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Viewing cable 07IRANRPODUBAI71, COALITION-BUILDING FOR IRANIAN ELECTIONS: PART ONE-

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI71 2007-11-28 14:39 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Iran RPO Dubai
VZCZCXRO7964
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0071/01 3321439
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 281439Z NOV 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0202
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0001
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0150
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0182
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0195
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD 
ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM; BAKU FOR HAUGEN 
PARIS FOR WALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/28/2017 
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: COALITION-BUILDING FOR IRANIAN ELECTIONS: PART ONE- 
REFORMISTS AND CENTRISTS 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000071  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
 1.(C) Summary: Although campaigning for the March 14, 2008 
Majles elections is not officially allowed until two weeks prior 
to the elections, Iran is already very much in election mode. 
Both reformists and conservatives are attempting to create broad 
electoral coalitions.  Reformist parties have urged former 
President Khatami to run;  while he has called on reformist 
groups to unite, he has consistently declined to run himself. 
Nonetheless, Khatami still appears to be the leading figure 
around whom reformists are rallying.  Reformists appear opposed 
to any electoral boycott; one reformist privately expressed 
concern that the reformist cause could be undermined if the USG 
encourages a boycott.  The lynchpin issue for the 2008 Majles 
elections will clearly be the economy; both conservatives and 
reformists are criticizing the Ahmadinejad government's economic 
performance.  While the international crisis over the nuclear 
issue will likely play into votes, the upcoming elections 
promise to be even more about the price of bread than the last 
one.  A look at the conservatives' approach to the elections 
will be reported septel.  End summary. 
 
Reformists try to build coalition 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.(C) Campaigning for Majles elections is not officially 
permitted until two weeks prior to the elections, which are 
scheduled for March 14, 2008.  Nonetheless, Iran is already very 
much in election mode.  With four months left, reformists appear 
to have been somewhat more successful to date than conservatives 
at building an electoral coalition.  Former Majles speaker Mehdi 
Karrubi has, however, thus far kept his National Trust Party out 
of the larger reformist coalition, a tactic some groups charge 
may damage reformists in the elections.  Karrubi has long viewed 
himself as a distinct from the main body of reformists, leading 
him to set up his own party.  Despite the National Trust Party 
keeping its own electoral list, Karrubi has maintained publicly 
that "90% of those in our list are coordinated with the 
reformists." 
 
3.(C) Several reformist parties, including the National Trust 
Party, have publicly urged former President Khatami to run for a 
Majles seat, but he has consistently declined.  He has 
nonetheless urged reformist groups to consolidate their efforts 
for the elections.  An official of the reformist Islamic Iran 
Participation Front (IIPF) said in an interview on a reformist 
news site that if Khatami does not run for the Majles, they will 
urge him to run again for the presidency in 2009.  Khatami 
reportedly plans to make a series of provincial visits, which 
some observers are reading as possible campaign stops.  Whether 
or not he runs, it is noteworthy that despite being criticized 
while in office as ineffectual, Khatami appears to be the 
leading figure around whom reformists are rallying.  According 
to contacts, other possible reformist presidential candidates 
are former vice president Hamid Reza Aref and former science 
minister Mostafa Moin. 
 
Reformist strategy is to run big names and encourage voting 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4.(S) A reformist MP asserted that if there were free and fair 
elections, the Majles would be split 70-30 between reformists 
and conservatives.  He said the goal of the reformists for the 
2008 elections is to win 50% of the seats, although a minimum of 
100 of the 290 seats would still be considered good.  The MP 
claimed that the electoral strategy of the conservatives is to 
encourage internal divisions among reformists and added that 
conservatives are relying on the Guardian Council to disqualify 
scores of reformist candidates. 
 
5.(S) A Dubai-based businessman who claims to be involved in 
reformist politics, said that reformists are putting forward 
prominent, well-known former government and parliamentary 
officials in order to make it more difficult for the Guardian 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000071  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Council to block their candidacies.  He said this is the 
opposite of the reformist strategy in the December 2006 
municipal elections, when reformists put forward no-name 
candidates in hopes that their anonymity would give the Guardian 
Council no grounds on which to bar them from running.  The 
businessman predicted that the current strategy would be more 
successful, as Iranians tend to favor well-known quantities. 
 
