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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: MILITARY OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC 
ABOUT CONGOLESE AND MONUC'S PLANS TO ATTACK LRA 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 1099 
 
     ¶B. KINSHASA 1100 
 
KAMPALA 00001482  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary 
James Swan and Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim 
Shortley discussed Congolese plans for dealing with the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Garamba National Park with 
Ugandan officials.  The meeting took place at the conclusion 
of the Tripartite Plus Commission in Kampala on September 17. 
 The Ugandan civilian and military officials expressed 
skepticism that the Congolese army and MONUC could conduct a 
successful operation against the LRA.  DAS Swan and Shortley 
pointed out that it would be important for Uganda to engage 
the Congolese military officials on the specifics of their 
plans, including the objective of an operation.  Defense 
Minister Kiyonga welcomed U.S. statements that the peace 
process could not be open-ended and was receptive to 
intensifying coordination within the Ugandan government and 
with neighboring governments.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On September 17, Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant 
Secretary James Swan, Shortley, P/E Chief, and Defense 
 
SIPDIS 
Attache met with Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga, Chief 
of Defense Forces Aronda, Chief of Military Intelligence 
Colonel Leopold Kyanda, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Director for East Africa and Ring States, Julius Kagamba on 
the heels of the Tripartite Plus ministerial meeting.  Senior 
Advisor Shortley gave a short brief of his recent travel to 
Kinshasa and meeting with President Joseph Kabila.  (Reftels) 
Shortley reported that Kabila promised that after December, 
if no progress was made on the peace talks, Kabila would tell 
the LRA that it was no longer welcome in Garamba National 
Park.  Meanwhile, MONUC was training two battalions of 
Congolese army forces to be ready in January for use in 
operations against the LRA. 
 
¶3.  (C) Defense Minister Kiyonga outlined the key points from 
SRSG Bill Swing's presentation to the Tripartite Plus 
ministers that highlighted limitations to MONUC's planned 
operations against negative forces, including the LRA.  Swing 
emphasized MONUC's limitations, including that the area of 
operation for MONUC was too large for the size of its forces. 
 He also stated that MONUC was unable to track negative 
forces, including the LRA, into heavily forested areas. 
Swing also described ongoing three-month-long "crash 
training" of Congolese army forces numbering 33 battalions. 
In addition, an airstrip at Dungu was being refurbished from 
which MONUC and FARDC operations against the LRA would be 
launched.  Kiyonga also noted that Swing claimed that MONUC 
suffered from inadequate intelligence. 
 
¶4.  (C) Shortley emphasized that the U.S. Government 
preferred that the LRA problem be resolved peacefully and 
stated that the U.S. would take an active approach to 
supporting the peace process, including pushing long-term 
priorities such as the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan 
(PRDP).  However, if the talks failed, a credible response 
would be needed and contingency plans would need to be in 
place.  Shortley told Kabila that MONUC was not pushing fast 
enough on contingency plans.  Kabila told Shortley that Congo 
would cooperate with Uganda if there were spill-over from 
operations against the LRA.  Congo would not, however, engage 
in a coordinated effort with Uganda. 
 
¶5.  (C) DAS Swan asked what would be MONUC's and/or the 
Ugandan military's primary objective in operations against 
the LRA.  Aronda and Kyanda were categorical that the Uganda 
objective would be to destroy and capture the LRA leadership. 
 However, MONUC's objective might be only to disrupt the 
LRA's ability to operate in Garamba.  Swan suggested that 
given the Congolese army's weaknesses, it might be 
unrealistic for it to defeat the LRA.  Instead, a Congolese 
operation might be more geared to disruption of LRA 
activities, force its members to flee, or persuade its 
leaders to negotiate seriously for peace.  Shortley 
recommended that the Ugandan military clarify the objective 
of the plan Congo presented at the Tripartite meeting. 
 
