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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1674/01 3510704
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170704Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1898
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1407
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: Serbian Government Warns EUR/SCE Deputy Director about 
Consequences of Kosovo Independence 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Officials of Serbia's ruling parties warned visiting 
EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein on November 28 that U.S. 
recognition of Kosovo independence would destabilize Serbia and the 
region.  Kostunica's key lieutenants went further, saying the GOS 
was planning a tough response (NFI), but the United States, not 
Serbia, would be responsible for any instability.  We strongly 
rejected these assertions.  A senior member of President Tadic's 
Democratic Party (DS) urged the United States to delay recognition 
of Serbia until after Tadic's reelection in order to ensure a 
democratic victory and preserve Serbia's path towards European 
integration.  A vice president of Prime Minister Kostunica's 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) said that Serbia would not 
"exchange" Kosovo for membership in the European Union, and would 
instead choose closer partnership with Moscow.  Meanwhile, both 
Albanian and Serbian leaders from the Presevo Valley took advantage 
of a DCM-hosted dinner to express concern that Belgrade was 
neglecting the region.  In a trip through the south, local politics 
-- especially development and investment -- trumped the Kosovo 
question that has absorbed the Belgrade's attention.  Post will 
continue to reinforce the message that it is a mistake for Belgrade 
to believe its own rhetoric and we will continue dialogue with 
constructive voices in Belgrade on consequence mitigation, 
especially in the south.  End Summary. 
 
DS - Delay Kosovo Independence to Help "the Good Guys" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) MFA Political Director Borislav Stefanovic told visiting 
EUR/SCE Deputy Office Director Robert Silberstein on November 28 
that he expected U.S. recognition of Kosovo to damage U.S.-Serbian 
ties and to disrupt President Tadic's pro-Western national agenda. 
Stefanovic, who is close to President Tadic, said that the 
President's reelection was critical for the Democratic Party (DS) 
goal of a strong relationship between the United States and Serbia. 
In that regard, Stefanovic urged the United States, "the beacon of 
freedom," to delay Kosovo recognition until after the second round 
of presidential elections, which he expected would be on February 3, 
¶2008.  A delay in Kosovo's declaration would allow Tadic to avoid 
defeat.  Silberstein said that there was no appetite in Washington 
for further delay and real disappointment in Tadic's leadership. 
Stefanovic argued that Tadic was "the most pro-Western leader in the 
region" and that Tadic's reelection would be "crucial and strategic" 
to keep Serbia on a Euro-Atlantic path.  Tadic's reelection as 
commander-in-chief would also bring "peace and stability 
guarantees."  Early U.S. recognition, Stefanovic said, risked a 
"doomsday scenario" of both an independent Kosovo and Radicals in 
charge of Serbia; Stefanovic warned, "do not underestimate our 
ability to screw up."  Stefanovic noted that Serbia would respond 
vigorously to a Kosovo coordinated declaration of independence (CDI) 
and should not take Serbia's western direction for granted.  For 
example, he noted that the Government of Russia promised Serbia two 
billion dollars of FDI over the next seven to eight years. 
 
Looking for Assurances of U.S. Support 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Silberstein said that Stefanovic and other leaders should 
think carefully about reactions to a Kosovo CDI, and that Washington 
would look to Tadic and the DS to lead Serbia past Kosovo and 
towards Europe, rather than espouse a policy of rejectionism and 
opposition.  Stefanovic said that Washington's expectations failed 
to consider the political context and did not acknowledge Serbia's 
efforts to maintain regional peace.  He complained about Washington 
pressure for Tadic to encourage the public to accept the loss of 
Kosovo -- something no Serbia leader could do.  The late Prime 
Minister Djindjic "was assassinated for less," Stefanovic said. 
Stefanovic said that Washington never praised Tadic for taking 
"difficult" steps such as apologizing for the Srebrenica massacre. 
Nonetheless, Stefanovic promised that damage to Serbia's relations 
with the West was a "redline the DS would not cross." 
 