6.(U) The centrists appear to be adopting a similar strategy, 
although it is not yet clear whether they will join the 
reformist coalition electoral list or remain separate.  The 
electoral list of the centrist Rafsanjani-affiliated Executives 
of Construction party includes prominent figures such as former 
nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, former Iranian ambassador to 
France Sadegh Kharrazi, and Rafsanjani's brother Mohammad 
Hashemi, among others.  Political scientist Farideh Farhi 
posited in a November editorial that this "powerful" electoral 
list is intended to make it difficult for the Guardian Council 
to disqualify its candidates since many are former government 
officials and key policymakers. 
 
7.(S) The reformist MP told IRPOff that another part of the 
reformist strategy is to encourage voter participation, as 
conservatives would benefit if the "silent majority" does not 
vote.  The MP implied that he did not favor a boycott, even if 
the conservative Guardian Council disqualifies many reformist 
candidates.  The MP claimed, however, that Karrubi has 
threatened to boycott the elections if there are massive 
disqualifications. (Note: There has been no indication in the 
press that Karrubi intends to urge an election boycott if there 
are massive disqualifications.  In a March 2007 interview, 
Karrubi characterized a previous boycott as being responsible 
for reformist electoral defeat. End note.) 
 
Concern over possibility of US call for boycott 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.(S) The Dubai-based businessman was weighing the risks of 
returning to Iran to help organize the reformist electoral 
campaign in a province outside Tehran.  He expressed to IRPOffs 
his concerns that the reformist cause could be undermined if the 
USG encouraged an election boycott using Farsi-language VOA and 
Radio Farda broadcasts, as he felt the US had in the 2005 
Iranian presidential elections. 
 
 
 
Commentary on elections/electoral strategies 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.(U) Iranian political scientist Sadeq Zibakalam predicted in a 
domestic newspaper interview that excessive disqualifications of 
candidates by the Guardian Council could lead to decreased voter 
participation.  He commented, "The principle-ists [i.e. 
conservatives] are like tight-rope walkers who are treading on a 
very thin rope. If they make extensive use of expedient 
supervision, they risk losing public participation; if they 
don't, their opponents will take the Majles.  I predict that 
they will disqualify prominent reformist personalities and allow 
minor ones to run, hoping that they lack name recognition." 
 
 
 
It's the economy, stupid 
 
------------------------- 
 
10.(C) The key issue in the March Majles elections, and likely 
also in the 2009 presidential elections, will be the domestic 
economy.  Both conservatives and reformists are criticizing the 
Ahmadinejad government's economic policies, a somewhat distinct 
issue from the economic pressures from nuclear-related 
sanctions.  Conservative deputy Majles speaker Mohammad Reza 
Bahonar said that the most important challenge faced by 
principle-ists is controlling inflation.  The secretary general 
of the reformist IIPF, Mohsen Mirdamadi, strongly criticized the 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000071  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ahmadinejad government's economic performance, saying, "What our 
people currently see through heavy propaganda launched by 
official and unofficial media about unrivalled achievements of 
the country in all fields is excessive prices, unbridled 
inflation, reducing economic growth, declining standards of 
living and loss of hope in future." 
 
11.(S) Background: Asked about the procedure for candidacy, the 
reformist MP said a potential candidate must have approval from 
four parts of the government: the ministry of intelligence; the 
judiciary (ensuring that there are no corruption charges against 
the candidate); the education ministry (candidates must have a 
university degree to be eligible); and the law enforcement 
forces (verifying that the candidate has no criminal record). 
The MP also said that the government does not fund or subsidize 
campaigns in any way, but did not elaborate on sources of 
campaign funds. 
 
12.(C) Comment: The upcoming elections in Iran promise to be 
even more about the price of bread than the last election. 
Although some reformists have criticized the government's 
nuclear policies in their speeches, the nuclear issue is not the 
driving issue in these elections.  If reformist groups manage to 
create a united electoral strategy, and appeal effectively to 
public dissatisfaction over the economy, they may stand a good 
chance of increasing their numbers in the Majles.  While 
predictions about results are still premature, the idea that 
reformists may regain the Majles is perhaps overly ambitious. 
Although early indications of coordinated cooperation on the 
elections between Karrubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani, have 
reportedly eroded due to personal differences between Karrubi 
and Rafsanjani, the three do not appear to be working at 
cross-purposes. 
ASGARD