VZCZCXYZ0022
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTG #1292/01 2122133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 312133Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6484
INFO RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 2654
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0155

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/VO/L/A, AND CA/VO/L/C 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017 
TAGS: CVIS PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ZELAYA AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS TRIP TO 
MANAGUA AND NEW UN AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1247 
 
     ¶B. STATE 98124 
 
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES FORD. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In response to a request by the GOH, 
Ambassador Ford met with Honduran President "Mel" Zelaya, 
Foreign Minister Milton Jimenez and proposed Ambassador to 
the United Nations Jorge Arturo Reina. Zelaya used the first 
part of the meeting to offer another explanation for his trip 
to Managua to attend the Sandinista Revolution commemoration 
with Daniel Ortega and Hugo Chavez. This time the trip was to 
prepare Daniel Ortega for the upcoming International Court of 
Justice ruling of their shared maritime boundary that Zelaya 
believes will be decided in Honduras's favor. Ambassador Ford 
pointed out the trip received so much attention in Honduras 
because of the lack of movement on key issues on our 
bilateral agenda; there is very little else to talk about. 
Zelaya agreed and committed his government to begin work on 
five or six key issues of mutual interest in the areas of 
regional security, economic development, corruption and 
social justice. 
 
¶2. (C) CONT. SUMMARY. The second part of the meeting was 
devoted to Jorge Arturo Reina trying to make a case in his 
own favor for the issuance of a visa so he can travel to New 
York. Reina tried to argue that he was never as radical as 
the USG may have believed and his terrorist-related 
activities were not that serious and can be explained. He 
offered to meet with Post officials to provide more details. 
Neither President Zelaya nor Minister Jimenez offered any 
strong support for Reina nor did they appeal to the 
Ambassador for his assistance in this matter. It appears 
Reina will be on his own when dealing with Post on the visa 
request. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) Honduran President "Mel" Zelaya, Foreign Minister 
Milton Jimenez, and recently nominated Honduran Ambassador to 
the United Nations Jorge Arturo Reina met with Ambassador 
Ford and Poloff on July 27. The Hondurans requested the 
meeting and, while they did not offer a reason for the 
request, Post expected that Zelaya wished to discuss his 
selection of Jorge Arturo Reina as the new Honduran 
Ambassador to the U.N. and seek Post's help in obtaining the 
G-1 visa so that Reina could travel to the United States to 
perform his new duties (see reftel A for a more detailed 
explanation of Reina's visa problems). 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Another Reason Offered for the Managua Trip 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Zelaya began the meeting by offering another reason 
for his recent trip to Managua to participate with Daniel 
Ortega and Hugo Chavez in the ceremony commemorating the 
Sandinista Revolution of 1979. Obviously forgetting that he 
had told the Deputy Secretary that the purpose of the trip 
was to warn Ortega and Chavez to stay out of internal 
Honduran politics and not to support Honduran political 
campaigns (reftel B), Zelaya told the Ambassador that the 
focus of the trip was to establish friendly relations with 
Ortega in anticipation of the eventual International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ruling on the Honduras - Nicaragua maritime 
boundary case. Oral arguments in that case were heard in 
March, and the GOH expects a ruling in its favor soon. Zelaya 
stated that he talked with Ortega regarding the creation of a 
commission to implement the ICJ's ruling. Promotion of trade 
was another reason for the trip, according to Zelaya. He 
pointed out that Nicaragua is the only country with which 
Honduras has a positive trade balance, and Zelaya would like 
to see the amount of trade between the two countries 
increase. 
 
¶5. (C) Zelaya attempted to brush off any objection by 
Honduran politicians to his meeting with Ortega and Chavez 
with the explanation that all countries have groups of 
friends, and sometimes those groups do not get along with 
each other. Honduras can be friends with Nicaragua and 
Venezuela, who are in one group,  and with the U.S. which is 
in another. Zelaya did not see any problem with his close 
contacts with Nicaragua and Venezuela and stated that those 
contacts should not affect Honduras's relation with the U.S. 
Zelaya stressed he considers the Honduras - U.S. relationship 
very important and wants to maintain a close and strong 
friendship. 
 
