VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCL #0207/01 2991630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261630Z OCT 07
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7869
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 8117
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2939
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0821
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0321
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3753
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 2297
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 8118
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2062
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0605

C O N F I D E N T I A L CASABLANCA 000207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA/NAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017 
TAGS: MO PGOV PINR PHUM
SUBJECT: CASABLANCA: POST-ELECTION TALK OF THE TOWN 
 
 
Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas C. Greene for Reasons 1.4 
(b), (d). 
 
REF: RABAT 01617 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: Casablanca, with its diverse population, 
represents a cross-section of Morocco and reactions here to the 
recent elections and formation of a new government are revealing. 
While voter turnout across the country was only 37 percent, it was an 
embarrassing 27 percent in Casablanca.  Casablancans' lack of trust 
in the system, charges of widespread corruption and poor management, 
or simple disinterest or confusion - all combined to keep almost 
three quarters of voters away from the polls. 
 
¶2.  (C) The appointment of the new Prime Minister, Abbas El-Fassi, 
was a disappointment to most Casablancans.   However, while there is 
a general lack of confidence in the new Prime Minister, the verdict 
is still out on the 33 new members of his government.  Of even 
greater interest in Casablanca, however, is the fact that the party 
that led Casablanca in popular votes and the number of seats  won in 
parliament, the Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD),was 
excluded from participation in the government.  Many Casablancans, 
whether pro-PJD or anti-PJD, would like to see what the party can do. 
 Many also believe that the PJD may very well be given the chance in 
the 2009 municipal elections -- if the government remains neutral. 
 End Summary 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Transparent Democratic Elections - Really? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) For the September 7, 2007, parliamentary elections only 37 
percent of registered Moroccan voters bothered to show up at the 
polls, and an even lower 27 percent participated in Greater 
Casablanca.  In a city of nearly six million residents, boasting a 
population that includes some of the richest and poorest in the 
country, educated and illiterate, urban dwellers and recent rural 
migrants, the statement was clear, according to many Casablancans we 
have spoken with: "we don't trust the system and we don't care." 
Numerous Casablancan contacts quietly scoffed at praise from abroad 
applauding Morocco's electoral success. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) That said, most Casablancans we talked with acknowledged 
improvement, even while expressing serious doubts.  "Maybe this 
election day was cleaner than before," one young caf customer told 
us, "but what about before the day of the elections, were people 
watching [for corruption] before?" "You saw what happened, Istiqlal 
won," another customer chimed in. "They have done this before and 
have the best system for buying votes."  However, while many were 
skeptical of claims of a "clean" election, the majority of 
Casablancans we spoke with readily admitted that there appeared to be 
a concerted and public effort on the part of the government to curb 
corruption in the elections, a noted change from the past.  But, when 
asked if he thought the elections were "democratic," one patron 
chuckled and walked away. 
 
¶5.  (C) A senior PJD member we met with over "iftar" during Ramadan 
spoke frankly about his party's views.  Bribes and corruption were 
widespread, in advance of the elections, he charged.  Many parties 
paid voters to come out and vote for them.  Yes, the government had 
taken some widely-publicized steps to crack down on corruption in the 
months in advance of the elections, but during election week, the 
government was a "study in neutrality" on corrupt practices by 
parties. Second, management of the elections was poor.  Our contact 
cited many citizens who had registered, but whose names were not on 
the voters lists when election day came (and who therefore were not 
allowed to vote).  "My mother, for example," he exclaimed.  Third, 
re-districting ("Texas-style," he smiled) had been effectively 
implemented by the government in the period before the elections to 
be certain that in key areas, the party with the most votes would not 
win the most seats.  The clear goal of the King, in sanctioning this 
effort, was to be sure that no one party could win big - that the 
parliament would necessarily be composed of many parties, with no one 
able to exert undue influence. 
 
