VZCZCXRO3990
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1429/01 2541317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111317Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9348
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0647
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0433
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3343

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS UG CG
 
SUBJECT: Ugandan Perspective on Museveni-Kabila Summit 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Congolese 
President Joseph Kabila met in Arusha, Tanzania for a two-day summit 
on September 7 and 8 to discuss border issues, the Lord's Resistance 
Army and other negative forces, and sharing of common resources. 
The two heads of state agreed on mechanisms to diffuse tensions over 
key issues.  Kabila's commitment to take action against the LRA in 
January surprised Museveni and was a source of disagreement with 
Kabila's Defense Minister and Intelligence Chief.  The atmospherics 
between the two heads of state were excellent.  The Ugandan 
Government got an agreement in writing that can be shared with 
international and regional partners, but the Foreign Ministry 
remains skeptical that Congo will deliver on commitments.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  P/E Chief met with Julius Kagamba Singoma, Director for 
East Africa and the Ring States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
September 10 to discuss the outcomes of the summit between Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni and Congolese President Joseph Kabila. 
Singoma was a member of the Uganda delegation at the summit. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
- - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The Ugandan Government realized that using the approach 
of security and military officials to discuss the issue of the 
negative forces over the past year and to diffuse tensions in the 
border areas over the past few months with Congolese President 
Joseph Kabila was not working, according to Singoma.  Museveni had 
sent Minister of Security Mbabazi, Chief of Defense Forces Aronda, 
and Chief of Military Intelligence Kyanda several times to urge 
Kabila to take action against the LRA and other negative forces. 
President Museveni decided that changing tactics might prove more 
fruitful and directed his ministers to approach the Congolese from 
an economic perspective, which he argued would demonstrate to the 
Congolese the joint benefits and prosperity that could be brought 
about through cooperation. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On August 11, Kabila called Museveni "to regret" the 
recent border incidents.  According to the Ugandans, the incidents 
were not directed by Kinshasa, but rather the result of soldiers and 
local officials "free-lancing" because they had not been paid. 
Kabila promised to send his Foreign Minister to provide Museveni 
with the details.  He did not come so Museveni sent Foreign Minister 
Kutesa to visit Kabila.  According to Kutesa, Kabila promised that 
the Joint Permanent Commission could be resurrected and convene in 
Fort Portal, Uganda on August 30 and 31.  The meeting never 
materialized. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Kabila sent Foreign Minister Nyamwisi to Uganda to 
propose a summit in Tanzania.  Kutesa told his officials that 
according to Nyamwisi, Kabila did not fear coming to Uganda, where 
he was raised, but had to continue to beat an "anti-Uganda drum" for 
domestic purposes.  Tanzanian President Kikwete agreed to host the 
meeting.  The agenda for the meeting included: border demarcation, 
border security, joint resource sharing, negative forces, reviving 
the joint permanent commission, and re-establishing diplomatic 
relations at the ambassadorial level.  According to the Singoma, the 
Ugandans insisted on a formal written agreement, rather than a 
Memorandum of Understanding, because a formal agreement could be 
shared with outside parties. 
 
- - - - - - - 
BORDER ISSUES 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Uganda and Congo agreed to demilitarize Rikwanzi and 
other disputed areas, such as Arua.  Congo would be allowed to 
administer Rikwanzi for a month.  On October 9, Uganda would name a 
co-administrator.  In addition, both Congo and Uganda would post an 
equal number of police.  A joint team of experts would be 
constituted to re-mark the border.  The British-Belgian agreement of 
1915, confirmed by the Organization of African Unity and African 
Union consultative acts, would be the basis for the border 
demarcation.  Singoma asked if there were U.S. experts available to 
assist.  "Border Authority" meetings would be held to monitor the 
progress of the experts. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
NEGATIVE FORCES 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Kabila pre-empted Museveni on the issue of negative 
forces, according to Singoma.  Kabila told Museveni that he was 
working on an action plan for January.  Museveni thanked him. 
However, in the working level meeting to draft the agreement, 
 