---------------------------- 
Creation of a Shared Agenda 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (C) Passing over Zelaya's explanations for his Managua 
trip, Ambassador Ford explained that the reason that trip 
received so much interest is because there is very little 
else to focus on in the Honduras - U.S. relationship. Zelaya 
has been in office for almost 1.5 years, yet there is still 
no movement on a shared agenda. In fact, it does not appear 
that the Zelaya administration has an agenda and no progress 
is being made on those key areas that are important to the 
USG. The President responded by pulling out a small notebook 
and making a list of those topics he considered most 
important to address: security, commercial interests, the 
Millennium Challenge Account, the justice system and the 
environment. 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Ford responded with his own list and 
elaborated on specific issues within each of the following 
areas: (1) Regional Security: publication of the National 
Security Strategy and use of peacekeepers, along with the use 
of SICA to promote regional security; (2) Economic: 
society-wide macro-economic issues must be addressed, in 
addition to the specific problems at the state-owned 
telephone company (Hondutel) and electric company (ENEE); (3) 
Rule of law and corruption to include increased prosecutions 
and judicial system reform; and (4) Social justice issues. 
The Ambassador stressed that those are the key areas that 
must be part of a joint agenda. Zelaya agreed with the list 
and stated he is ready to start the process at the 
Presidential level to move that agenda forward. He tasked his 
Foreign Minister with pulling together a working meeting to 
make some initial decisions soon after President Lula's 
August 7 visit. 
 
-------------------- 
Reina's Visa Plea 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The conversation eventually turned toward the primary 
purpose of the meeting: what can be done to obtain a G-1 visa 
for Jorge Arturo Reina so he can assume his position at the 
United Nations? Zelaya made only a few general comments in 
support of his proposed ambassador, highlighting his family 
relationship with Reina, Reina's long service in various 
Honduran administrations and his desire for Reina to go to 
New York. Zelaya did not make a direct request for the visa 
nor did he argue that USG must grant Reina a visa to travel 
to the U.N. Instead, after his brief introduction, he 
motioned to Reina to make his own case. Foreign Minister 
Jimenez did not offer any support or make any comments in 
Reina's favor. 
 
¶9. (C) Reina tried to disavow his early radical days and 
claimed he was never a Communist. He also tried to wave off 
his early activities in various radical groups, commenting 
that all that happened so long ago in the 1960s and 1970s. He 
is still proud of his support for the Sandinista takeover of 
Nicaragua and argued that the Sandinistas were fighting for a 
good cause and the whole world wanted Somoza gone. Reina was 
very general in discussing the terrorist-related allegations 
against him and tried to dismiss them as either never 
occurring or they were not as serious as the USG may think. 
In the end, Reina offered to meet with Post officials to talk 
about the allegations and stated he will "come clean" about 
his early activities. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Ford responded that Post will try to 
accommodate Reina's visa request but made no guarantee as to 
the eventual outcome or a timeframe for a final decision. The 
one condition requested by the Ambassador, and quickly agreed 
to by Zelaya, was that the GOH keep this matter out of the 
papers, particularly any characterization of US views on this 
visa. The local media does not need to know every step of 
this visa application process. Zelaya ended the subject by 
telling Reina to work with Post on this matter. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT. Obtaining President Zelaya's commitment to 
begin work on five or six key items that are essential for 
the Honduran - U.S. agenda was the important result of this 
meeting. Post will develop the proposed agenda in detail and 
push the GOH to commence working jointly on the items. As for 
the visa problem, neither Zelaya nor Reina appeared to 
believe the issue will be resolved in their favor. Zelaya 
offered only minimal support for his candidate while Reina's 
speech was rather short and it did not appear that even Reina 
believed what he was saying. Reina appeared to simply be 
going through the motions of arguing on his own behalf but 
not believing that his explanations would change the outcome. 
This may signal that Zelaya will not give Reina much time to 
resolve the visa issue and if the matter reaches an impasse 
 
or takes too long, Zelaya may pick another candidate. Reina's 
visa is now solely a matter between him and the USG, while 
Zelaya and Minister Jimenez distance themselves from the 
problem. END COMMENT. 
 
FORD