VZCZCXRO2735
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSM #1055 2410616
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290616Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0139
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2588
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0010

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 001055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS GG SR SW
SUBJECT: BILDT ON GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT FOLLOW-UP, 
KOSOVO, CHAD 
 
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 988 
     ¶B. STATE 109526 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (c) On August 28, the Ambassador raised the Georgia 
missile incident and Kosovo with Foreign Minister Bildt in a 
meeting devoted to other issues.  On Georgia, Bildt 
speculated on the context of the incident and said we need to 
keep diplomatic pressure on, but that Zuzul was not the right 
choice for OSCE's representative.  On Kosovo, Bildt said we 
need to keep quiet and let the process go forward.  End 
summary. 
 
Georgia Missile Incident 
------------------------ 
¶2.  (s) Ambassador Wood discussed the Georgia missile 
incident and its diplomatic follow-up (ref A) with Foreign 
Minister Bildt August 28 in meeting at the Embassy.  Bildt 
said that it was clear that the reports of the experts on the 
missile incident were accurate, and diplomatic follow-on had 
so far been useful in putting pressure on Russia to which it 
was paying attention.  He added, however, that there seemed 
to be context connected to the incident that had not been 
disclosed by either Georgia or Russia.  Bildt said the 
Georgian radar against which the Russian's aborted attack may 
have been directed "should not have been there."  He said 
that there was also "something else" going on in the incident 
in the Kodori valley, though it was not clear what.  Bildt 
said Georgia had been importing lots of weapons from Ukraine. 
 He offered a hypothetical scenario where the Georgians could 
have shot missiles "they were not supposed to have" at the 
Russian aircraft; neither side would want to acknowledge what 
really happened.  Bildt thought the Russian incursion had 
been ordered by Moscow and not by the Russian military 
command in the North Caucusus, but it was not clear who in 
Moscow was behind it. 
 
¶3.  (c) Bildt said the diplomatic follow-on needed to be 
carefully managed.  Bildt said he had dined with Georgian 
President Sakashvili August 26 (apparently in Slovenia) and 
told him that Georgia should let its friends handle this one. 
 The Georgians, Bildt said, appeared disposed to do so. 
Bildt said he thought Croatian diplomat Miomir Zuzul, who had 
been appointed Personal Representative of OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office Moratinos for this matter was not the 
right person.  Bildt said that Zuzul, who was Croatia's 
Ambassador to the UN at the time (and later Ambassador to the 
U.S.), was implicated in the decision to go forward with the 
Croatian government's 1995 ethnic-cleansing Operation Storm. 
This would discredit him.  He said Zuzul should not be the 
OSCE's representative for Georgia. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
¶4.  (c) On Kosovo (ref B), Bildt said what was necessary now 
was a period of quiet, including, he added, from the U.S.  We 
needed to see what technical fixes could be found.  He was 
not sure where Russia was.  It would take weeks to evaluate 
what is possible.  The process had been engaged; it needed to 
be allowed to work its way through undisturbed. 
 
Chad 
---- 
¶5.  (c) Bildt said he will be traveling September 3 to Chad 
in connection with a possible Swedish and EU role in a UN 
mission there. 
WOOD