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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: THE REFERENDUM -- AND AFTER: WHAT TO WATCH 
 
 
CARACAS 00002270  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, 
REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The December 2 constitutional referendum is 
proving to be President Chavez's most difficult electoral 
test since the 2004 recall referendum, but the Venezuelan 
president and his supporters still enjoy significant 
electoral advantages.  Both the "Yes" and "No" camps are 
battling to persuade potential supporters to actually go to 
the polls, rather than abstain, but the government has 
significantly more carrots and sticks at its disposal to 
influence voters.  An exuberant opposition is predicting 
electoral victory and warning the National Electoral Council 
(CNE) to run a fair election or face violent protests.  No 
matter what the referendum result is, Chavez will still be 
president, and the opposition has yet to establish a common 
long-term strategy to counter Chavez's authoritarianism.  If 
his reforms are adopted, we anticipate Chavez will move 
quickly to accelerate his "socialist revolution."  End 
Summary. 
 
-------------- 
The Opposition 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Will "No" Voters Vote?  The "No" camp has succeeded in 
persuading all the noteworthy abstentionist parties to openly 
advocate voting "No" on December 2.  Nevertheless, leaders 
from mainstream opposition parties like A New Time (UNT) and 
Justice First (PJ) told us early in the referendum campaign 
that they were not sure they can persuade disheartened and 
election weary rank-and-file members to turn out.  Over the 
last few weeks, opposition party leaders appear to have 
succeeded in re-energizing the sizable body of potential "No" 
voters.  Local pollsters predict that if overall abstention 
can be reduced to 30 percent or below, the "No" camp stands a 
chance of winning.  However, the opposition lacks the 
government's logistical capacity, as well as carrots and 
sticks, to deliver voters to the polls.  The official 
abstention rate was 25 percent in last year's presidential 
election. It was 30 percent in the 2004 Chavez recall 
referendum, but 55 percent in the referendum that approved 
the 1999 Constitution. 
 
¶3. (C) Can the "No" Camp Cover the Polls?  One of the most 
important deterrents to electoral fraud is fielding electoral 
monitors at the over 11,000 polling stations in Venezuela. 
The "No" camp started late in recruiting and training 
electoral monitors.  Opposition leaders tell us that in the 
2006 presidential election, the opposition did not have a 
sufficient number of volunteers to cover all the polls.  In 
addition, many opposition election monitors did not stay 
until polls closed.  This year, the "No" camp is counting on 
the active support of university students and the Podemos and 
Democratic Action (AD) parties to fill in gaps.  "No" 
campaign organizers express confidence they can cover almost 
all polling stations, but we believe it will be a real 
challenge for them to do so, particularly in Chavista 
strongholds. 
 
¶4. (C) Will the "No" Camp Accept Defeat?  At the opposition's 
closing Caracas rally November 29, Baruta Mayor Enrique 
Capriles Radonski told the crowd that the "No" block would 
accept any electoral result so long as the National Electoral 
Council (CNE) runs a transparent election.  At the same time, 
he asserted that the "No" block is the majority, implying 
that the opposition may not recognize a defeat.  Just as in 
the 2004 recall referendum and 2006 presidential election, 
there is a widespread belief among the opposition that they 
will win at the polls.  Unlike the 2006 presidential election 
in which consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales 
conceded defeat, there is no natural "No" block spokesperson 
who can do the same.  Opposition activists tell us that 
hard-liners may resort to violent protests if they believe 
the government "has stolen" an electoral victory. 
 
¶5. (C) Can the Opposition Sustain Its Momentum?: Over the 
last few weeks, the opposition has demonstrated real signs of 
political life, the first such signs since student protests 
after RCTV's closure in late May and Zulia Governor Manuel 
Rosales' campaign for president in late 2006.  The student 
movement has provided the opposition with fresh and credible 
voices.  The opposition has demonstrated its ability to 
mobilize large crowds, particularly during the "No" 
campaign's November 29 Caracas rally.  The opposition finally 
managed to unify behind a common vote "No" policy.  However, 
the opposition has a long history of coming together late 
 
CARACAS 00002270  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
before elections only to fall apart quickly after each 
electoral defeat to Chavez.  To date, the disparate and 
divided opposition has not articulated a unified political 
strategy beyond the December 2 referendum, win or lose. 
 
¶6. (C) What Will the Students Do After?: Opposition 
university students continue to enjoy substantial credibility 
among Venezuelans across the socioeconomic spectrum.  Their 
influence stems in large part by the fact that they have 
maintained a public distance between themselves and 
traditional opposition parties (although many student 
leaders, in fact, are opposition party youth activists).  In 
the final days of this campaign, the university movement has, 
however, increasingly joined forces with opposition parties 
in the "No" campaign.  They shared the stage with opposition 
leaders, for example, during the November 29 massive "No" 
rally.  This will likely erode their image as an essentially 
spontaneous and unaligned political phenomenon. 
 
