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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD RAISES REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
ISSUES WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT 
 
REF: KAMPALA 1419 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  Summary: Senator Russell Feingold discussed Somalia, the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Congo, the war on terror, and 
the President's plans for the 2011 election with President 
Yoweri Museveni on August 28.  Museveni described  potential 
military action against the LRA in Congo as "easy" and did 
not rule out running for a fourth term in 2011.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - 
SOMALIA 
- - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  Senator Russell Feingold, accompanied by staff 
members Sarah Margon and Evan Gottesman, Ambassador Browning 
and P/E Chief (notetaker) met with President Yoweri Museveni 
on August 28.  Feingold sought Museveni's views on what 
Uganda hopes to accomplish in Somalia.  Museveni said that 
Uganda has three goals: the liberation of Somalia from the 
Islamic Courts, the building of the pillars of state 
authority, and the establishment of democracy.  Museveni said 
that now that the Islamic Courts were ousted, Uganda wanted 
to help rebuild the army as a national institution and 
respond to the humanitarian needs of Somalis. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Regarding the third goal, Museveni said Uganda was 
seeking a timetable for the transition. Museveni wanted 
Uganda to act as an engine to relaunch the Somali state so 
the transitional government could hand power to the people. 
Unfortunately, Museveni said, Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) President Yusuf does not want to talk to some parts of 
the opposition who were not in the clan structure. 
 
¶4.  (C) Museveni told Feingold that "this time, the U.S. 
acted well in Somalia," America is unpopular in Somalia. 
Museveni said that he discusses Somalia with Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer.  In his 
 
SIPDIS 
opinion, the Bush Administration took a stand against the 
Islamic Courts and encouraged Ethiopia from behind-the-scenes 
to act.  Museveni said that the timing for this action was 
right because if the Islamic Courts had taken Baidoa, then 
the TFG would have fallen.  Museveni described U.S. bombing 
of suspected terrorists in Somalia as "irrelevant." 
 
¶5.  (C)  Looking forward, Museveni outlined "mistakes 
expected to come" in Somalia.  A key concern for Uganda was 
if those who want to talk, get left out of the process. 
Second, Museveni was concerned that the army being built was 
not national in character, which would create suspicions 
among the population.  Museveni argued that the way forward 
on democracy was that it must be transparent or it would 
fail.  It would be critical for Yusuf to elaborate milestones 
for the transition.  The TFG must develop an ideology to 
bring Somalis together as a nation.  Without one, the task of 
nation-building could fail, according to Museveni.  Finally, 
Museveni stated that the TFG must deliver infrastructure and 
services to the population to demonstrate the benefits of the 
new government. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
WAR ON TERROR 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Feingold thanked Museveni for Uganda's help in the 
global war on terror and asked what has been the impact of 
U.S. involvement in Iraq.  Museveni stated that he had 
supported the U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
because he thought these operations were in self-defense. 
Afghanistan harbored Al Qaida and used it as a base to attack 
the U.S.  Uganda supported operations in Iraq because the 
U.S. stated that Sadam Hussein had links with Al Qaida and 
had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Uganda was concerned 
that its neighbor, Sudan, had ties to both Hussein and Osama 
Bin Laden.  Museveni said that Uganda was surprised to learn 
that Saddam had neither WMD or links to Al Qaida.  If Uganda 
had known this, it would not have voted for the motion at the 
U.N. on Iraq. 
 
¶7.  (C) Nonetheless, Museveni said Uganda would continue to 
operate closely with the U.S. and described U.S. positions as 
"more correct" than those of Europeans, which he described as 
"too weak, almost criminal, and opportunistic."  According to 
Museveni, "the U.S. never obstructs our stand on Sudan." 
Feingold agreed that there was a strong, bipartisan consensus 
on a tough policy on Sudan. 
 
¶8.  (C) Museveni also said that democracy must come from 
 
KAMPALA 00001426  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
within; it cannot be brought by invaders.  He stated that the 
U.S. mistakes on Iraq included bad intelligence and 
misinformation; attempts to install democracy; lack of 
credibility on issues related to WMD; poor optics of naming 
an "Administrator for Iraq"; and the mishandling of the army. 
 Museveni said he told President Bush in December that he 
wanted to meet with him confidentially to discuss Iraq and 
encourage the U.S. to hold an American-African Summit, 
similar to the one hosted by China. 
 