KAMPALA 00001429  002 OF 003 
 
 
Kabila's Minister of Defense and Intelligence Chief objected and 
said the plan would be proposed in January, not implemented.  The 
Ugandans insisted that the issue be taken back to Kabila, Foreign 
Minister Nyamwisi and Museveni, who had spent two full days together 
as the details of the agreement were worked out.  Kabila reiterated 
his commitment that the Congolese would be ready for action in 
January.  Still, the two Congolese Ministers continued to try to 
change the text. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The Congolese also gave Museveni information about 
attempts to implicate Uganda as a supporter of dissident General 
Laurent Nkunda. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
IMPROVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Uganda raised the issue of ambassadorial level 
representation in each capital.  Kabila agreed, but the language 
proposed by the Congolese stated that the two parties would 
undertake actions that would lead to the full upgrade in diplomatic 
status.  According to Singoma, those actions include: settling of 
claims, resolving a dispute over the Congolese embassy property, and 
discussion of the outstanding USD 10 billion International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) decision.  The parties agreed to set up commissions on 
properties and the ICJ decision.  On the claims issue, there were 
contract disputes between private individuals that were causing 
friction.  Several include court decisions in the favor of Ugandans 
that the Congolese parties do not want to pay.  The Congolese 
requested that the Ugandan Government pressure the individuals not 
to pursue payment of the claim.  The Ugandans explained that they 
cannot interfere in these court judgments. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The second issue involved the Congolese chancery in the 
Kololo neighborhood.  It backs up to a property that was recently 
purchased by a new owner.  The wall that had been built by the 
embassy was on the new owner's property.  The new owner tore it 
down.  The Congolese claim that the wall was on their property, but 
the records of the land title had been destroyed in a fire years 
ago.  The Ugandan Government asked the Attorney General to look into 
the issue and found that the land registry had no records of the 
Congolese claim and that no fire was ever reported to the police. 
The new property owner agreed to resurrect a wall, but on the 
correct property line. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The final issue is the ICJ finding that Uganda owed 
Congo USD 10 billion for riches plundered during its foray across 
the border.  The Ugandan Government was willing to discuss it and 
negotiate with the ICJ on the judgment. 
 
- - 
OIL 
- - 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The Congolese delegation reportedly accused Uganda of 
taking its oil.  The Ugandans proposed a joint committee to work on 
the issue of shared resources, such as oil, drawing from good 
examples of international cooperation found between Norway, Sweden, 
and the U.K., and avoiding bad precedents such as between Nigeria 
and Sao Tome.  Each country would deploy its own oil expert at each 
embassy that would participate on the committee.  Kabila then 
requested that the terms of the resource sharing agreement be 
reviewed.  Museveni reminded Kabila that the first agreement was 
signed in 1990 with former President Mobutu, then reviewed and 
agreed to by Laurent Kabila.  It was already in force.  Kabila 
insisted that the agreement had not been ratified.  Museveni pointed 
out that the agreement entered into force upon signature, not 
parliamentary ratification.  Museveni agreed to send Minister of 
Energy Resources, Daudi Migereko, to review the document with the 
Congolese. 
 
- - - - - - - 
ATMOSPHERICS 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Singoma described the relations between Museveni and 
Kabila as excellent.  The two presidents spent long hours in each 
other's company while their respective delegations worked out the 
details of what had been agreed.  The Congolese delegation members 
reportedly tried several times to change the language from what 
Kabila had agreed to so there was considerable back-and-forth to the 
presidents to clarify what had been agreed.  Singoma also said that 
the Congolese delegation tried to prevent Kabila from signing the 
agreement and insisted that he do it after returning to Congo.  The 
Congolese delegation then tried to put a number of "urgent" calls 
through to Kabila from Congo, presumably to dissuade him from 
 
KAMPALA 00001429  003 OF 003 
 
 
signing the document, according to Singoma.  The Ugandans wanted a 
signed agreement that they could show the U.N. and neighboring 
countries. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Despite the apparent progress, the Ugandans are adopting 
a wait-and-see approach as the provisions of the agreement are 
implemented.  The Ugandans also remain concerned about the split 
between Kabila and his security officials, but hope that the 
momentum created could be carried through to the Tripartite Plus 
meetings in Kampala from September 15-17. 
BROWNING