--------- 
Chavistas 
--------- 
 
¶7. (C) Will pro-Chavez voters vote "Yes"?  Chavez has tried 
to frame the referendum debate as a plebiscite on his 
leadership and has continually warned his followers against 
abstaining.  The "No" camp and civil society NGOs, however, 
have succeeded in raising legitimate questions in the minds 
of some Chavez voters regarding the constitutional reform's 
impact on democratic freedoms, the protection of private 
property, and the concentration of power in the central 
government at the expense of state and local governments. 
Moreover, former Defense Minister Baduel, the pro-government 
Podemos party, and even Chavez's ex-wife, are all openly 
advocating voting "No."  Local pollsters tell us, however, 
that only a small percentage of traditional Chavez voters 
intend to vote "No'"  The opposition is hoping that many 
pro-Chavez voters will stay home and indeed abstention may be 
more palatable than a "No" vote for Chavistas who oppose the 
reforms. 
 
¶8. (C) Will Chavez's Electoral Machine Be As Effective As 
Before?  The Venezuelan government and campaign are virtually 
one and the same, so the "Yes" camp consequently should enjoy 
a huge advantage in terms of mobilizing voters on election 
day.  Moreover, close to one-third of the electorate depends 
economically on the government either through employment or 
income they receive for participating in the BRV's social 
programs ("misiones"), a significant factor in a country 
where there is widespread doubts about the secrecy of 
electronic balloting.  Chavez's United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela (PSUV) has experienced organization problems, but 
it is still Venezuela's largest political party and maintains 
real grass-roots bases that can field both election monitors 
and deliver voters to the polls. 
 
¶9. (C) Are Chavista Governors and Mayors Working Hard for 
"Yes"?:  Some pro-Chavez governors and mayors appear to be 
paying only lip service to the "Yes" campaign without ramping 
up the traditional pro-Chavez machine in their areas.  The 
fact that the reform provides for the elimination of term 
limits for President Chavez, but no other elected office, may 
account for less than active support, and in a few cases, 
opposition (usually passive) from some pro-Chavez state and 
local officials.  Moreover, some state and local leaders 
appear to be wary of a reform that takes power and resources 
away from them and concentrates authority even more in the 
hands of the executive branch.  On the other hand, state and 
local leaders can be expected to be evaluated by Chavez on 
how well they deliver the "Yes" vote.  Their future prospects 
in government likely depend on energizing the pro-Chavez 
bases in their areas, a powerful incentive to cooperate with 
the "Yes" campaign. 
 
¶10. (C) Can Chavez Contain Dissent Within Chavismo?  As 
Chavez radicalizes his "revolution" and assumes even more 
power, he is likely to experience growing internal dissent 
from some of his supporters.  So far, however, he has been 
able to marginalize and discredit his detractors in the eyes 
of most of his supporters.  Nevertheless, the list of 
prominent Chavez dissidents is growing and now includes 
former Defense Minister Baduel, the Podemos political party, 
and even radical National Assembly deputy Luis Tascon, who 
was expelled from the PSUV a few weeks ago.  The elimination 
of presidential term limits via constitutional reform also 
stymies the ambitions of any potential successors to Chavez, 
who openly talks about governing for at least the next two 
 
CARACAS 00002270  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
decades. 
 
¶11. (C) How Fast Will Chavez Accelerate the Revolution? 
After winning the presidential election in 2006, Chavez 
reshuffled his cabinet, announced his decision to close the 
only independent free-to-air broadcast network, moved to 
expropriate the largest telecommunications company, the 
electricity sector, and demanded government-majority stakes 
in the mixed associations with international oil companies. 
He also announced five "motors" of a "socialist revolution," 
including his intention to make sweeping constitutional 
changes.  He has moved forward in all of these areas.  Chavez 
has already declared his intention to pass 100 laws in the 
wake of a referendum victory and to "accelerate the 
revolution."  Chavez supporters have openly voiced the need 
to close Globovision, the most vocal opposition network on 
cable TV.  The National Assembly gave Chavez the authority to 
issue decree-laws in 12 broadly defined areas until the 
summer of 2008, so Chavez has wide powers to legislate 
changes consistent with the sweeping, constitutional changes. 
 We expect he will move quickly to do so. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The "No" vote campaign has at least temporarily 
revived opposition to President Chavez's grand plan to 
transform Venezuelan society.  This may have induced a 
certain nervousness in the Chavista ranks, but, if the "Yes" 
vote wins, it will probably not do much to inhibit Chavez's 
move to consolidate his Bolivarian revolution - especially if 
opposition activism fades quickly following the referendum. 
In the event of a surprising "No" victory, Chavez may opt to 
employ his power to rule by decree to deepen aspects of the 
revolution. 
 
DUDDY