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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003192 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
ALSO FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/ACE 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU AND W. BALKANS:  CARROTS NOT ALWAYS EFFECTIVE; 
STICKS LARGELY UNUSED 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3120 
 
Classified By: Acting POL Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
- - - - - 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) The EU has repeatedly reaffirmed the "European 
vocation" of the countries in the Western Balkans.  It is 
committed to membership for all countries in the region and 
the Commission plans to contribute almost USD two billion 
over 2007-09 to help prepare them for eventual membership. 
While the W. Balkans will be one of the upcoming Slovenian 
Presidency's priorities, we are not sanguine that it will 
have great achievements in the region -- much like the 
Austrian Presidency (2006), other than to secure an ESDP 
mission in Kosovo.  The EU has little strategy on containing 
fallout from Kosovo final status in Serbia.  On BiH, the EU 
is realizing that it may have to play harder ball given that 
the promise of a Stabilization and Association (SAA) 
Agreement has not produced police reform there. 
Decision-makers in London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin likely 
will continue to have more influence over events in the 
region than those in Lisbon and Ljubljana.  Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn will continue strongly to support the 
accession process for the region, with HR Solana helping 
channel member state thinking on Serbia, BiH, and Kosovo. 
(Reftel addressed the EU and Kosovo; EU relations with 
Croatia are not handled by EU officials covering the W. 
Balkans.)  End Summary 
 
Slovenian Mission:  W. Balkans a Top Priority 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) Both the Slovenian Mission's W. Balkans expert and 
the Slovenian serving as BiH desk officer in the Council 
Secretariat (who will serve as the Slovenian Presidency's 
 
SIPDIS 
coordinator with the Council Secretariat) told us recently 
that the W. Balkans will be one of the top priorities of the 
Slovenian Presidency.  Given the pace of events, maintaining 
EU unity over post-status Kosovo is of paramount importance, 
both stressed.  Launching an ESDP mission in Kosovo, even 
without a new UNSCR (both said neither the U.S.-EU-Russia 
Troika nor the UNSC would produce a last-minute negotiated 
settlement) will be "messy" given some member states' 
questions over legal interpretations of a mandate. 
Nevertheless, a mission "almost certainly" will be launched, 
in part because member states recognize that the EU's 
credibility will be damaged absent such a mission. 
 
A Priority, but Little Strategy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) Asked about Slovenia's and the EU's strategy for 
strengthening Serbia's and BiH's ties to the EU, the 
Slovenian Mission rep noted that the EU's leverage is not 
terribly strong.  The Commission will continue its plans to 
support the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) in both 
countries (contributing approximately USD 800 million in 
Serbia and USD 316 million in BiH from 2007 to 09). 
According to our contact, while Slovenia (reportedly 
supported by Austria, Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Greece) would like 
the EU to take a more "flexible" approach on police reform in 
BiH and on ICTY conditionality in Serbia in order to proceed 
with the SAA processes in both countries, other member 
states, particularly Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg, oppose any loosening of EU conditionality.  The 
UK and France, previously supporters of strict conditionality 
are softening somewhat, our contact added.  He stressed that 
the Presidency, as honest broker, will have to try to find 
common ground between the hard-line camp and those wanting to 
ease the SAA process for Belgrade and Sarajevo. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) The Slovenian Council Secretariat contact had a 
different perspective.  In her view, the EU has stressed 
publicly and at length the links between police reform in BiH 
and full Serbian cooperation with ICTY with signing an SAA. 
For the EU to weaken these links now for an "immediate goal" 
would undermine the EU's credibility with both countries over 
the long term, she reasoned. 
 
Serbia:  How to contain Fallout from Kosovo 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) While officially the accession process for Serbia 
is not related to Kosovo, many contacts have privately 
confirmed that several member states will block progress if 
 
BRUSSELS 00003192  002 OF 003 
 
 
Serbia acts "aggressively" on post-status Kosovo.  All 
predict that Belgrade will protest vociferously after status 
is finalized.  Our contacts are divided over what, if any, 
concrete actions Belgrade will take. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) A few predict that Belgrade will interrupt energy 
supplies.  Others note that the Serbian Radical Party and 
hard-liners within the military will support paramilitary 
activity in northern Kosovo.  A plurality, however, believe 
Serbia will neither take nor tolerate any such action, and 
therefore the accession process can continue. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) Asked how ICTY cooperation factors into the 
equation, one contact noted that the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia is ready to be 
initialed and could even be signed in 2007 if Belgrade 
demonstrated significant progress leading to the arrest of 
Mladic.  Even without this, however, the EU believes 
Belgrade will continue to promulgate legislation and 
implement reforms as outlined in the SAA, so as not to lose 
too much time in the process and with the hope that Mladic 
eventually will be seized and an SAA will be signed. 
 
