VZCZCXRO8462
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1467/01 2631324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201324Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9390
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0653
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0444
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3355

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS UG SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: PEACE PROCESS UPDATE 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Tim Shortley, Senior Advisor on Conflict 
Resolution, traveled to Kampala with AF A/S Secretary Jendayi Frazer 
and remained in the region to meet with key officials in Uganda, 
Southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo from September 
5-17.  The GOU's lead negotiator at the Juba peace talks, Ruhakana 
Ruganda, was extremely pleased with A/S Frazer's remarks that the 
U.S. supported the peace process and that it was not open-ended. 
Rugunda made several recommendations for ways in which the peace 
process could be expedited, including conduct of full-time 
negotiations and the strengthening of the mediation secretariat. 
Betty Bigombe, former GOU negotiator with the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA), reported that it was clear from her recent conversations with 
LRA leader Joseph Kony and other interlocutors that the LRA was 
listening to the U.S.  Close Kony associates do not believe he is 
ready to make a deal.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley 
visited Uganda, Southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
from September 5-17.  Shortley and P/E Chief met with a range of GOU 
officials, international donors, members of parliament, military, 
and non-governmental organization officials.  Senior Advisor 
Shortley used these meetings to reiterate U.S. objectives and 
support for the ongoing peace process in Juba.  He also solicited 
ideas and information on ways in which the process could be moved 
forward.  Shortley also shared A/S Frazer's press conference 
transcripts with our interlocutors. 
 
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FOCUSED U.S. MESSAGE 
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¶3.  (SBU)  During his visit, Shortley explained his facilitation 
role in coordinating the regional aspects of the LRA problem.  The 
U.S. believes that the LRA problem is part of larger regional 
tensions, and that its cross-border nature involving Uganda, Congo, 
and Southern Sudan required attention in order to bring peace to the 
LRA-affected areas.  Shortley outlined key areas for focus: (1) 
support for a timeline for the negotiations, which should not be 
open-ended (2) emphasizing to the mediator and the parties that 
negotiations should be full-time (3) thinking through scenarios and 
formulas for an end game (4) being prepared to handle the needs of 
returnees, primarily by getting the Ugandan Peace, Recovery, and 
Development Plan officially launched to attract sufficient donor 
funds. 
 
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GOU NEGOTIATING TEAM REVIEW OF CONSULTATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On September 6, Shortley, P/E Chief, and USAID Peace 
Support Team Chief were invited to join the GOU's internal debrief 
of the consultations held to date on Agenda Item Three: 
Accountability and Reconciliation. Minister of Internal Affairs 
Ruhakana Rugunda, who is the lead GOU negotiator, and other members 
of the negotiating team, reviewed the messages that they heard from 
Ugandans during consultations in Adjumani, Gulu, Lira, and Soroti. 
The team's deliberations revealed that throughout the consultations, 
the team was flexible and made changes in how the discussions were 
conducted to accommodate local conditions and demands. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Rugunda and other team members stated that they were 
extremely pleased with A/S Frazer's comments during her visit. 
Rugunda argued that focused attention on the peace process was 
timely and could facilitate the successful execution of the talks. 
Rugunda and Minister of State for Defense Ruth Nankabirwa stated 
their willingness to assist U.S. efforts to advance the peace 
process.  Rugunda requested that Shortley help strengthen the GOSS 
mediation effort, particularly the Secretariat.  Nankabirwa 
explained that she had always been a proponent of "Plan B," a 
military strike against the LRA, which she said was actually her 
"Plan A."  However, she said that progress made at the talks 
persuaded her to take a less vocal stance. 
 
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RUGUNDA MAKES PLEA FOR FULL-TIME TALKS 
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¶6.  (SBU) In Rugunda's view, a peace deal could be completed in a 
matter of months if expedited with better time management of the 
negotiating sessions and improved administration of the financial 
aspects of support for the talks.  The LRA was looking for ways to 
talk about money, not peace, and manipulating donors, according to 
Rugunda.  He elaborated that a clearly stated structure of 
leadership and administration would significantly decrease the 
amount of time wasted at Juba.  For example, technical teams could 
now be drafting the terms of the cease-fire and the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration. 
 
KAMPALA 00001467  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) He specifically asked Shortley to press the GOSS and 
Machar to conduct the talks full-time.  This would require more time 
and attention by Machar, but also a fully-authorized deputy to 
conduct the negotiations in Machar's absence.  Rugunda also 
advocated more full-time support and attention for the process by 
U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Chissano.  Support for 
Chissano's offices in Kampala and Juba would be helpful, according 
to Rugunda. 
 