- - - 
CONGO 
- - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Museveni told Feingold that he would be meeting 
Congolese President Joseph Kabila in Tanzania to discuss 
cross-border tensions, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and 
conflict in eastern Congo.  (Note: The meeting took place on 
September 7-8 in Arusha.) Museveni complained about 
western-backed Mobutu, whom he described as a "clown" and 
stated that Uganda worked against him because he sided with 
the Rwandan genocidaires.  Rwanda did not hold a national 
reconciliation conference, which was a contributing factor to 
the war in Congo.  Museveni said that the Lusaka Accord was 
well-thought out because it covered both internal and 
regional dimensions of the conflict and contained provisions 
about use of Congolese territory as a safe haven by rebel 
groups.  The reason for current tensions, according to 
Museveni, was that the regional aspects of the treaty had not 
been implemented. 
 
¶10.  (C) Museveni stated that Uganda's current border 
"nonsense" with Congo could be easily diffused.  The 
Europeans demarcated the borders, which African leaders 
accepted.  The documents were available to resolve the 
boundary dispute.  In Museveni's view, integration could put 
an end to border problems for good. 
 
¶11.  (C) Feingold asked Museveni about Uganda's options 
should the peace talks fail.  Museveni said he had advised 
Kabila to allow Uganda to operate with the Congolese army or 
find another partner, such as France, to take action against 
the LRA.  Museveni warned Kabila that Congo could become 
known as "a terrorist holiday center" and that fortifying 
Uganda's border with Congo could not be a long-term solution. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Museveni said that the Juba negotiations could 
succeed if there was military pressure on the "terrorists". 
He said the LRA had not assembled as required and was using 
Congo to roam at will.  He accused the LRA of engaging in 
smuggling and poaching at Garamba.  On accountability, 
Museveni said that "we agreed to alternative justice or a 
soft landing" if the LRA agreed to peace.  According to 
Museveni, if the LRA accepted, the GOU could accept no/no 
jail time for LRA leaders.  (Note: The President's apparent 
position is at odds with his negotiating team.  End Note.). 
Museveni said a  military operation against the LRA would be 
"easy" or "not hard." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FOURTH TERM, CORRUPTION, HIV/AIDS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) Feingold told Museveni that the U.S. was concerned 
about corruption and asked how Uganda was addressing it. 
Museveni said that the political will to fight corruption 
existed, the legal framework was falling into place, and that 
the institutional framework, primarily in the form of the 
Inspector General of Government, as present in Uganda.  He 
hoped that the fourth component, human and technical 
resources, could be provided by donors.  Museveni said 
Uganda's own surveys indicated that some progress was being 
made on corruption.  He dismissed Transparency International 
rankings as "superficial." 
 
¶14.  (C) Feingold asked Museveni if he was planing to run 
again, with respect to term limits.  Museveni admitted that 
he disagreed with Uganda's partners and Washington.  Museveni 
explained his "holistic" approach to leadership which 
differed from "state leadership" perspectives.  Museveni said 
that for Uganda, leadership was tied to tasks that need to be 
performed by the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), 
such as liberation and establishment of state authority. 
When the NRM determined the tasks were complete, then it 
would be time to leave power.  The tasks were not time 
defined.  Feingold pointed out that under such a system, 
former U.S. President Bill Clinton could be running against 
his wife.  Museveni responded that U.S. history is different 
from that of modernizing societies.  The crucial factors for 
democracy in Uganda were that people voted, elected officials 
 
KAMPALA 00001426  003 OF 003 
 
 
at regular intervals, and competition was free.  Other 
issues, such as who stands for election were tactical in 
nature.  The President then cited Israel as an example where 
the lack of term limits provided experienced leadership at 
times of crisis. 
 
¶15.  (U)  Feingold congratulated Museveni on Uganda's success 
on HIV/AIDS, Museveni thanked Feingold, and said that he was 
concerned that the infection rates were not dropping but 
remaining stagnant.  The President attributed this to 
complacency and said a nationwide sensitization campaign was 
needed to address the problem. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶16.  (C)  Senator Feingold was able to cover a great deal of 
ground on foreign policy issues with Museveni.  A historian 
by training, President Museveni explained the rationale 
behind his positions on key issues, whether at odds with ours 
or not, with examples to bolster his arguments.  Museveni 
expressed the same position on Iraq during the visit of 
Deputy National Security Advisor McCormick on March 3. 
Museveni's position on amnesty for the LRA if it accepts a 
peace deal tracks has not changed over the course of the 
peace process.  His preferred option remains military action 
against the LRA, but he continues to demonstrate restraint 
while the peace process proceeds. 
 
¶17.  (U)  Senator Feingold did not have an opportunity to 
clear this message. 
BROWNING