DSS: Kosovo trumps EU 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Officials from Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 
said that keeping Kosovo was more important to Serbia than joining 
the European Union.  Kosovo Ministry State Secretary Dusan 
Prorokovic, a self-described "Euro-skeptic," said that Kosovo 
independence would be bad for the region and would "impair the 
regional security framework," but would not necessarily hurt Serbia. 
 He claimed that Russia and "other Eastern countries" would provide 
enough investment to compensate for possible disruptions in 
relations with the West.  Prorokovic raised Bosnia, saying that 
Republika Srpska "would naturally become a national issue," if 
Kosovo declared independence.  Insinuating that the Radical Party 
 
BELGRADE 00001674  002 OF 002 
 
 
would benefit at the polls, if the democrats failed to address this 
issue, he said that political leaders could either respond to the 
will of the electorate or lose power to those who did.  In a 
separate meeting, DSS vice president and parliamentary caucus chair 
Milos Aligrudic said that delay or suspension of Serbia's entry into 
the EU "was not the end of the world...but losing Kosovo was."  If 
the United States recognized Kosovo, he warned, Serbia would become 
"anti-American". 
 
¶5. (SBU) Echoing Stefanovic's theme of U.S. responsibility, 
Prorokovic said that U.S. "pro-Albanian policies...forced Belgrade's 
hand."  Aligrudic said that U.S. "insistence" on Kosovo independence 
discouraged any real negotiations and warned that a Kosovo 
declaration could also void the Kumanovo military agreement, but 
that "with this [Serbian] government" there would be no military 
option. 
 
Southern Serbia: Keep Belgrade Involved 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) For Presevo Valley Serbs and Albanians, local development 
issues trumped the Kosovo debate.  At a DCM-hosted dinner with GOS, 
British, and OSCE representatives, November 28, Stojanca Arsic, the 
Serb former mayor of Bujanovac and Armend Aliu, an Albanian who runs 
a development NGO, expressed worry that Belgrade was neglecting 
their region.  Arsic and Aliu drove six-hours (together) from 
Bujanovac to attend the dinner and were direct with their concerns 
to the senior officials of the GOS Coordinating Body for Southern 
Serbia (CB) present at the event.  Aliu said that if Kosovo became 
independent, Belgrade should do more, not less, to stabilize the 
south through investment rather than more militarization.  CB 
economic head Nenad Popovic assured Arsic and Aliu that Belgrade 
"would take care of Southern Serbia," and Economic Ministry State 
Secretary Verica Kalanovic promised cooperative efforts between 
 
SIPDIS 
Belgrade and local governments.  The DCM and Silberstein said the 
United States was working hard to achieve the "softest landing" for 
Serbia after Kosovo, which included pressure to keep Belgrade and 
the local leaders -- both represented at the table -- committed to 
each other.  Serbia, however, had to seize the opportunities for 
progress inherent in resolving Kosovo's final status.  In this 
context, it was in everyone's interest that Belgrade invests in the 
south and locals should engage with Belgrade. 
 
¶7. (U) During Silberstein's trip through Southern Serbia, November 
29, pragmatic Vranje mayor Miroljub Stojcic echoed Arsic and Aliu's 
concern that Belgrade was more worried about responding to Kosovo 
than about the impact of those responses on the ground.  Stojcic 
said that he hadnot been consulted on Belgrade's Kosovo contingenc 
plans for Kosovo CDI and admitted that his regio would suffer from 
closure of the Kosovo border r other efforts to punish Kosovo. 
Albanian leades in Bujanovac and Presevo said that the local 
Abanians contributed to stability in the south and hat Belgrade 
had yet to deliver on promises -- spcifically regarding minority 
rights (to use the lbanian language, symbols, etc), key developmentprojects, and demilitarization in the region. 
 
Cmment 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The DS was more suppliant, the DSS more arrogant and 
tough.  Their underlying message was the same, however.  Both sought 
to link U.S. support for Kosovo independence to rgional 
destabilization, disruption of pro-Western movement in Serbia, and 
Serbia's move toward Russia.  Our message to both was clear:  We 
want Serbia to seize the opportunities for rapid integration into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions that would emerge after Kosovo status is 
resolved.  At the same time, our red lines are well known and Serbia 
will have to shoulder the responsibility for its actions should it 
take provocative steps in the aftermath of a CDI. 
 
¶9. (U) The United States plays a critical role in Southern Serbia. 
We will continue to emphasize to both Belgrade and Southern Serbia 
leaders that Presevo Valley Albanians must commit to peaceful 
integration in Serbia, and Belgrade must deliver on investment and 
political integration promises.  This will be more important than 
ever during the next months, where political decisions from Belgrade 
could affect everyday life in Southern Serbia.  End Comment. 
 
¶10. (U) EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein has cleared this 
message. 
 
MUNTER