neutrality.  Voronin 
explained that the Moldovans had convinced the Russians to accept 
words like "respect" and "acknowledge" in describing Moldovan 
neutrality and the international community's acceptance of Moldova's 
neutrality.  Voronin agreed that no other country could guarantee 
Moldova's neutrality. 
 
¶3. (C) Voronin said that he and Assistant Secretary Dan Fried had 
discussed the issue of neutrality during their February 9 meeting in 
Munich.  Voronin understood that Fried had agreed that State 
Department experts would review the differences and consequences of 
using words like guarantee vs. respect or acknowledge. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Voronin whether the Russians would 
discuss important TN-related issues after resolving questions about 
Moldova's neutrality.  Voronin lamented that the Russians had not 
responded to the Moldovan package of issues; nor had they raised 
objections, Voronin added.  Voronin thought that, after agreeing to 
some language on neutrality, 5+2 negotiations would be able to move 
forward in earnest.  The Ambassador noted that EU Special 
Representative Kalman Miszei had suggested extended (two- to 
three-week) 5+2 discussions to address seriously and continuously the 
issues on the table.  The U.S. was ready to engage in such extended 
discussions on the basis of the Moldovan package and the Yushenko 
plan, the Ambassador told the President.  Ideally, such talks would 
take place in Helsinki, the Ambassador added.  (Comment:  It is not 
clear that everyone is ready for a real push on a TN settlement, but 
we should not be an impediment to one.  End comment.) 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador suggested that, when the 5+2 discussions become 
more concrete and seem to be leading to a solution, the Moldovan 
government include opposition political leaders in discussions on 
TN's future.  The Ambassador observed that opposition politicians 
seemed to view TN in narrow, political-opportunistic terms and should 
be encouraged to see a solution to the TN conflict as in the best 
interests of Moldova.  Voronin responded somewhat surprisingly that 
Iurie Rosca (the Christian Democratic Party leader about whom the 
President has had sharp words) had changed since the 2005 elections; 
Rosca better understood and had a more constructive approach to 
political issues now, the President believed. 
 
Moldovan-Romanian Relations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Voronin said that he felt the greatest resistance from the 
Romanians, rather than from the Moldovan political opposition, when 
the GOM has been close to a TN settlement.  The Ambassador urged the 
President to conclude a border agreement with Romania, noting that an 
agreement which defined the border on the Prut River instead of the 
Nistru River would underscore Moldovan sovereignty.  The lack of such 
an agreement provided fodder for Transnistrian accusations that 
Moldova wanted to join with Romania.  Voronin agreed that a border 
agreement was important for political reasons and added that the 
Russians, too, needed to understand that Moldova and Romania were 
separate countries.  Voronin concluded by saying that Moldova was 
ready "any day" for a constructive dialogue with Romania. 
 
¶7. (C) In the meeting with the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador asked 
about progress on a border agreement.  Stratan responded that no 
progress was visible.  He noted he likely would meet with Romanian 
Foreign Minister Cioroianu in Kyiv on February 14. 
 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance of signing an Article 98 
agreement between the U.S. and Moldova before Moldova ratified the 
Rome Treaty.  The President responded that the GOM had prepared the 
legal foundation for signing an Article 98 agreement.  He asked 
whether the Article 98 agreement could be signed after April 9. 
 
CHISINAU 00000132  002 OF 003 
 
 
Voronin preferred to avoid an EU fuss and a negative EU assessment by 
waiting to sign an Article 98 agreement until after the April 9 EU 
assessment of Moldova's progress on the EU-Moldova Action Plan.  The 
Ambassador responded that the agreement between our two countries 
could be signed later, as long as the Article 98 agreement was signed 
before the Rome Treaty was ratified.  The President recalled that he 
had heard such a requirement existed. 
 
¶9. (C) During the conversation with Stratan, the Ambassador stressed 
the importance of signing Article 98 first and then ratifying the 
Rome Treaty.  Ambassador Kirby noted that the embassy recently had 
shared six variants of an Article 98 agreement with MFA specialists. 
 
