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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0355/01 0380626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5606
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR USAID/ANE/IR 
NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 
TAGS: PARM PGOG PREL IZ
SUBJECT: JANUARY 2008 UPDATE ON IRAQ'S INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
PERSONS AND RETURNEES 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 02737 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 03678 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 03885 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The latest reports on Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) from the United Nations (U.N.) Cluster F and 
Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) show an 
increase in the number of IDPs in the past 3 months.  This 
increase likely reflects a lag in data processing and a spike 
in registration of previous displacements rather than 
significant new displacement. Recent IDP and refugee returns 
have received considerable press coverage, but the number of 
returnees is minute in comparison to the 2.2 million who 
remain displaced (one million before February 2006 and 1.2 
million displaced after that date according to the U.N.). Two 
Government of Iraq (GoI) plans to assist returns are unclear. 
 A new United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
3-month pilot return project will assist 5,000 families.  To 
date, GoI efforts to support IDPs have been disorganized and 
lacking clear leadership. The USG through USAID has provided 
over $228 million USD to Iraq in support of vulnerable 
populations since 2003 through five implementing partners. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
U.N. and MoDM Reports Show Slight Increases in Iraqi IDPs 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The U.S. Mission views the UN Cluster F IDP reporting 
as the most reliable data available in Iraq.  Cluster F draws 
on data provided by International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), and UN agencies as well as data from MoDM.  MoDM only 
counts GOI registered IDPs.  Since IDP registrations in 
Baghdad were halted in September, MoDM numbers are considered 
under-reported.  In 2007 the U.N. reported 198,428 families 
were displaced in Iraq between February 2006 and November 
¶2007.  This is an increase of 24,447 families (or 149,824 
individuals) since the last report was released in September 
¶2007.  The UN data on Baghdad indicates 59,346 IDP families 
(30 percent of all displaced Iraqis) have been displaced 
since February 2006 and that there are more IDPs in Baghdad 
than any other province.  A MoDM report released 21 November 
2007 stated there are 163,574 IDP families in Iraq, up from 
151,350 families reported the previous month.  57,808 
families (or 355,889 individuals) are currently located in 
Baghdad.  UN reporting supports this. The MoDM report 
indicates that most of the new registrations since the last 
report occurred in the provinces of Diyala, Baghdad and 
Karbala. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment: An increase in the number of IDPs does not 
necessarily reflect only recent displacement.  In Baghdad, 
the increase of registered IDPs is probably a function of 
several factors, including some new displacement; improved 
data processing by the MoDM Karkh and Rusafa branch offices; 
and the announcement of several assistance programs for 
registered IDPs.  The potential for obtaining assistance 
likely prompted some previously unregistered IDPs to 
register. End comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Iraqi Red Crescent Society Shows a Decrease in IDP's 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) The Iraqi Red Crescent (IRC) IDP numbers are 
significantly higher (by 117,000 families) than those 
reported by the UN and MODM. The IRC report dated 27 December 
2007 states that there were 344,236 IDP families as of the 
end of November 2007. Interagency analysis concludes that the 
main reason IRC counts are higher is that counting 
methodology changed in August 2007 to include IDPs displaced 
prior to February 2006.  The UN and MODM do not include 
pre-February 2006 displaced populations in their current 
reporting numbers. IRC maintains that their numbers are not 
inclusive of pre-February 2006 displacements and are 
reflective of post displaced populations only. We will 
continue to monitor this to bring clarity to the discrepancy 
in reporting numbers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Baghdad IDPs and Returnees 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (C) MoDM data, press reports, and local contacts indicate 
an increasing number of IDP returns to Baghdad.  An MoDM memo 
dated 13 December 2007 reports that 3,653 families have 
 
BAGHDAD 00000355  002 OF 004 
 
 
returned.  Of that total, about one-half returned to West 
Baghdad and the balance to East Baghdad since January 2007. 
There are 4,502 families in the process of completing 
paperwork to document their return to various parts of the 
country and most of that total (3,455) will return to 
Baghdad. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
GoI Introduces Two Plans to Address Returns 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) There are currently two GoI-led plans to facilitate 
IDP and refugee returns, but neither plan has been 
coordinated with Iraqi, Coalition, or civil society 
(Non-Governmental Organization) stakeholders. Both plans are 
unclear in terms of practical implementation. 
 