Bosnia-and-Herzegovina:  How could they refuse Police Reform? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) Many EU and member state officials seemed actually 
shocked that the Bosniak and Republika Srpska leadership 
continued to block police reform despite HR/EUSR Lajcak's 
last-ditch efforts in late September.  One Council 
Secretariat official working on BiH told us recently that the 
 
SIPDIS 
Commission and several member state officials believed the 
BiH leaders would compromise at the last moment, given the 
tremendous importance of signing an SAA with the EU.  The 
fact that this "carrot" did not bend the BiH leaders' 
political will should serve as a wake-up call, particularly 
to the Commission, on the tough nature of Balkan politicians 
and their unwillingness to be kowtowed by EU bureaucrats. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF)  All of our contacts noted that the Commission is 
extremely hesitant to use its funding (consolidated in the 
"Instrument for Pre-Accession" -- IPA, begun this year) for 
strictly political ends.  Rather, the IPA's raison d'etre is 
to promote infrastructure projects, enhance a country's 
administrative capacity through training and exchanges, and 
support freer markets, not to pressure officials in the 
region to accept EU political views.  Asked about possible 
visa restrictions on intransigent BiH officials, one Council 
Secretariat contact told us that the EU has not yet 
 
SIPDIS 
considered this option, with some member states likely to 
oppose its use based on "intransigence" rather than human 
rights abuses or criminal activity.  HR Solana, she noted, 
has only in the last few weeks devoted attention to BiH.  His 
office reportedly has increased the demand for briefing 
papers on BiH dramatically as a result. 
 
Macedonia:  Not Going Well 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) The Slovenian Mission has told us that the 
lackluster pace of reforms and continued problems in 
genuinely integrating the ethnic Albanian parties into 
collaborative decision-making on the national level combine 
to make Macedonia a problem case for the EU -- officially it 
is a candidate country, but without a date for accession 
negotiations to begin.  Several of our contacts told us 
earlier this year that the EU might give Macedonia a date in 
2008 to begin negotiations.  Our contacts are less optimistic 
lately.  They do not rule out giving a date next year, but 
stress that Macedonia must "get its act together" and 
demonstrate greater political maturity to overcome resistance 
from some member states.  Macedonia's position on Kosovo has 
helped in this regard, but, in the view of one Council 
Secretariat official, Skopje's "provocations" of Greece are 
 
SIPDIS 
not helping its case.  None of our contacts would reveal 
where Greece is coming down on granting a date for accession 
negotiations with Skopje, with all saying "officially" that 
NATO deliberations over a potential membership invitation are 
not affecting EU discussions. 
 
Albania:  Making slow but steady Progress 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C/NF) The EU appears satisfied and even a bit surprised 
that Albania's accession process is moving forward, albeit 
slowly.  The EU remains concerned about crime, corruption, 
and administrative capacity in Albania, but sees recent 
elections there as a sign that the country is slowly moving 
 
BRUSSELS 00003192  003 OF 003 
 
 
in the right direction. 
 
 
Montenegro:  A Relative Success Story 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C/NF) Given its smaller size and relatively good 
economic policies, Montenegro may advance more quickly in 
implementing its SAA commitments, according to a Commission 
contact.  Its use of the Euro must be addressed (but one 
contact predicted that the EU ultimately will not force 
Montenegro to adopt a new currency), and as with Albania, the 
EU has serious concerns about organized crime.  Several 
contacts voiced the hope that Montenegro's expected progress 
with its SAA would "shame" BiH and Serbia to overcome its 
problems and allow their respective SAAs to be signed. 
 
The Broader EU Context 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C/NF) The EU has a less than stellar record in 
leveraging the "carrot" of membership to obtain concrete 
political results in the region.  Brussels generally remains 
loathe to use "sticks" to promote immediate goals in the 
region.  Rather, the EU, particularly the Commission, views 
the accession process as a necessarily multi-year endeavor in 
building a strong foundation for these countries' "European 
identity."  Increased skepticism among the European public 
regarding enlargement -- "enlargement fatigue" -- and the 
general consensus in Brussels that Romania and Bulgaria were 
not ready for accession in 2007, are contributing to a 
stricter interpretation by the Commission of implementation 
of SAA commitments.  Two of Enlargement Commissioner Rehn's 
advisors have told us that the EU wants to address problem 
areas in candidate and aspirant countries earlier, rather 
than later, to avoid having to take the largely political 
decision to admit not-quite-ready candidates, as was the case 
with Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶14.  (C/NF) The last stage of the Portuguese Presidency and 
the first few months of the Slovenian Presidency will be full 
of challenges:  maintaining EU unity on Kosovo while securing 
agreement to launch the ESDP Mission, offering support to 
HR/EUSR Lajcak in BiH while maintaining some level of "local 
ownership" in BiH, containing damage to the EU's relationship 
with Serbia in light of final status for Kosovo while keeping 
the pressure on Belgrade to deliver Mladic to The Hague, 
prodding the Macedonian leadership to make and implement 
genuine political reforms, and maintaining credibility with 
the European public for enlargement in general. 
 
¶15.  (C/NF) From what we have seen, the EU, the Portuguese 
Presidency, and the incoming Slovenian Presidency have little 
in the way of a coherent strategy to address these issues, 
other than to reiterate the "European vocation" of the 
countries of the region.  Visa facilitation and IPA 
assistance are not enough to ensure that the region continues 
on its European path.  The key to taking critical decisions 
regarding the Western Balkans remains in key member state 
capitals, not Brussels.  Rehn will remain a strong champion 
of membership for the countries in the region; Solana is the 
official, however, who can help move member states on 
critical issues, such as the ESDP mission in Kosovo and 
confronting obstructionists in BiH.  If the draft EU Reform 
Treaty is ratified, the High Rep position will be even more 
capable of moving the EU in the right direction in the 
region, given the marriage of his responsibilities with 
Commission financial resources. 
GRAY 
.