VZCZCXRO7136
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1284/01 2961455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231455Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5825
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PBTS PREL MD
SUBJECT: MINISTER SOVA INSISTS PLAN NEEDS CLEAR DEADLINES 
 
REF: A: CHISINAU 1273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Minister for Reintegration Sova welcomed and 
supported EUR DAS Kramer's outlines of the three-point 
proposal presented in Moscow, which looks at Transnistria in 
the context of the CFE treaty, but said clear timelines must 
be established.  Sova proposed limiting to one year the 
transfer period from peacekeeping forces to civilian 
observers.  Sova questioned the idea of destroying all 
Russian munitions on site, because a lot of this material 
could more easily be removed to Russia.  On-site destruction 
could take years and lead to footdragging.  Sova proposed 
also imposing a deadline guaranteeing that the process of 
removing munitions would be over in one-two years.  End 
Summary. 
 
Clear Deadlines Necessary 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After President Voronin's early-morning meeting with 
EUR DAS David Kramer, Ambassador Kirby, and EUR/RPM Deputy 
Director Jennifer Laurendeau (ref A), Minister for 
Reintegration Vasile Sova was briefed by President Voronin's 
Political Advisor Marc Tkaciuk about the meeting and the 
USG's three-point CFE plan which Kramer had presented. 
Sova's mid-afternoon response thus reflected the results of 
preliminary GOM consultations on this proposal.  Several 
times Sova used the expression "we think," indicating that 
the suggestions he articulated, which are reported below, 
reflected consideration and input from Tkaciuk. 
 
¶3. (C) Minister Sova welcomed Kramer's proposals, supporting 
the joint goals of settling Transnistria and keeping Russia 
in CFE.  However, he said the plan required that clear terms 
of reference be set.  Sova suggested that the time period for 
transference from peacekeeping forces to civilian observers 
should be limited to one year.  OSCE observers could monitor 
the demilitarization process and winding down of the 
peacekeeping forces, but the mandate of those civilian 
observers should not last for over one year.  (Comment: When 
pressed by DAS Kramer on the time limit, Sova expressed 
flexibility.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Sova suggested that the civilian mission monitoring 
the shutdown of peacekeeping forces should not include 
Russians and Ukrainians, since they were in those forces. 
Kramer responded that he would hesitate to accept that 
suggestion, arguing that the Ukrainians could play a very 
important and useful role.  In Brussels, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Veselovsky had offered as many as 500 Ukrainian 
civilian observers.  Though this was more than would be 
needed, Kramer suggested that Ukrainian participation should 
not be ruled out.  Sova responded that Yanukovich would 
pursue narrow Ukrainian interests, as Ukraine wanted to 
snatch Transnistria for itself. 
 
Deadlines needed for Removal of Munitions 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) While fully supporting the idea of ridding Colbasna of 
all munitions, Sova said that it would not be a good idea for 
the agreement to limit the options to on-site destruction, as 
a lot of the material could be removed to Russia.  With the 
understanding that there are 22,000 tons of munitions there, 
Sova said on-site destruction could take many years, and lead 
to a lot of foot dragging.  Sova suggestion that the first 
step would have to be sending observers to see what is 
actually there.  In terms of timelines, even destroying a 
hundred missiles a day could take a hundred years to complete 
the process.  Thus it was critical that the agreement include 
a guarantee that the process be completed in one-two years. 
 
¶6. (C)  To reinforce the necessity of guaranteed deadlines, 
Sova narrated his own historical experience.  As deputy 
minister, Sova had spent three years from 1991-1994 carrying 
out negotiations on withdrawal of munitions. An agreement was 
signed in 1994 on removal within three years, i.e., by 1997. 
It is now 2007, and that still has not been carried out. 
Hence, Sova said he fears the same would happen now, and thus 
any agreement must include a guarantee of the timeline. 
 
Next Steps on the Proposal Package 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Sova said he found the proposal's conceptual 
framework complex, but felt the proposal has practical 
possibility, as long as the timeframe issue is considered, 
and the proposal is implemented in as short a period as 
possible.  Kramer underscored that there was a window of 
opportunity now, as it would get worse if the Russians pulled 
out of CFE.  The ball is now in the Russians' court, and 
 
CHISINAU 00001284  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kramer said the U.S. is waiting to hear back from them.  The 
U.S. told Moscow that we would consult with the Moldovans and 
Georgians as well as other allies. 
 
¶8. (C) In Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin had 
suggested the possibility of renewing 5 plus 2 talks. 
Karasin had reiterated the Russian position that direct talks 
between Transnistria and Moldova could solve the problem.  He 
acknowledged that Voronin and Smirnov would not get together. 
 However, Kramer said, the problem is that when Litskai 
comes, he claims to lack full negotiating authority.  Kramer 
had told Karasin that the Russians need to urge Transnistria 
to come to the table ready for serious discussions. 
 
Dual Citizenship Law Could be Impediment to Settlement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador raised his concerns about the proposal 
in Parliament prohibiting people with dual citizenship from 
government jobs.  Though this might appear to be directed at 
people with Romanian citizenship, it would clearly hurt those 
in Transnistria with Moldovan passports, as well as those 
with Russian and Ukrainian passports.  The bill could thus 
become an impediment to a Transnistrian settlement.  Sova 
acknowledged that there were discussions on this 
controversial issue.  One suggestion was that it might apply 
only for people running for office, and then perhaps only 
that they be required to declare their second citizenship. 
The issue remains unresolved. 
 
Resolution of Issues with Romania Also Important 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (C) DAS Kramer said he was planning to go to Romania in a 
few weeks.  He urged signing the border treaty with Romania, 
and told Sova he had said the same to President Voronin and 
Foreign Minister Stratan.  With respect to the border treaty, 
everyone in Moldova says it is 95 percent done, and everyone 
in Romania says it is 95 percent done.  Kramer urged 
finishing that last 5 percent and signing the border treaty. 
Kramer had checked with the Romanians, and said that they are 
not linking the border treaty with the political treaty, and 
are willing to move ahead independently with signing the 
border treaty.  Sova suggested that Moldova wants the border 
treaty only in conjunction with the political treaty.  Kramer 
counseled dropping that position, and seizing victory where 
you can, as having a border treaty would pave the way for 
reaching a political treaty.  Kramer urged not letting one 
become hostage to the other.  Reaching this accord would be 
good for Moldova's standing with the EU.  Sova said he would 
like to see something signed with the Romanians by the end of 
the year. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Sova's addition of timeframe requirements should be 
considered as part of Moldova's official response to the 
proposals effecting Transnistria and Russian continued 
participation in CFE -- and a reasonable, if not unexpected, 
request.  His own experience of having already negotiated an 
agreement on withdrawal of Russian munitions that remained 
unfulfilled speaks to the need for guarantees on any 
agreement that might be reached in the future. 
LINDEN