---------------- 
X Marks the Vote 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Despite efforts by the government to run a cleaner election 
and encourage voter participation, the vast majority of Casablancans 
simply did not vote.  On election night, poloff dinned with a group 
of ten well- educated Moroccan business people.  The only one of the 
ten who voted was a woman from a political family in Rabat with a PhD 
from Duke University.   The nearly unanimous reason for abstention by 
the others present was the unwavering certainty that their votes were 
irrelevant.  When asked if they were concerned about the PJD 
apparently wining a majority of the popular vote in Casablanca, this 
very liberal assemblage dismissed any concern about the possibility 
of an Islamist government.  Expressing support for democracy up to a 
point, they noted that "the king would never let things get out of 
hand."  Many of this small class of affluent young Casablancans put 
their complete trust in the 44 year-old monarch and have little 
concern that their comfortable situation will deteriorate as long as 
the King controls all key decisions in the country. 
 
¶7.  On the other end of the spectrum, we spoke to a number of 
residents from some of the most impoverished communities in 
Casablanca who did and did not participate in elections.  None were 
very well informed about parties or candidates.  "I just went in and 
made my "x" but I don't know any of the candidates," chuckled a tiny 
old man working as a caretaker in one of Casablanca's middle class 
neighborhoods.  "I gave somebody a job for a few years" he smiled. 
Many people with whom we spoke did not vote because of unfamiliarity 
with the candidates or confusion about the vast number of party 
symbols.  Some we met voted for the PJD, explaining that it was the 
only non-corrupt party and the only one which was visible throughout 
the year in the dilapidated neighborhoods.  One young recent high 
school graduate we spoke to from Sidi Moumen wanted to participate 
but did not have an idea for whom to vote.  "I like horses" he joked 
"so I marked the horse (the symbol for the Constitutional Union 
Party)." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Disappointment with the PM and MPs 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  When the King appointed Abbas El-Fassi Prime Minister there 
was an audible groan from the Casablancans who were paying attention. 
 In his role as Minister of Labor, El-Fassi promoted - presumably 
unknowingly - the bogus ploy of an Emirati company to hire 30,000 
Moroccans in 2002, bilking Moroccan's out of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.  Moroccans have not forgotten this fiasco, and view it as an 
indication of El-Fassi's incompetence (reftel).  To boot, El-Fassi 
served as Ambassador to France from 1990-1994, during a period one 
contact deemed one of the "worst in Moroccan-French relations." 
Recently, many took it as a grim sign that the new Prime Minister 
failed to propose a complete cabinet by the October 12 deadline set 
by the king. 
 
¶9. (C)  To our surprise, even some strong advocates for democratic 
and transparent change came out against the King's decision to 
appoint El-Fassi despite the fact that as Secretary General of the 
winning party he was the obvious choice.  Younes Naoumi, president of 
Association Action Jeunesse, a Casablanca-based NGO that received 
MEPI funding for a youth election program, was very outspoken in his 
dissatisfaction with the new PM.  While Naoumi admitted that, yes, 
appointing the head of the winning party was democratically the 
proper measure, he couldn't help feeling like it was "taking a step 
backwards."  Naoumi, however, is waiting for what he calls the real 
test, local elections in 2009. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In the short period since the palace announced the new 
government on October 15, some Casablancans have reacted with further 
cynicism.  One local professional told poloff that she and her 
colleagues got together the morning after the announcement to discuss 
the appointments.  They even consulted the new ministers' biographies 
on the internet since so many names were unfamiliar.  "It's a 
disaster," she said. "So many of these people have no experience at 
all or they are just the same old men."   Others we spoke to echoed 
her feelings of disappointment, however, sometimes with the hopeful 
caveat that even though the PM was from the old school, there was 
still a chance for positive movement if he made some sweeping 
changes. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Others, nevertheless, seemed more than willing to take a 
wait and see approach.  Many of the newly appointed technocrats, they 
said, could provide the energy needed to revive the parliament.  Even 
so, there is a fear from some corners that the new ministers" may 
find themselves facing roadblocks to changes they propose.  By far 
the majority of Casablancans we spoke with, however, were simply 
uninterested in the workings of the government in Rabat. 
 
