VZCZCXRO4592
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3615/01 3041835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311835Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4142
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS IN BAGHDAD ON THE CRISIS WITH TURKEY 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Ellen Germain for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kurdish view in Baghdad on the conflict 
with Turkey over the PKK has largely been unified and 
concentrated on several main themes.  In multiple 
conversations with Poloff since the October 20-21 PKK attack 
on Turkish soldiers, the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 
particular has asserted that the U.S. bears responsibility 
for the security of Iraq and should ensure that Turkey 
remains on its side of the border.  Many Kurds are still 
reluctant to label the PKK a terrorist organization and claim 
that the PKK issue is merely an excuse for Turkey to hinder 
Kurdish autonomy and prosperity.  Kurdish contacts also 
warned of the consequences of a Turkish Cross-Border 
Operation (CBO).  Some more liberal-minded Kurds opined that 
Barzani would only be convinced to act after a reality-check 
from the U.S.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. Bears Responsibility, Only Peaceful Solution 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (C) Baghdad-based Kurds, in particular the KDP, have 
during the past ten days tried to portray the Turkey-PKK-KRG 
issue as one for which the USG bears the primary 
responsibility.  They assert that the U.S. is responsible for 
the security of the entire country so any violation of Iraqi 
sovereignty by the Turks should be rebuffed by U.S. force. 
They continue to say that the only way to solve the PKK issue 
is through peaceful political means.  They see the only 
solution as a scenario in which the GOT issues an amnesty for 
all PKK and their sympathizers/relatives, such as those in 
the Makhmour refugee camp.  Many Kurds refuse to label the 
PKK terrorists, instead viewing them as freedom fighters and 
sympathizing with their fight against what they view as 
Turkish oppression of the Kurds in Turkey.  Kurdistan 
Alliance List deputy leader Saadi Barzinji in particular 
bristled at the suggestion the KRG officially designate the 
PKK as a terrorist organization.  One or two POL contacts 
even revealed their previous associations with the PKK and 
claimed that, were they younger they might join the PKK in 
the mountains. 
 
PKK Only an Excuse 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Most Kurds view Turkey's obsession with the PKK as 
only peripheral to the "real issue" that they feel Turkey is 
reacting to, namely Kurdish autonomy and the potential for an 
independent Kurdish state, as well as the fate of Kirkuk. 
Local KDP leaders and CoR members warned Poloff on October 30 
that Turkey would not stop with the PKK, but rather would 
occupy Iraqi Kurdistan and move as far south as Kirkuk.  They 
said the Turkish generals could not be placated no matter 
what actions were taken by the KRG.  They also warned that 
any operation in the mountains was doomed to failure.  (Note: 
most Kurds present were former peshmerga.  All offered their 
firsthand accounts of how difficult operations in the 
mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan are.  End Note). 
 
¶4.  (C) The Kurds also view the PKK issue as a power struggle 
between Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP party and the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS).  Many have said the TGS is 
enriching itself through military contracts and keeping 
itself powerful and relevant through the continued conflict 
with the PKK.  The Kurdish Deputy Director of the INIS even 
told Poloff on October 30 that the TGS has infiltrated the 
PKK and encourages them to fight in order to keep the 
conflict going. 
 
Consequences of a Turkish CBO 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Kurds on all sides have offered many dire predictions 
should the U.S. not find a way to solve this crisis. 
Independent Kurdish CoR member Mahmoud Othman and his son, 
Hiwa, who is media advisor to President Talabani, warned that 
Iran would take advantage of a Turkish CBO.  The Kurds will 
have nowhere else to turn but Iran, which has already told 
the Kurds that it would welcome them with open arms and open 
borders, the Othmans said ) a line reiterated by many 
Baghdad-based KDP and PUK members, including Talabani advisor 
Aram Yarweissi.  Should the PKK be forced out of the 
mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, the &real terrorist groups8 
such as Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda would move in, several 
Kurdish CoR members and local KDP leaders claimed. 
 
¶6.  (C) Finally, the Othmans, along with many KDP members, 
have emphasized over the past two weeks that "the Kurds are 
the U.S.,s only friend in the Middle East," and warned that 
the Kurdish public would blame the U.S. should Turkey conduct 
a CBO. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003615  002 OF 002 
 
 
Taking a Tougher Line with Barzani 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) A few non-KDP Kurds, including the Othmans, have told 
us that they understand that the U.S. is unlikely to fight 
Turkey on behalf of the KRG, but that many Kurds, including 
KRG President Massoud Barzani, believe the U.S. will defend 
Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a Turkish Cross Border 
Operation (CBO).  They argued that the U.S. must be forceful 
with Barzani and explain to him that this is not going to 
happen.  Then, they said, Barzani might reevaluate the way he 
is addressing the current crisis. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Othmans said U.S. efforts to convey the 
seriousness of the situation to Barzani have thus far failed. 
 Hiwa suggested it was time to stop using &diplomatic 
language8 and be more forceful.  According to Mahmoud, 
Barzani himself had told him that the U.S. would protect the 
Kurds from Turkey.  He also claimed that Deputy Kurdistan 
Alliance List leader Saadi Barzinji (KDP) told him October 30 
that MNF-I troops in Mosul and Kirkuk had been warned to 
prepare to move north to defend the Kurds in the event of a 
CBO. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  The intensity of the KDP message suggests a 
deep, legitimate belief in their views, namely that the Turks 
are really going after the Kurds and successful Kurdish 
autonomy, not just the PKK; and that the U.S. will defend the 
Kurdistan region.  The PUK, in particular President Talabani, 
have taken a somewhat softer line, but generally appear to be 
on the same track as the KDP.  The KIU has also fallen in 
line behind the KDP points.  Most Kurds have been reluctant 
to discuss what the KRG's (military) reaction would be should 
Turkey come across the border, preferring to return to the 
argument that the U.S. should prevent it. 
BUTENIS