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RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0742
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001513 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  ON EVE OF U.S. TRIP, HARIRI LOOKS AT 
PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1511 
 
BEIRUT 00001513  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  On 9/28, MP Saad Hariri said he would have four 
requests for USG officials during his upcoming Washington 
consultations:  first, accelerated support for the Lebanese 
army and police, including highly visible equipment to put 
Hizballah off balance; second, immediate embrace of Lebanon's 
next president, to keep him focused on the west rather than 
Syria; third, some resettlement of Nahr al-Barid Palestinians 
in the West Bank; fourth, transfer of Sheba' Farms to UN 
custody after presidential elections.  On elections, Hariri 
said that he would back "all the way" March 14 presidential 
candidates Nassib Lahoud or Boutros Harb.  He thought there 
was a slim chance of getting Lahoud, his preferred choice, if 
the Saudis would be willing to intervene with the Iranians. 
But Hariri also hinted at a fall-back position, saying that 
the cost to Lebanon of electing a candidate with only a 50 
percent-plus one majority of MPs may be too great.  While 
noting that his March 14 partners are opposed to compromise, 
he mused about whether Charles Rizk, Michel Khoury, or Robert 
Ghanem might be fall-back consensus choices.  (As we are 
reporting septel, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is 
deeply worried that Hariri is rushing too quickly to back 
Ghanem.)  Over dinner with the Ambassador on 9/28, Ghattas 
Khoury, advisor to Hariri, elaborated on these themes. 
Khoury noted that Hariri intended to become prime minister 
after presidential elections but may decline if a president 
is elected without consensus support.  End summary. 
 
HARIRI'S PLANNED TALKING POINTS 
FOR WASHINGTON MEETINGS 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador met one-on-one with MP Saad Hariri on 
9/28.  Previewing his talking points for his upcoming 
consultations in Washington, Hariri said that he would 
emphasis how important USG leadership and support has been in 
Lebanon's independence struggle and how much the Lebanese 
appreciate Washington's attention.  Beyond expressions of 
thanks, he said that he plans to make four requests of USG 
officials: 
 
--  First, the USG should accelerate and increase its 
assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal 
Security Forces (ISF), in order to take the argument from 
Hizballah that only its weapons can protect Lebanon.  The 
Ambassador briefed Hariri on the USD 250 million-plus 
commitment to the LAF in FY07 and the USD 60 million INL 
program for the ISF, about to be signed.  All well and good, 
Hariri responded, but the programs need to include highly 
visible hardware -- helicopters, missiles, planes -- that 
would demonstrate to the Lebanese people a real strategic 
upgrading to the security services, to weaken Hizballah's 
arguments.  Hariri said that USG assistance should address 
the "psychological" needs of the Lebanese to see physical 
evidence of the LAF's increasing capacity. 
 
--  Second, the USG should immediately and strongly embrace 
the next president of Lebanon, even if he is less than 
perfect, in order to root him solidly in the west.  The next 
president should see that his support comes from the moderate 
Arabs and the international community.  Such support will 
make him less vulnerable to Syrian pressure and less likely 
to turn to Syria and Iran for backing.  "He should see the 
benefits of being part of the international community and not 
part of the Axis of Evil." 
 
--  Third, the USG should back some resettlement of displaced 
Palestinian refugees from Nahr al-Barid in the West Bank 
rather than Lebanon.  Given Lebanese hysteria about permanent 
implantation ("tawteen") of the Sunni Palestinians in 
Lebanon, moving a few thousand out of Lebanon would be the 
most effective way of strengthening the new president, the 
new cabinet, and even PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.  The 
Ambassador suggested that Hariri keep his expectations in 
check on this point. 
 
