VZCZCXRO3266
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0001/01 0160852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 160852Z JAN 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0210
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0203

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/IR PLEASE PASS TO ECA/FO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/16/2018 
TAGS: OEXC PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING "FRIENDS OF AMERICA" IN IRAN (IPRO PD YEAR 1, 
PART II) 
 
REF: 2007 RPO DUBAI 70 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, Dubai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: As reftel details, the Department restarted 
US-Iran official exchanges in August 2006, featuring the 
flagship USG exchange program, the IVLP.  The Iranian government 
became aware early on of USG funding for the IVLP and, even for 
the first program in November of 2006, issued written and oral 
warnings against IVLP participation.  Iranian government 
attention continued in varying degrees, largely depending on the 
subject matter and institutions involved, throughout the year. 
Attrition for various reasons, particularly anxiety over Iranian 
government reaction, thinned the participant field for some of 
the programs.  Despite these obstacles, Iranians participated in 
record numbers and spread the word widely about their positive 
experience with America after returning home.  Some alumni faced 
IRIG retaliation for being "friends of America", but continued 
to strongly support the positive impact of continued US-Iran 
exchanges.  The experience of returning alumni also helped 
reveal fissures within Iranian society which can help inform 
future PD programming.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) As soon as IRPO was anounced, generalized IRIG paranoia 
about IRPO and US policy towards Iran led them to label our 
exchange programming as part of US "regime change" efforts aimed 
at fostering a "velvet revolution" in Iran.  (As recently as 
November 2007 the Iranian government specifically referred to 
the US government's Dubai office as the focal point of the USG 
regime-change program.)  Given this context, and the novelty of 
reestablishing such exchanges after a 27-year hiatus, the number 
of Iranian IVLPs in our first year nonetheless exceeded 
expectations to become the top IVLP program in the NEA region 
and third worldwide (see ref).  Program participants have been 
effusive in their praise of the quality and value of their 
exchange programs, and have been key supporters of further 
engagement with the Iranian people.  Alumni have both suggested 
future participants and volunteered to help organize future 
programs.  In addition, they have spoken in glowing terms about 
the American people they met and institutions they visited. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) We expect IRIG scrutiny to remain in FY2007, possibly 
increasing or decreasing based upon the state of bilateral 
tensions and the subject matter of the program.  We also expect 
Iranians to continue to participate, although recruitment under 
current conditions will remain challenging.  To offer a more 
textured view of the impact of and challenges to US-Iran 
exchange programs, we offer the following in-depth discussion 
with an IVLP alumnus detailed below.  It offers useful insights 
into how exchanges can help to mobilize and empower "friends of 
America" within Iran and help identify and exploit fissures 
within Iranian society to advance USG policy goals. 
 
 
 
