VZCZCXRO7249
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0853/01 2001353
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191353Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9378
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV GE EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH OPPOSITION LEADER ON MISSILE DEFENSE: 
WORRIED ABOUT EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Jiri Paroubek, Chairman of the opposition 
Czech Social Democrats (CSSD), told Ambassador July 18 that 
he continues to have no personal objection to missile 
defense, but has been placed in a bind because of the lack of 
support within his party and the absence of maneuvering room 
the government has permited him.  He said the best hope for a 
change in the atmosphere within CSSD would be proof that the 
missile threat was real, which he does not expect will be 
seen in the next year.  Paroubek said he is very focused on 
improving CSSD's relations with the German Social Democrats, 
and said that he is close to reaching an agreement on 
cooperation with SPD; he made clear that SPD's views on MD 
will color his own.  However, contradicting a statement he 
made in a televised debate, Paroubek said that he would 
adhere to any agreement concluded by this government if he 
becomes Prime Minister, including missile defense.  Paroubek 
also said he looks forward to visiting the United States 
later this year.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador asked to meet with Paroubek to discuss 
several recent comments the CSSD leader has made that appear 
to signal a toughening position on MD.  The meeting took 
place at the embassy.  The Ambassador acknowledged Paroubek's 
difficult political situation, but reminded him of his 
repeated pledge to remain flexible on MD.  He encouraged 
Paroubek to think beyond politics and consider what is 
important for his country.  He reminded Paroubek that CSSD 
had previously focused heavily on the importance of linking 
the proposed U.S. MD assets in Europe to NATO, and noted how 
much progress had been achieved on this front in a short 
period. 
 
¶3. (C) Paroubek's response was largely focused on politics. 
He complained that he faced a dilemma in that there was 
almost no support for MD within his party and further that 
the Topolanek government had left him "no room to maneuver." 
He assured the Ambassador he was looking for a way to make MD 
work within CSSD.  The only sure way to build support within 
the party was to demonstrate that there is an actual threat 
to the country from missile attack, not a "virtual threat." 
He doubted such a shift in perception would take place in the 
next 6-12 months, i.e., within the period that the MD 
agreements will be negotiated and considered in Parliament. 
Paroubek acknowledged the Ambassador's assessment of the 
progress on NATO, but stated only that he "wished it had come 
earlier." 
 
¶4. (C) Paroubek focused much of the meeting on his relations 
with other European social democratic parties.  He said that 
CSSD positions will increasingly reflect the views of 
European social democrats.  Specifically he focused on CSSD's 
links with the German SPD.  He termed this the most important 
partner for CSSD, and said he wants the closest possible 
cooperation with them.  Paroubek revealed that he is now 
negotiating a cooperation agreement with SPD.  He termed MD 
the first issue on which SPD had expressed significant 
interest in cooperating with CSSD.  He added that the 
position of his "friends" in Europe -- mentioning 
specifically Slovak PM Fico and Italian PM Prodi -- made it 
difficult for him to take a more positive stance on MD.  At 
the same time, as he always does, Paroubek went out of his 
way to stress that MD was the only significant issue on which 
his party disagreed with the U.S. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador and Paroubek also discussed the trip he 
plans to make (with USG support) to the U.S. in the fall. 
Paroubek promised to let us know the best dates for travel in 
October or November, depending on the parliamentary calendar. 
 He said (without notable enthusiasm) that he looks forward 
to learning more about MD and U.S. policy, and said he had no 
specific requests in terms of facilities that he would visit. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Paroubek clearly feels backed into a corner 
on MD.  It is not clear from this meeting whether he is 
responding now primarly to domestic political calculations or 
some desire to boost his influence by expanding his position 
on the European stage.  Czech government officials told us 
they had not previously heard of Paroubek's desire for closer 
cooperation with SPD, and plan to use their own connections 
in Berlin to see if the SPD connection can actually be a 
positive.  The GOCR continues to see Paroubek as a key 
element in their effort to win eventual parliamentary 
approval of the MD agreements.  We will be encouraging the 
government to find some way to counter Paroubek's perception 
that the government has left him no "maneuvering room."  We 
(and the GOCR) continue to support the planned Paroubek trip 
to the U.S. in the fall, including a visit to U.S. facilities 
 
PRAGUE 00000853  002 OF 002 
 
 
where he can be briefed both on the MD system and the threat 
to Europe and the United States. 
DODMAN