--  Four, the USG, after a new Lebanese president is elected 
 
BEIRUT 00001513  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
and a new cabinet sworn in, should strengthen the new 
administration vis-a-vis Hizballah by seeing that Sheba' 
Farms is transferred to U.S. custody, thus depriving 
Hizballah of another pretext for its weapons.  The Ambassador 
urged Hariri not to raise the Sheba' Farms point, given the 
unlikelihood that, without seriousness first on dealing with 
Hizballah's arms, Lebanon would see its request fulfilled. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Over the longer term, Hariri said, the international 
community should brace itself for another Paris III-style 
donors conference.  Once there is a credible new president in 
place and a credible cabinet accepted by most Lebanese, then 
Lebanon can move aggressively to implement the social and 
economic reforms proposed for Paris III but which are now 
largely stalled because of the ongoing political crisis. 
Depending on the audience, Hariri said that he may raise the 
need for debt reduction linked to performance on reform with 
Washington officials. 
 
BACKING NASSIB AND BOUTROS 
"ALL THE WAY" TO BAABDA PALACE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  As for his bottom-line thinking on Lebanon's 
upcoming presidential elections, Hariri claimed to be backing 
"all the way" March 14 presidential candidates Nassib Lahoud 
and Boutros Harb.  He said that there was still a slim 
possibility of broader consensus behind Nassib, who he 
indicated is his top preference.  To get Nassib by consensus, 
the Saudis will have to talk to the Iranians and get them on 
board.  The Ambassador asked whether the Saudis were willing 
to try.  Laughing, Saad said, "I need to have a serious 
conversation with King Abdullah."  He urged the U.S. to help 
make sure the Saudis were playing a strong role in pushing 
for a March 14-backed president. 
 
¶5.  (C)  As for Boutros, Saad accused Parliament Speaker 
Nabih Berri of trying to trick him in a recent Berri-Hariri 
meeting.  Berri, aware of the lack of personal chemistry 
between Saad and Boutros, told Hariri that it might just be 
possible to get a consensus behind Boutros, but not Nassib. 
Hariri told the Speaker to try with both.  In Hariri's 
analysis, Berri was hoping to provoke Hariri into vetoing 
Harb himself, thus splitting the March 14 bloc.  While not 
blocking Harb, Hariri claimed at the same time to be evincing 
little enthusiasm for Harb, an approach Harb asked him to 
adopt to help lure Berri and Hizballah into backing him.  "If 
I am too enthusiastic about Boutros," Hariri said, then Berri 
will become more suspicious. 
 
BUT HINTING AT A FALL-BACK 
STRATEGY OF A CONSENSUS PRESIDENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador asked what happens if March 14 cannot 
get a broader consensus behind either Nassib Lahoud or 
Boutros Harb.  "We'll have to go for 50 (percent) plus one," 
Hariri said.  But he said that he was not sure that March 14 
allies realized the cost Lebanon would have to pay for that 
confrontational approach.  "The consequences will be great," 
Hariri said.  If the March 8-Aoun bloc chooses to respond by 
electing its own president or appointing a competing cabinet, 
the country will be split.  Hariri mused about three 
potential fall-back candidates:  former Central Bank Governor 
Michel Khoury (son of Lebanon's first president), Minister of 
Justice Charles Rizk, and MP Robert Ghanem.  "I wonder," 
Hariri said, whether getting broader backing behind one of 
them wouldn't be better than electing a president with only 
an absolute majority, given the problems such an election 
would cause.  "But I'll never abandon my allies," he said, in 
reference to the less compromising thinking of Samir Geagea 
and Walid Jumblatt. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Hariri described his recent consultations as 
"excellent."  Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, he claimed, admitted 
that Nassib Lahoud was the best candidate.  AS for Berri, he 
wanted to talk about principles to guide the next cabinet. 
According to Hariri, Berri supported having a cabinet program 
based on UNSCR 1701, the four issues agreed upon unanimously 
during the spring 2006 National Dialogue sessions, 
implementation of the Taif agreement, and return to the state 
of armistice with Israel.  Berri's red lines for his cabinet 
statement, Hariri said, were UNSCR 1559 and Hizballah's arms, 
 
BEIRUT 00001513  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
with Berri insisting that neither 1559 nor Hizballah's arms 
be mentioned explicitly in the next cabinet program.  (Note: 
The issue of UNSCR 1559 has come up with increasing frequency 
by March 8 supporters, who argue that UNSCR 1559 will be 
irrelevant after presidential elections.  At that point, they 
say, what's left of UNSCR 1559 is subsumed into UNSCR 1701, 
and UNSCR 1559 files can be closed.  We may want to have the 
lawyers start examining this question, to help head off this 
line or reasoning before it is broadly accepted here.  End 
note.) 
 
