VZCZCXRO5957
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTL #0573/01 2431244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311244Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0140
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC: POSTS FOR 
FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC EN
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - TALLINN:  THIRD QTR 
FY2007 
 
REF: A) STATE 083571;  B) 05 STATE 205073 
 
Answers keyed to reftel: 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  No change from previous 
fraud summary. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD: 
 
-- No significant changes from the previous fraud 
summary.  Post continues to verify suspicious 
applicant-provided information using various online 
resources, including but not limited to Lexis- 
Nexis, which we are finding to be a valuable and 
far-reaching tool to research applicant claims 
regarding U.S. residents and businesses.  Our 
upload to CLASS last year of 7,505 "L" entries for 
suspected overstays (based on DHS I-94 records) 
continues to pay dividends, with several NIV 
applicants confessing to previous overstays, 
leading in some cases to 214(b) and/or 212(a)(9) 
findings. 
 
-- Many of our suspected overstay cases, along with 
all cases with derogatory CLASS, CCD or local NIV 
information, are identified before the applicant 
even appears for an interview.  Post uses a semi- 
automated method of name-checking all applicants in 
INK using information gleaned from our online 
appointment system.  Basically:  The day before 
applicants appear, our NIV Visa Assistant downloads 
an Excel spreadsheet list of all the next day's 
applicants from our online appointment system (a 
Microsoft commercial product leased at $29 per 
month).  She then runs an Excel macro that cleans 
up the list (drops diacritics, etc.) and 
reformats it as an INK-ready .csv file.   She then 
runs a batch namecheck on the file from INK.  Next, 
our Consular Associate reviews the results, pulling 
any CAT files or CSD info on any serious/complex 
cases so adjudicating officers have a leg up on the 
case prior to interview time. 
 
¶C. IV FRAUD:  Post began full IV and DV processing 
for the first time in May 2007. Prior to the launch 
all Consular section FSOs and FSNs visited IV- 
processing posts (London, Helsinki, and Moscow) 
prior to May 1 for training on all aspects of IV 
processing included IV-related fraud, such as 
marriage fraud.  Post also sent two representatives 
to the one-day fraud conference Stockholm on May 8. 
 
¶D. DV FRAUD:  See above regarding IV fraud 
 
¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  Post encountered one 
Amcit with a history of lost passports who claimed 
to have lost yet another in Tallinn.  He did not, 
however, submit an application or a DS-62 report at 
the time, because, in his words, he "couldn't be 
bothered".  The Amcit, a dual U.S.-Estonian 
national appears to be indigent and have a 
substance-abuse problem.  Post noted the incident 
in ACS+ and will try now with our PLOTS access to 
make an appropriate lookout on the passport number. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION:  No change from previous fraud 
summary. 
 
¶G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS FRAUD:  Post has received a 
Visas 92 case in which the original asylee 
"petitioner" appears to have been granted U.S. 
asylum on the basis of wildly exaggerated or false 
claims of persecution in Estonia.  Post will not, 
however attempt to "prove a negative." 
 
¶H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: 
Post has approached the Interior Ministry on 
several occasions to obtain access to the GOE's 
list of excluded aliens, but has not yet been 
granted a copy.  The list is the basis of the 
Ministry's online individual namecheck system which 
can be used to check if a given individual is 
registered as an excluded alien. 
 
¶I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: 
 
Lost and Stolen Passports:  In June Post marked the 
six-month anniversary of fully-automated operation 
of our LASP reporting system.  The program began in 
 
TALLINN 00000573  002 OF 002 
 
 
April 2006 and became fully automated in December 
¶2006.  In the first six months of fully automated 
processing, our stand-alone "LASP2" PC logged onto 
the Estonian Migration Board's LASP list webpage 
182 times (once every 24 hours).  During those 
sessions it detected 2,611 new records of lost and 
stolen Estonian passports, which it then submitted 
to the CA Support Desk via email, in the form of 48 
separate Excel spreadsheets. Fifteen of those files 
were sent on a Saturday or Sunday.  The system is 
described also in Department's June 15 ALDAC on 
LASP reporting (Ref A). 
 
¶J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The consular section 
consists of two officers, one consular associate 
and two FSNs. The FSNs and consular associate 
assist with fraud prevention work as required. 
Both officers have completed PC541 Fraud Prevention 
for Consular Managers.   The Visa Assistant has 
recently completed PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention. On 
May 8, Post sent two representatives to the one-day 
fraud conference in Stockholm. 
 
PHILLIPS