¶7. (C) Abd Al-Samd Rahman Sultan, Minister of Displacement 
and Migration, presented his ministry's returns plan in 
November.  That plan is more a set of guiding principles than 
clear action items.  The plan calls for voluntary returns, 
coordination, and rehabilitation of property, reintegration, 
and protection. MoDM says this plan will be used as a 
blueprint to facilitate and support returns.  However, the 
plan fails to address essential issues such as evicting 
squatters and security for returnees. The plan mentions that 
"various entities" should coordinate efforts to provide 
assistance to returnees, to include helping them find jobs 
and repairing their homes, without saying which entities 
should coordinate, and how or where resources will be made 
available.  Under this plan, the GoI is supposed to repair 
private and government property to accommodate returnees. 
The plan does not articulate who will carry out repairs or 
who will decide which properties are repaired and in which 
order of priority.  The plan indicates that returnees should 
be afforded protection but provides no details on the 
proposed role of Iraqi and Coalition Forces, the courts and 
other GoI entities. 
 
---------------------------------- 
BOC Plan Not Coordinated with MoDM 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On 9 December, General Aboud Qanbar, Commanding 
General of the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), presented a 
six point plan to facilitate the returns of IDPs and refugees 
to Baghdad.  In Baghdad the BOC commands the Iraqi army and 
National police and has an essential role in planning for 
returnees. The BOC plan includes roles for MoDM, the Baghdad 
Provincial Council, and Coalition Forces, none of whom were 
consulted before the plan was released. The initiative would 
use media campaigns to publicize locations for returnees to 
settle and would identify returnees, which could endanger 
these individuals. MoDM officials have said they do not 
concur with the BOC plan. 
 
¶9. (C) The BOC plan includes the following points: 1) The 
BOC, in coordination with MNF-I, will identify areas safe for 
returns.  This information will be provided to the Baghdad 
Provincial Council (BPC) and MoDM, which will use the media 
to invite displaced families to return to those areas; 2) 
displaced citizens will register with the MoDM and indicate 
their desire to return to their homes; 3) MoDM will provide 
the BOC with the names and addresses of those who wish to 
return; 4) the BOC, in coordination with MNF-I, will inspect 
homes of potential returnees to determine if they are 
habitable; 5) MoDM and BPC, in coordination with the BOC and 
MNF-I, will announce the names of those citizens approved to 
return to their homes and provide a timetable for doing so; 
6) the media will publicize returns and all administrative 
and security details will be coordinated among the BOC, the 
BPC, and MoDM. Comment:  IDP population breakout is 
approximately 63% Shia Muslim; 30% Sunni Muslim; 5% Christian 
and 2% Other. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: The plan does not lay out standards for how 
areas will be determined "safe". Publicizing returns could 
encourage attacks on returnees.  Most Sunni IDPs who have not 
already registered are reluctant to do so because they do not 
want to provide their personal information to the 
predominantly Shia Government or because the process is too 
time consuming.  Many Sunnis will be reluctant to advise MoDM 
that they want to return to their homes amid growing 
suspicion that the GoI is only interested in promoting Shia 
returns.  Finally, the plan states returnees should await 
permission to return to their homes, although Iraqi officials 
acknowledge that IDPs should be allowed to return on their 
own timetable.  None of the plans deal with potentially 
explosive issues such as evicting squatters, the possibility 
 
BAGHDAD 00000355  003 OF 004 
 
 
of renewed sectarian tension as now homogeneous neighborhoods 
attempt to reintegrate multiple sects, compensation for 
damaged or destroyed property, competing property claims, and 
increased demand for already strained services.  End Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
UN Introduces Rapid Response Plan and SRSG staffing 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11. (C) UNHCR and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) have developed a rapid response plan for 
returnees that will target the most vulnerable returnees 
while improving registration and needs assessment mechanisms. 
 The $11 million dollar plan is a 3-month pilot project that 
will be limited to providing immediate assistance to just 
5,000 returnee families. The U.N. plans on issuing an appeal 
for $200 million dollars in funding in February 2008 to 
continue the program beyond the 3 month pilot period. 
 
¶12. (C)  We have supported the SRSG efforts to increase UN 
staffing based in Iraq, in part to address the 
IDP/Refugee/Returnee issues.  This plan on returnees is a 
positive step. However, the U.N. does not currently have 
sufficient local or international staff on the ground to 
effectively oversee a large-scale returnee program.  We are 
encouraged by recent dialogue with the U.N. that they will 
seek to increase staff in Iraq in the near future. The UN 
appeal will seek additional resources from the USG to fund 
the same activities USAID currently funds. 
 