HARIRI'S ADVISOR ELABORATES, 
HINTS AT SAAD'S OWN AMBITIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Over a one-on-one dinner hosted by the Ambassador on 
9/28, Hariri's advisor Ghattas Khoury (who plans to travel 
with Hariri to Washington but not attend the meetings) 
reiterated many of the same points, with the Ambassador 
cautioning Ghattas to drop the Sheba' Farms request and lower 
expectations on the Nahr al-Barid resettlement proposal. 
Khoury also talked of a nascent rapprochement with Michel 
Aoun (see reftel), which had suffered a set-back just an hour 
earlier:  Khoury, on behalf of Hariri, was supposed to see 
Aoun; at the last minute, Aoun diverted Khoury to Aoun's 
son-in-law and advisor Gebran Bassil instead.  Hariri took 
offense at this bait-and-switch. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Khoury confirmed that Hariri fully intends to become 
prime minister in the cabinet to be formed after presidential 
elections.  Asked whether the Saudis were on board, Khoury 
responded that he presumed so.  But Hariri may decline the 
office, Khoury said, if the president is elected with only a 
March 14 absolute majority.  In that case, the risks of 
failure are so great, for there could be two competing 
presidents and two competing cabinets.  Hariri wants to be 
part of a solution to unity the country, not head of a 
cabinet that divides Lebanon. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  As we are reporting septel, Lebanese Forces leader 
Samir Geagea is convinced and deeply worried that, once it is 
clear that Nassib Lahoud will never win the presidency by 
consensus, Hariri will shift his support to MP Robert Ghanem, 
one of the three potential fall-back choices he mentioned to 
us.  (We think either of the other two fall-backs are better 
choices than Ghanem.)  With us, Hariri put on a good show 
about backing either Nassib or Boutros Harb all the way. 
But, given his ambitions to become prime minister and given 
the experience of his father's premiership (when the PM far 
exceeded the president in importance), we could see how 
Hariri might be tempted by a weak president like Ghanem, 
whose election would be a preferable way for Hariri to start 
his premiership compared to a chaotic situation with two 
presidents or two governments. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Thus, in the context of Geagea's subsequent remarks 
about Hariri's private hopes for a Ghanem president, we would 
not be surprised if Hariri asks USG officials to intervene 
with his hard-line March 14 ally Walid Jumblatt (who will be 
in Washington less than two weeks after Hariri) to urge a 
compromise on the presidency.  Jumblatt, in turn, may ask for 
USG help in ensuring March 14 gains the presidency.  Our 
message, we believe, should be that March 14 needs to stay 
united. 
 
¶12.  (C)  As for Hariri's hope to become Lebanon's next prime 
minister, we strongly urge that Washington interlocutors not 
raise with him any hesitations we may have.  The Saudis are 
best placed to give Hariri honest career advice.  Just as we 
aren't picking Lebanon's next president, we believe that we 
shouldn't be seen as picking Lebanon's next premier, 
particularly not at Saad's expense when we need his active 
engagement on the Lebanese scene.  Indeed, in need of all the 
help they can muster at this critical time before 
presidential elections, March 14 leaders, we believe, should 
hear from Hariri when he returns that we remain strongly 
supportive of them.  Finally, we suggest muting our praise 
for PM Siniora or putting it in the context of giving credit 
to Hariri who (with our encouragement) sagely picked Siniora 
back in 2005:  Hariri is extremely sensitive to the profile 
 
BEIRUT 00001513  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
and stature Siniora has gained over the last two-plus years. 
If we need Siniora to be involved in the new cabinet to be 
formed after presidential elections, then Hariri should not 
perceive him as a threat to his own influence and prestige. 
FELTMAN