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KONY'S SECURITY CONCERNS 
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¶8.  (SBU) Betty Bigombe, former GOU negotiator with the LRA, met 
with Shortley on September 9 and again on September 17 after her 
trip to northern Uganda.  Bigombe is now working for the U.S. 
Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C.  Bigombe shared with Shortley 
her recent conversations with the LRA leaders and other commanders. 
According to Bigombe, A/S Frazer's comments and the Arusha Agreement 
between Uganda and Congo (in which Congo agreed to take action 
against the LRA in 90 days) had gotten Kony's attention.  Bigombe 
had spoken with Kony on September 14 and said that she reminded him 
that the LRA had not done anything to show that it was serious about 
negotiations.  She told Kony that releasing women and children and 
assembling at Rikwangba would be indications that the LRA was 
interested in a peaceful settlement.  Kony told Bigombe that he 
could not release the women and children because "they would be 
evidence to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) charges 
that the LRA had abducted people."  Bigombe told Kony that there 
were thousands of former abductees in northern Uganda that could 
testify against him.  He did not need to keep the women and children 
he had. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Kony asked Bigombe to explain what it meant to be on the 
U.S. terrorist list.  Bigombe did not have enough information to 
clarify for him, but promised to get the answer for him.  He also 
wanted to know when the 90-day clock started ticking from the Arusha 
declaration.  Kony also asked Bigombe to explain how the former 
leaders of RENAMO, Pol Pot, Charles Taylor, and a Guatemalan leader 
were handled and what security guarantees they were given. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Bigombe urged a trusted intermediary, Yusuf Odek, to 
explain to Kony and Otti, in simple terms, what their options were. 
She had already told Otti over the telephone that remarks that the 
process should take two or three years were not acceptable and would 
not make the ICC issue disappear.  During a second call, Otti 
threatened to call off talks if the LRA was not given $2 million for 
its consultations.  (Note: Some observers believe that the LRA's 
demand for USD 2 million is based on a GOU payment made to the 
former West Bank Nile Front to surrender its arms.  End Note.) 
During a call with Kony, Bigombe claimed to have received assurances 
from Kony that the LRA would be back at the negotiating table in 
October.  Kony said that the LRA wanted to have joint-consultations 
with the GOU after the LRA consultations took place at Rikwangba. 
Meanwhile, Acholi paramount chief Rwot Acana went to Rikwangba to 
meet with the LRA about the consultations.  At this point, the LRA 
leaders were calling for all former LRA combatants to come to 
Rikwangba.  The LRA requested that local and traditional leaders 
invite former LRA to the meetings. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  According to Odek, he does not see Kony and Otti leaving 
the bush immediately after a peace settlement.  Kony reportedly was 
"genuinely scared" that coming out of Garamba National Park would 
result in his death.  Odek did not believe that Kony would prefer to 
assess the situation.  Odek did not believe that there was 
continuing contact between Kony and Khartoum, despite lingering 
suspicions.  The LRA continued to be concerned about delays in cash 
disbursements from the Government of Southern Sudan's Secretariat 
and wants to be facilitated with more funds.  Odek said that he was 
often approached to talk to Kony and Otti but that he did not have a 
Thuraya satellite telephone, so his ability to weigh in with the LRA 
leaders was severely limited. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Bigombe also learned from a CARITAS worker who delivers 
food to Rikwangba that LRA fighters that come to the assembly area 
to pick up the food have made repeated requests to him to bring back 
carpenters and masons.  The CARITAS worker stated that the LRA wants 
to build more permanent structures in the park.  The worker was 
becoming increasingly worried for his life on each trip because he 
had not complied with the LRA requests. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
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¶10.  (SBU)  Reactions to the public U.S. stand on the peace process 
 
KAMPALA 00001467  003 OF 003 
 
 
are generally positive, but some express caution or concern over 
U.S. pressure.  Government interlocutors and some non-governmental 
organizations have praised recent U.S. efforts.  This includes some 
of the groups that called for a Special Envoy, such as Resolve and 
Uganda-CAN, even though they oppose a military resolution to the 
conflict.  President Museveni and the Ugandan military are anxious 
to deal with the LRA as a security problem, and welcome a hard-line. 
 Other government civilian officials, such as Rugunda and many 
northern leaders, support an expedited process with clear direction 
that addresses domestic political considerations, such as public 
opinion in the north.  Rugunda, for example, would view a military 
solution as a last resort.  The LRA's diaspora spokespersons 
publicly denounced U.S. statements and the Arusha Agreement's 
timetable for Congolese action against the LRA.  However, Bigombe 
believes that the LRA leadership at Garamba National Park appears to 
be taking the situation and their future more seriously.  We 
continue to monitor the LRA's threats of war and potential chilling 
affects on returns. 
BROWNING