¶6.  (C) Shortley also said that Congolese Foreign Minister 
Mbusa and Presidential Advisor Kapanga were traveling to 
Khartoum to discuss Congo's border with Sudan and the LRA in 
addition to implementation of the Arusha agreement.  Shortley 
outlined steps the U.S. was taking to think through the 
various scenarios for the LRA leaders if they choose a 
peaceful resolution, and other steps to strengthen the 
ongoing peace process.  He solicited recommendations on the 
types of pressure that could be applied to bring the talks to 
 
KAMPALA 00001482  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
a successful conclusion. 
 
¶7.  (C) General Aronda was pessimistic that there could be a 
peaceful solution to the LRA problem.  In his view, the LRA 
continued to violate the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. 
The LRA had not complied with anything it had agreed to and 
should not be rewarded.  Aronda said that Kony had declared 
that the war lasted 20 years and that it would take 20 years 
to conclude peace.  Aronda interpreted statements from Kony, 
Vincent Otti, and Juba Delegation Leader Martin Ojul to mean 
that Kony was waiting for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to lose meaning.  Aronda said that "underhand deals 
between Khartoum, Congo, and the LRA" remained an important 
dynamic in the situation.  He asserted that Congo was content 
to keep the LRA in Uganda's backyard until it was clear that 
former Vice President Bemba was no longer a threat. 
 
¶8.  (C) Aronda pointed out that there was a stand-off 
developing between Khartoum and Juba over the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which might 
require the calling of an extra-ordinary summit of 
Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) leaders. 
Given the environment of escalating tensions between north 
and south Sudan, Aronda questioned Khartoum's willingness to 
"let the LRA go."  For Aronda, LRA assembly would be an 
indication that Kony might take the next step toward peace 
and sign an agreement. 
 
¶9.  (C) DAS Swan encouraged the Ugandans to look at the 
coordination of contingency plans that might be needed. 
Aronda questioned the use of peacekeepers, who might not be 
properly trained for offensive operations, rather than 
special forces in an assault against the LRA.  Aronda found 
it disturbing that an entire brigade of Congolese soldiers 
virtually collapsed before &the likes8 of Laurent Nkunda in 
the recent fighting.  Swan said that it would be difficult 
for MONUC and the Congolese army to fight the Rwandan and 
Ugandan negative forces simultaneously.  Aronda agreed that 
the reality of the situation was that combined forces could 
only tackle one negative force at a time.  Swan asked if a 
sequence that focused on one negative force at a time might 
be more practical and realistic. 
 
¶10.  (C) Shortley also recommended close coordination with 
the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to conduct full-time 
negotiations and develop a timeline for how the talks will 
conclude.  Kiyonga asked what leverage the U.S. Government 
had on Khartoum.  Shortley described the impact of current 
U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan's banking sector.  P/E Chief 
asked Aronda if Uganda had concrete information on contact 
between Khartoum and the LRA that could be shared.  He said 
yes. 
 
¶11.  (C) Shortley recommended that political and military 
strategies develop in parallel to increase pressure on the 
LRA to negotiate seriously as the calendar and negotiations 
talks proceed, and which could accelerate the peace process. 
Kiyonga agreed.  Shortley suggested that the same group, with 
additional inter-agency players, such as Rugunda and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs officials meet again in a month's time to 
pull together its objectives and develop a coordinated 
strategy. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Ugandan military officials remain pessimistic that 
LRA leaders Kony and Otti will agree to a peace deal.  A key 
gap in strategy remains the building of confidence through 
coordinated incentives and disentives to persuade Kony and 
Otti to give up.  Swan and Shortley urged Kiyonga and Aronda 
not to allow their skepticism of the capacity of Congo and 
MONUC to conduct successful military operation against the 
LRA to hinder efforts to coordinate with them.  It is clear 
that Ugandan military planning is not coordinated with other 
relevant ministries, such as the MFA and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, and that the GOU did not have a coordinated, unified 
strategy to move the peace process or military contingency 
planning forward. 
BROWNING 
 
BROWNING