------------------- 
What about the PJD? 
------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The Islamist PJD did well in the popular vote  throughout 
the country, winning the majority, with 503,396 votes against new 
ruling party Istiqlal's 494,256.  In Casablanca, PJD candidates won 
at least one seat in nearly every district.  The only exception was 
of the affluent Anfa neighborhood, where oddly enough, another 
candidate from the Islamist Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV) won 
a seat.  As noted above, many believe nationwide redistricting, 
completed only months before the elections, was responsible for the 
PJD coming up short in the number of seats the party won throughout 
the country.  In Casablanca, this was almost certainly the case.  The 
PJD's image of honesty and concern resonates here not only in the 
poorer neighborhoods but with many middle class city dwellers who see 
the PJD as the only party against corruption. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Although there was a general consensus on why the PJD did 
so well in the city, even the most stalwart secular liberals seemed 
unconcerned.  "I would have loved to see them in the government just 
to screw up," said a U.S.-educated Moroccan shop owner in an upscale 
neighborhood.  The sentiment is echoed by many in Casablanca who 
believe that as long as the PJD remains in opposition, they will 
remain the underdog heroes who, in the eyes of many, could save the 
country if only given a chance.  "Let them show what they can do," is 
a statement often heard in cafes around the city from both sides of 
the fence.  Overall, however, very few Casablancans see any changes 
ahead regarding their real concerns -- jobs, increasing food prices 
and housing -- no matter who is in power.  "Nothing will change with 
the new government" is a refrain we often hear. 
 
¶14.  (C) Our senior PJD contact put it differently.  The regime is 
hurting itself, he said, by keeping the PJD out of the government. 
The PJD is the vehicle for Islamist sentiment and emotion in the 
country, and to the extent those who hold Islamist views are blocked 
from participation in government, then there will be problems down 
the road.  The PJD in opposition does not serve the interests of 
long-term stability in Morocco - an interest which the PJD shares 
with the regime, he claimed. 
 
----------------------- 
Local Elections in 2009 
----------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  According to Lahcen Haddad, national board member of the 
Popular Movement Party, "redistricting worked well for the government 
in the national elections, but wait until 2009."  The PJD could win 
big in the local elections if there is no government interference, he 
predicted.  Many Casablancans share that view, and believe that the 
2009 local elections may be a crossroads for the city.  Some here 
feel that if the GOM is truly committed to transparent democratic 
elections, it must remain on the sidelines. Moreover, they say that 
for the general population to regain faith in what they perceive to 
be a  corrupt system, the  oversight of the 2007 elections must be 
improved upon. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Naoumi, who believes that local elections provide the only 
opportunity for a real democratic exercise under the current system, 
also thinks the PJD will do well in local elections.  "If they win" 
he says, "we will have to see what they do in office."  Naoumi, who 
is considering a run in his district in 2009, is an independent youth 
activist who has much direct knowledge of the PDJ.  "They know how to 
reach out to the people" Naoumi told poloff.  He related a story 
about a recent concert, organized by his NGO, to promote youth 
participation in the parliamentary elections.  "I sent invitations to 
the youth organizers of five leading parties" he said, "I received 
one regret from the PPS and a phone call from the office of the PJD's 
Secretary General saying the youth director would attend. He was 
 
SIPDIS 
there talking to people.  That means something."  No other party 
representatives attended the event. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) There is a great deal of cynicism and apathy about the 
current political situation among many of those we talk with here. 
Suggestions that the new government will usher in positive changes 
are met with apprehension at best and outright dismissal at worst. 
But the focus here is on other issues: the high level of 
unemployment, the increases in the price of commodities, and the 
increase in crime in the city's neighborhoods.  If, as most doubt, 
the new government can make some improvements in the economic and 
security situation before the municipal elections, there may be 
stronger support for members of the current government's parties. 
If, however, the situation remains the same or deteriorates, the door 
will be left wide open for a PJD landslide.  Casablancans of 
different strips seem more than willing to give the Islamist party 
the opportunity to make a difference. End Comment. 
 
GREENE