VZCZCXRO9002
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0589/01 3331503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291503Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7909
INFO RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANJUL 000589 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PHUM PINR SOCI GA
SUBJECT: ETHNICITY IN THE GAMBIA:  THE RISE OF THE JOLAS 
 
BANJUL 00000589  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  The Gambia is lauded by its government, people, and 
visitors for its ethnic diversity and the apparent harmony among its 
many tribes.  The lack of civil conflict along ethnic lines in an 
often-troubled region is prized by Gambians.  Freedom from tribalism 
is also touted at the political level as officials from different 
backgrounds work together, publicly eschewing ethnic ties under the 
banner of unified Gambian identity.  However, the years of the 
Jammeh regime have witnessed the decline in political power of the 
country's largest tribe, the Mandinkas, who have historically held 
the majority of high-level positions in the GOTG and other key 
institutions, while President Jammeh's tribe, the Jolas, have gained 
both political and economic clout.  The rise in the Jolas' 
socioeconomic status may indicate a significant shift in power, as 
Mandinkas are no longer represented proportionately in top 
government, security, and media posts.  This has raised concern for 
the future among some observers of the transition.  END SUMMARY 
 
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ETHNIC BREAKDOWN 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  According to 2003 census data, the Mandinka tribe is the 
largest ethnic group in The Gambia, approximately 42 percent of the 
population of approximately 1.5 million.  The Fula and Wolof tribes 
constitute 18 and 16 percent respectively, followed by the Jola (10 
percent), Serahuli (nine percent), and smaller tribes such as the 
Sererr, Manjago, and Aku.  The Gambia is also home to non-African 
and non-Gambian residents, including an economically prominent 
Lebanese minority, estimated to be at least 3,500, many of whom have 
been in The Gambia and West Africa for generations.  Among resident 
Africa expatriates, Senegalese are the largest group, numbering 
several hundred thousand, and constitute much of the skilled labor 
in the country.  The Senegalese are largely either Wolof or Jola, 
but also represent other tribes.  Other notable African expatriates 
with economic clout include, inter alia, Mauritanians, Nigerians, 
Guineans, Sierra Leoneans, and Liberians, each community numbering 
5,000 or more.  Frequent intermarriage among ethnic and national 
groups tends to blur such distinctions. 
 
¶3.  (U)  While members of all ethnic groups are found in all walks 
of life, particularly farming, certain occupations do tend to be 
dominated by particular tribes.  Excluding Lebanese domination of 
the business community here, Fulas generally control the retail 
trade sector, while Wolofs and Serahulis own the majority of large 
businesses.  Wolofs and Mandinkas make up the bulk of the civil 
service, while Jolas constitute the majority of unskilled laborers 
(e.g. household help) and dominate the fishing industry.  All of the 
ethnic groups are represented in the security forces, but Jolas and 
Manjagos are becoming more dominant within these services. 
 
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SHIFTS IN POWER 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The GOTG traditionally has been dominated by Mandinkas, 
particularly during the Jawara regime, which began when The Gambia 
gained independence in 1965 and ended in 1994.  Jawara, a Mandinka, 
was careful in composing his cabinet and ensuring both ethnic groups 
and geographic regions were fairly represented, according to a 
source who worked in his administration.  Since Jammeh came to power 
in 1994, Mandinkas gradually have been edged out of key roles in the 
government and security forces, and are no longer represented 
proportionally in the higher echelons of the GOTG.  There are now 
very few Mandinkas in key central government roles and institutions. 
 Of the 18 Cabinet positions only three are currently filled by 
Mandinkas.  Six positions are filled by Jolas (including the 
president), six by Wolofs, and one each by a Fula, Creole, and 
mixed-ethnicity member.  However, National Assembly Members 
(parliamentarians) representing the 48 constituencies throughout the 
country tend to come from the majority ethnic group in each voting 
district.  Of the five regions in The Gambia, the Western Region is 
predominantly Mandinka and Jola; the Lower River Region is 
predominantly Mandinka; the Central River Region is a mixture of 
Wolof, Fula, and Mandinka tribes in relatively equal proportions; 
the Upper River Region is made up of Mandinka, Fula, and Serahuli 
tribes; and the North Bank Region is largely Mandinka. 
 
----------------------------------- 
JOLAS: GROWING IN STATUS AND NUMBER 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  The Jola tribe has traditionally been perceived as 
less-educated with lower social status than other groups.  As a 
Jola, President Jammeh has on several occasions publicly made 
reference to the need for Jolas to educate themselves.  Since his 
1994 takeover, the Jolas have, on the whole, risen in both social 
and economic status.  A series of reports released in 2006 based on 
 
