VZCZCXRO4699
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3617/01 3042032
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 312032Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4146
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2037 
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS: PKK IS PRETEXT FOR DEEPER TURKISH AIMS 
 
Classified By: Classified By Jess Baily, Regional Coordinator for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message. 
 
SUMMARY 
--------------- 
 
¶1. (S)  Conversations with senior Kurdish leaders indicate 
that they view Turkey's recent public statements and military 
action against the PKK as a pretext to forward Turkey's 
"true" strategic goals of undermining the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), delaying a referendum vote on Article 140, 
and creating fissures between the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).  They point 
to the disrespectful treatment of Kurdish delegates to recent 
talks in Ankara, the KRG's continued willingness to engage in 
talks, public statements labeling PKK actions "illegal," 
ceasefire pronouncements, and a new KRG-inter-ministerial 
security committee as evidence that the Kurds are serious 
about finding a solution to the PKK issue.  KRG officials see 
a critical role for the United States in any resolution 
scenario, but fear the possibility the U.S. would "sacrifice 
the Kurds" to broader regional interests.  In order to get 
the KRG to engage seriously in any resolution effort and to 
build trust that Turkey has no inherent anti-Kurdish agenda, 
a Turkish willingness to engage with the KRG as a 
constitutionally-empowered entity and a statement indicating 
Turkey's respect of Iraq's constitutional arrangements would 
go a long way. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The following report crystallizes recent 
conversations RRT Erbil staff has had with KRG officials 
listed below, together with official public statements and 
public media commentary.  Officials include:  Falah Bakir, 
KRG Director of Foreign Relations; Fuad Hussein, President 
Barzani,s Chief of Staff; Kemal Kerkuki, Deputy Speaker of 
the Kurdish National Assembly; Salahuddin Bahauddin, 
Kurdistan Islamic Union General Secretary; KRG Minister of 
State for Peshmerga, Jafar Mustafa Ali (PUK); and MG Aziz 
Weysi, head of the Peshmerga Zervani (KDP Intelligence). 
 
 
TURKISH FEAR AND LOATHING DRIVES PKK HUNT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S)  Public and private Kurdish reactions to the recent 
increased tensions with Turkey over the PKK reveal broad 
themes and concerns that focus on the manifest mistrust and 
ill-will between the Kurds and Turkey.  Seemingly no one in 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and few average Kurds 
believe that recent Turkish actions are fundamentally about 
eliminating the PKK's ability to strike from northern Iraq. 
Senior Kurdish political and security officials have 
privately shared their belief that the PKK is simply a 
convenient, high-profile pretext for Turkey's aim to 
undermine and destabilize the KRG.  Public commentary and 
editorials have made similar claims.  They point to 
"unacceptable insults" leveled by the Turkish military via 
the press against KRG President Massoud Barzani, the recent 
talks in Ankara at which KRG leaders were treated 
disrespectfully, and Turkey's purported "terrorist list," 
which includes senior Kurdish political figures including 
President Barzani,s son and Iraqi Council of Representatives 
member Mahmoud Othman.  This is all evidence, Kurdish leaders 
claim, that exposes Turkey's cynicism and lack of good faith 
toward real resolution of the PKK problem and lays bare 
Ankara's fear and mistrust of a prosperous, secure, 
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. 
 
 
DELAYING ARTICLE 140 POSSIBLE MOTIVE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (S)  Kurds also liberally point to Article 140 as a 
probable motive for Turkey's growing calls for military 
action against the PKK.  Many believe that the GOT's real 
interest lies in delaying the scheduled referendum on the 
status of Kirkuk until such time as a more favorable 
advantage can be gained for Turkey's interests.  The KRG, for 
its part, has responded by working to shore up support among 
Kirkuk's Arabs to counter any Turkish incursion. 
Additionally, some in the Kurdish political class believe 
that the Turkish government's potshots against President 
Barzani in the Turkish press are an attempt to check the 
power of Barzani,s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) vis a 
vis Iraqi President Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) -- possibly in an attempt to keep the KRG fractured, 
off-balance, and ineffective. 
 
 
USG KEY TO ANY RESOLUTION 
------------------------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00003617  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (S)  Many in the Kurdish political and security leadership 
class believe the United States is the only effective broker 
to push a resolution.  The KRG is concerned about perceived 
USG impatience with its position, but still sees the United 
States as critical in any resolution scenario.  Some have 
asked whether the United States would "sacrifice the Kurds" 
to broader strategic interests as they feel was done in the 
Algiers Accords of 1975. 
 
 
WHAT THE KURDS BELIEVE THEY'RE DOING RIGHT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (S)  Despite being stung by the recent slights in Ankara, 
the Kurdish leadership has signaled that it is still prepared 
to engage diplomatically on the PKK issue but argues that its 
resources are limited.  Kurdish leaders have stressed that 
any Kurd-on-Kurd violence would not be part of any solution 
-- dismissing any KRG military option against the PKK.  Aside 
from the inability (and unwillingness) of Peshmerga forces to 
rout the PKK from their mountain redoubts, KRG officials are 
also quick to remind people that the PKK continues to be 
viewed by Kurds as the protector of millions of ethnic Kurds 
in Turkey.  While KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani and President 
Barzani have publicly called PKK attacks on the Turkish 
military and emplacements on the border "illegal," there is 
little likelihood that any KRG leader will tag the PKK as 
terrorists.  Kurdish officials have distanced themselves by 
insisting that the conflict is between the PKK and Turkey; 
have called for a peaceful solution borne out of diplomacy 
and negotiation; and have officially banned anti-Turkish 
demonstrations, while allowing small neighborhood 
demonstrations.  Kurds keep pointing to ceasefire 
announcements, overestimating the good faith derived from 
such pronouncements, particularly when they fall short of a 
call to the PKK to lay down its arms.  When confronted with 
press reports about the PKK's ability to operate and garner 
support in northern Iraq, the KRG is hard-pressed to offer 
specific actions it could take to counter the group and 
quickly reverts to discussions about long-term solutions. 
(Note:  We understand a committee chaired by PM Barzani 
including key several security officials met on October 31 
and is developing specific measures to cut off the PKK's 
ability to move and re-supply in northern Iraq.) 
 
 
WHAT COULD HELP BRING THE KRG AROUND 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (S)  COMMENT:  The KRG wants legitimacy and respect and 
has repeatedly called for dialogue.  The view among Kurds is 
that if Turkey is serious about engaging Iraqi leaders on the 
issue, it must be prepared to talk to the KRG as a 
constitutionally-empowered entity.  Expecting official and 
public GOT recognition of the KRG as a regional Iraqi entity 
would, of course, be a redline for Turkey -- but a statement 
before any new negotiations indicating that the GOT respected 
Iraq's constitution arrangements and accepting KRG 
participation in Iraqi delegations would be helpful in 
reassuring the KRG that Turkey's aim is to stop PKK attacks. 
 
BUTENIS