Gagauzia Parliamentary Elections 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the concern about the possibility of 
the Gagauzia People's Assembly (parliament) elections not taking 
place as scheduled this March.  Gagauzia governor Mihail Formuzal had 
announced that his autonomous region had not received funds to carry 
out the elections.  Formuzal had threatened not to hold the elections 
if his region did not receive funds from the central government. 
 
¶11. (C) Voronin explained that the Gagauzia People's Assembly had 
made a mistake when approving the Gagauzia budget.  It should have 
budgeted for the elections and did not when Formuzal assured the 
parliamentarians that he would find money elsewhere.  The central 
government had given the autonomous region funds that could be used 
for various purposes, Voronin said.  Voronin believed Gagauz leaders 
should have used those funds for elections.  Voronin said the 
People's Assembly still had time to fix the mistake by voting for 
funds to be allocated to the elections.  The President worried that, 
if the central government allotted separate funds for the Gagauzia 
elections, it would be accused of interfering in the autonomous 
region's elections.  Voronin stressed that the Gagauzia elections 
should be conducted properly, according to norms and laws.  Since the 
central government's budget had been adopted by the national 
parliament, Voronin noted, it wasn't that easy to change the budget 
to send more funds to Gagauzia.  Still, Voronin concluded, "we'll 
give them funds if necessary." 
 
Moldovan-Ukrainian Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador noted a positive trend in Moldova's relations 
with Ukraine.  Voronin responded that only two major issues remained 
unresolved.  He added that Moldova wanted good relations with its 
eastern neighbor and resolution of issues on the basis of friendship 
and understanding.  Voronin said Ukrainian President Yushenko had 
agreed to come to Moldova to sign the package of agreements if 
agreement on the remaining issues could be worked out between the two 
countries. 
 
Special Thanks to USG for Health, Social Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13. (C) President Voronin concluded the conversation by thanking the 
Ambassador and U.S. Government for concrete, practical assistance in 
the health and social sectors.  The Moldovan leader noted that 
average Moldovans judged the U.S. by such visible assistance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) President Voronin was in a relaxed mood.  In discussing 
Moldovan neutrality and 5+2 talks, Voronin seemed unsure about 
Russian intentions or next steps on Transnistria.  He asked 
rhetorically whether the Russians agreed with the Moldovan package 
proposals or whether they would present their objections later. 
Voronin shrugged in response to his own questions with an "I don't 
know."  He seemed rather philosophical, or maybe just tired of trying 
to divine the Russian position on TN.  Voronin did not share his 
longer-term vision for settling the TN conflict.  During the meeting, 
at least, he did not exude a sense of urgency, of determination, or 
of the need to press forward on specific next steps. 
 
¶15. (C) Voronin did not engage on the Ambassador's point about the 
importance of bringing in the opposition into TN settlement 
discussions at the right moment to ensure buy-in from across the 
political spectrum.  He had measured, even kind, words for Christian 
Democrat leader Rosca.  Perhaps Voronin does not see domestic 
political opposition to a GOM agreement on TN as much of an obstacle. 
 
¶16. (C) Voronin's distrust of Romania was undiminished.  He implied 
that Romania undertook actions against a TN settlement ("greatest 
resistance") whenever prospects improved for such a settlement.  He 
did agree, however grudgingly, that signing a border agreement with 
Romania was important for political reasons.  "We are ready any day 
for a constructive dialogue with Romania," Voronin concluded. 
 
¶17. (C) Stratan, on the other hand, was less optimistic about 
progress with Romania.  There were no "active actions" on the table, 
he stated during the conversation.  Stratan may be wary about getting 
 
CHISINAU 00000132  003 OF 003 
 
 
out ahead of his President on relations with Romania.  We think 
President Voronin and his ruling party are more likely to use the 
Romanian boogey-man as a target in this pre-electoral season.  Such 
political divisiveness-the Communist Party representing Russian- and 
other-language speakers, while opposition parties represent 
Romanian-speakers-would bode ill for Moldova. 
 
KIRBY