BANJUL 00000589  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the Integrated Household Survey (IHS), conducted by the Gambian 
Bureau of Statistics from 2003 to 2004, reveal that since Jammeh's 
takeover, Jolas have taken the lead among ethnic groups in terms of 
both per capita annual total consumption and living standards (a 
World Bank measurement), and are among the groups least likely to 
suffer from poverty.  According to the data, the mean per capita 
annual consumption for Jolas was nearly 14,000 dalasi in 2003 (USD 
667 at the current exchange rate), twice that of Mandinkas and Fulas 
and significantly higher than the Wolof group and those classified 
as "others."  The mean per capita living standard for Jolas was 
estimated at almost 13,000 dalasi (USD 619), an amount that is 
slightly higher than that of the Serahuli and Sererr groups and is 
significantly higher than that of the Fula, Mandinka, Wolof, and 
"other" groups.  The study also revealed that Jolas had the lowest 
incidence of poverty with an estimated rate of 37 percent, compared 
to 67 percent for Mandinkas, 66 percent for Fulas, 59 percent for 
"others," and 58 percent for the Wolof, based on the upper poverty 
line.  It is possible, of course, that a small group of wealthy 
Jolas (the President's inner circle) cause the survey indicators to 
rise, as the IHS analysts themselves admit in their report.  This 
signifies a dramatic shift in socioeconomic status, complemented by 
the growing number of Jolas filling high-ranking positions in the 
GOTG and security forces 
 
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POPULATION BOOM 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In a meeting with Pol/Econoff, Embassy contacts who work 
for a regional peace-building NGO recalled that a few years ago, 
Jolas made up little more than five percent of the population, half 
of the current estimate.  The contacts suggested the source of the 
increase is immigration from the Casamance, the southern Senegalese 
region where Jolas are the majority tribe.  It borders the Fonis, a 
group of five Gambian districts that is traditionally home to the 
Jolas.  This theory was echoed by other knowledgeable sources, and 
seems to be consistent with data from a report issued by the GOTG's 
Central Statistics Department based on the 2003 census.  This report 
shows higher than average growth from 1993 to 2003 in four of the 
five Foni districts: 34 percent in Foni Brefet, 40 percent in Foni 
Bintang Karanai, 58 percent in Foni Kansala, and 32 percent in Foni 
Bondali, as opposed to 31 percent nationwide.  This level of growth 
was matched only by the more urban divisions in the west of the 
country. 
 
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IDENTITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Asked whether the Jolas' rise in prosperity and 
prominence was affecting ethnic harmony throughout The Gambia, NGO 
contacts felt that for now, the rise of the Jolas was important only 
to the political elite, and not yet at the grassroots level.  Most 
Jolas, they said, have not come to terms with their tribe's 
increased status and may continue to grapple with an inferiority 
complex given their historically low social rank.  Some Jolas, due 
to their traditional roots in the Casamance border area, may also 
feel torn between Senegalese and Gambian identities, the sources 
suggested. 
 
-------------------- 
A CAUSE FOR CONCERN? 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  NGO contactsfrom the regional peace-building 
organization noed that Jammeh has on occa sion made anti-Mandinka 
comments, citing in particular a 2006 television ppearance in which 
he explained, using maps of th sub-region, how the Mandinkas were 
not historically a true tribe of The Gambia since they came from 
elsewhere in West Africa.  The contacts blamed him for "sowing the 
seeds of discord," and also mentioned a tendency for Jammeh to 
demonize the Mandinkas, who also make up a significant number of 
supporters of the opposition United Democratic Party (UDP).  They 
noted that when officials are fired from the higher levels of the 
government, security forces, and parastatals, they are often 
replaces by Jolas, and alleged that the latest batch of Gambian army 
recruits were mostly Jolas --some possibly from Senegal. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Sources noted that for now, mainly lighthearted 
stereotypes persist among the various ethnic tribes at the 
grassroots level, but Jammeh's apparent political strategy of 
appointing Jolas and other non-Mandinkas to prominent roles could 
"evolve" or "explode," given time.  Contacts pointed out that most 
of the suspects in the March 2006 aborted coup plot and the majority 
of people held in prolonged detention are Mandinkas, while few, if 
any, are Jolas.  One source noted that Jammeh does not bear all of 
the blame for ethnic posturing, as the UDP allegedly brought up the 
"Mandinka issue" during the September 2006 and January 2007 
presidential and legislative elections, and has been accused by the 
ruling party of being a Mandinka party.  There is likely lingering 
resentment by Mandinkas over the 1994 coup.  However, a prominent 
 
BANJUL 00000589  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
UDP official pointed out that if people actually voted on ethnic 
lines and the UDP were truly a Mandinka party, the UDP would have 
won both elections.  He claimed the President's Alliance for 
Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) party accuses the 
UDP of tribalism, while appointing Jola APRC stalwarts from the 
Fonis, including Jammeh's hometown of Kanilai, and the urban Western 
Division, to key security and cabinet positions.  Another source 
reiterated this sentiment, saying that other regions are no longer 
proportionately represented in the cabinet. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  These shifts in power have not gone unnoticed.  Though 
the ruling APRC has demonstrated broad support among all tribes in 
recent elections, our sense is that this support is shallow and may 
conceal discontent among many groups, though few dare voice it.  But 
the opposition parties are weak and divided, and do not currently 
represent any electoral threat to Jammeh's continued rule.  If there 
were to be change, however, some contacts hint that the future for 
Jolas in a post-Jammeh era would be precarious, particularly if the 
next leader is a Mandinka. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (SBU)  Gambians of all tribes are rightfully proud of their 
harmonious coexistence, and the tradition of intermarriage between 
ethnic as well as religious groups reinforces that tradition.  In 
this peace-loving Islamic society, little ethnic tension is apparent 
on the surface.  However, if Jammeh continues to promote the rise of 
Jola influence at the expense of other ethnic groups, one of The 
Gambia's greatest advantages may be threatened.  END COMMENT 
BACHMAN