----------- 
USG Efforts 
----------- 
 
¶13. (C) Since 2003, USAID has provided over $228 million USD 
to Iraq in support of vulnerable populations. USAID/OFDA 
continues to provide humanitarian relief and assistance to 
IDPs and returnees through its five implementing partners: 
International Organization for Migration, International 
Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, Agency for Technical Cooperation 
and Development, and International Relief and Development. 
USAID leads the interagency effort in Iraq on vulnerable 
populations.  A draft strategy to assist Iraq to respond to 
on-going displacement challenges is in the process. Since 
December, the interagency team as well as partners and 
international organizations have engaged MoDM to strengthen 
their ability to address the current challenges. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MoDM Needs A Mandate and Resources 
---------------------------------- 
¶14. (C) The MODM has never received clear authority to direct 
GOI IDP policy, nor the resources.  In November 2007, 
Ambassador Crocker and General Petreaus wrote Prime Minister 
Maliki urging the GoI to adopt a unified, government-led 
approach to address challenges posed by IDPs and returnees. 
In the absence of legislation, an Executive Order (EO) was 
drafted by the National Security Advisor and MODM for the 
Prime Minister's signature to address the Crocker/Petreaus 
letter. However, there is progress on both the legislative 
and policy fronts.  The Basic Law will establish MODM as the 
ministry responsible for addressing and providing services to 
IDPS and Refugees in Iraq. On January 22, 2008 the Council of 
Ministers (CoM) approved the law and it is now with the 
Council of Representatives (COR) for the first of three 
readings. We anticipate that this process will take several 
months. The National Policy which defines the day to day 
operations of MODM has been drafted by MODM with assistance 
from UNHCR. The National Policy has gone through several 
re-drafts and is currently back with MODM. Until the Basic 
Law and the National Policy are approved, the EO (once 
signed) will to be the document that provides the framework 
and mandate for MODM. 
 
¶15. (C)The GOI must substantially increase MoDM's 2008 budget 
to enable it to increase administrative capacity and offer 
compensation to service ministries, NGO's and private 
companies that implement its plans, policies and projects. 
MoDM's 2007 budget was only $6 million despite the ministry's 
significant responsibilities and there is no clarity on the 
2008 budget 
 
--------------------- 
Disorganized Response 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) GoI efforts to assist IDPs and returnees have been 
disorganized, reactive, and plagued by administrative 
shortcomings and allegations of corruption.  Rather than 
 
BAGHDAD 00000355  004 OF 004 
 
 
encouraging a unified MoDM-led effort to address the 
considerable challenges posed by IDPs, the GoI has allowed 
other entities such as Dr. Ahmed Chalabi's Services Committee 
and the BOC create committees and weigh in on IDPs/Returnee 
issues in an ad hoc manner.  While providing limited 
resources to MoDM in 2007, the GOI has provided the Iraqi Red 
Crescent Society (another group that wants to be in the lead 
on IDPs) with about $60 million in 2007. The U.S. initiative 
to build MoDM capacity (funded by the State Department's 
Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and 
implemented by IOM) ended in December 2007. IOM provided 
technical training in IDP registrations for MODM, development 
of software to register IDPs, and infrastructure support to 
MODM branch offices. The results of that initiative are still 
being assessed.  To strengthen the skills of MODM's civil 
service corps, USAID's Tatweer program will develop a 
capacity building program in coordination with MODM 
leadership.  The first meeting between MODM and Tatweer will 
take place in early February 2008. 
 
--------------------------- 
GOI Funding Support to IDPs 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) GoI initiatives to provide monetary support to IDPs 
have been disorganized. In October 2006, a first initiative 
of one-time payments of 100,000 Iraqi Dinar (about $80.00 
USD) was planned for 15,000 displaced families in Baghdad. 
In the past year, less than 10,000 families received payments. 
 
¶18. (C) In the spring of 2007, a second initiative to make 
one-time payments of one million Iraqi Dinars (about $800.00 
USD) for displaced families who return to their homes in 
Baghdad was launched.  Funding for 5,000 returning families 
was provided by the COM and distributed through the 
Governor's office in cooperation with the BPC and MoDM. 
However, only 4,000 families (mostly Shia) received this 
payment.  Baghdad Governor Hussein Ali Tahan has reportedly 
announced that the rest of the payments in this allocation 
will go to Sunni families.  Payments have been halted for 
about 3 months due to allegations of corruption.  It remains 
unclear if the COM will allocate more funds to provide 
payments to displaced families returning to Baghdad. 
 
¶19. (C) The third initiative is a 6-month temporary salary of 
150,000 Iraqi Dinars per month (for a total of 900,000 Iraqi 
dinars, or about USD 735) for about 140,000 IDP families who 
registered their displacement between March 2006 and July 1, 
¶2007. MoDM states 56,000 Baghdad families will receive the 
salary in three lump sums. The first payment is still being 
distributed. MoDM officials say they are not sure when the 
second and third payments will be made. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
¶20. (C) There are encouraging developments these past two 
weeks that the GOI is now focused on addressing IDP, Refugee 
and Returnee legislative and policy priorities. We will 
continue dialogue with the GOI at all levels to advance gains 
that have been made. Strengthening MoDM to address the 
challenges ahead will remain a priority. Finally, as security 
improves in Baghdad, monitoring of neighborhoods to assess 
services where large populations of IDPS are located will 
need to be addressed. 
BUTENIS