"Friends of America" - An IVLP Case Study 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) In late November 2007, one of last year's International 
Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) participants, Dr. Farhad 
Towfighi (strictly protect) came to Dubai to discuss his 
post-exchange experience with IRPO.  Tofighi had been an 
employee of the Iranian Red Crescent Society's Relief Services 
branch.  He played an active role in delivering emergency 
medical care after the 2003 Bam (Iran) earthquake and the 2004 
Samarra (Iraq) mosque bombing.  Nonetheless, the IRC leadership 
retaliated forcefully against him after he participated in the 
April/May 2006 Disaster Response Management IVLP.  On the other 
hand, other government officials and organs were neutral to 
supportive of Dr. Towfighi and the program generally, reflecting 
nuanced diversity among different elements of the Iranian 
government towards engaging with the US. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) As told to IRPO, when Dr. Towfighi - then still an IRC 
employee - was invited to the IVLP, he arranged to meet with the 
IRC President, Dr. Seyed Massoud Khatami (no relation to former 
President Khatami), to explain the program and solicit his 
support.  He even brought a copy of the IVLP program description 
for review.  The IRC Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) 
liaison officer was present.  A representative from President 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ahmadinejad's Office, Dr. Biroudian (FNU), also attended.  While 
Dr. Biroudian was "very supportive" of the program, IRC 
President Khatami angrily rejected any such engagement with 
America and remained opposed to the program.  He was reportedly 
skeptical about the intent of the "L" (leadership) in IVLP, 
asking why the Americans were trying to recruit leaders in Iran. 
 (Note: Tofighi suggested dropping the L from future program 
materials if possible.)  Dr. Towfighi noted to IRPOff that 
Khatami was a former IRGC officer, and like the rest of the 
senior government officials with IRGC backgrounds appointed 
under Ahmadinejad, he was ideologically hostile to the US. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Despite the IRC President's opposition to the program, 
Towfighi went ahead and secured official leave to participate in 
the program, based somewhat on reassurances from Dr. Biroudian. 
He also briefed the Ministry of Health regarding the program and 
was told that the MOH had "no reaction".  The MFA was apparently 
supportive.  During the first week of the IVLP in Washington, 
Dr. Towfighi and his colleagues attended a dinner with the head 
and deputy head of the Iranian Interests Section.  At this 
event, Dr. Rahmanian of the Interests Section (title unknown) 
told the group that the communication offered by the program was 
"interesting", and that he was "very supportive" of the program. 
 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) According to Towfighi, the IRC remained angry about his 
participation and waited to retaliate after his return to Iran 
in early May.  First, he was summoned to the IRC security office 
and coercively interrogated for nine hours.  A few weeks later 
he was required to appear at an administrative hearing which 
resulted in him being fired him from his position with the IRC 
and banned from teaching.  The authorities also forced him to 
repay all income he had derived from teaching over the past year 
(upwards of 15,000 USD, a large sum in Iran, even for a doctor). 
 According to Tofighi, the IRC security officials offered him 
more lenient treatment if he agreed to denounce another IVLP 
participant, Dr. Noorbala, who was the President of the IRC 
during President Khatami's administration and the de facto 
leader of the IVLP group.  Dr. Towfighi refused to do so.  When 
IRC officials asked him specifically about his exchange 
experience, he described the trip as professionally useful, and 
the Americans he met as professional, kind, generous and 
friendly.  The IRC President grew even more displeased. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Taking their retaliation a step further, the IRC then 
reportedly banned possession or distribution of any of the eight 
books Dr. Towfighi had written on disaster relief operations, 
including sending notices to all 600 IRC offices throughout 
Iran's 30 provinces to remove these materials.  The IRC even 
visited IRC offices countrywide to ensure his books were removed 
from shelves.  He learned later from colleagues that while 
removing the books, IRC security officials warned staff that 
"this is what happens to friends of America". 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Dr. Towfighi fought back.  He hired a lawyer and appealed 
the IRC's ruling to the Supreme Administrative Court.  The 
Supreme Court awarded him damages for lost income from the 
banning and removal of his books.  He is currently appealing the 
other aspects of the IRC ruling as well.  Dr. Tofighi's story 
confirms that at least some means of redress are available 
through the Iranian courts.  Also, he reported that lobbying 
influential government and NGO officials can be at least 
somewhat effective in curbing hardliner conduct.  Dr. Towfighi 
said that he had argued his case with the Swiss Embassy, the 
MFA, the International Red Cross, and the Ministry of Justice 
about his case.  In addition, he was planning to speak with the 
Presidential Office official who had been supportive of the 
exchange at the outset.  Dr. Towfighi reported that ICR 
colleagues had responded very negatively to the ICR's crackdown 
on such a long-serving and respected member of their ranks 
(Towfighi had worked for IRC for 23 years), and many within the 
organization were rallying to his support and against the IRC 
President.  He claimed that a teaching colleague had even thrown 
a student out of his class when he learned that the student was 
an IRC employee in anger over Towfighi's plight.  Towfighi now 
works in a low-profile part-time teaching position. 
 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Towfighi's case is not the only example of 
problems faced by returning IVLP participants.  A few other 
participants have lost their positions or had their passports 
confiscated upon return.  Fortunately, they seem to be the 
exception rather than the rule, and even some of these people 
continue to keep in contact with us and help organize further 
exchanges.  The Towfighi case offers key insights into methods 
of suppressing dissent, or even engagement with the outside 
world, used by hardliners in Iran.  It further illustrates that 
redress through the courts and lobbying with influential figures 
can be effective to some extent in defending one's rights. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it suggests that 
attitudes towards engagement with the West, in particular the 
US, vary within the government, both among (and within) 
different Ministries, and between senior leadership and the rank 
and file.  We should use our public diplomacy tools to 
strengthen the hand of those supportive of engagement.  The 
primary fault line exists between the mass of the Iranian people 
and even a large portion of Iranian officialdom who want 
engagement with the outside world versus hardliners and their 
supporters opposed to any opening which risks their monopoly on 
power and their vision of a pure Islamic society.  As the 
Towfighi case illustrates, PD tools can meaningfully influence 
changes within Iranian society of benefit to American policy 
goals.  Part III of the IRPO PD Year 1 series will offer 
concrete recommendations for most effectivly using these tools 
to advance our Iran policy goals in 2008 and beyond. 
BURNS