VZCZCXRO6862
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1236/01 2121143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311143Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9158
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: CURRENT TRENDS IN PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: The Juba Peace Talks are on recess while the 
Government of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
undertake consultations with various stakeholders.  The break 
has provided many observers and the Government of Uganda an 
opportunity to take stock of the process and potential 
scenarios for its outcome.  End Summary. 
 
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ASSESSING THE PROCESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Government of Uganda is reviewing potential 
scenarios for the peace process. These include: the talks 
succeed and the LRA sign and implement a peace deal; the LRA 
signs an agreement but fails to implement it; and finally, 
the talks fail.  The consensus of civilian and military 
officials is that the LRA may sign an agreement one year from 
now and fail to implement it if the process does not fail 
before then.  Their analysis is based on the assumption that 
the LRA entered into and is using the peace process to 
regroup, rearm, resupply, and rebrand itself.  More 
importantly, the Government also views external patrons, 
Khartoum and the Ugandan diaspora, as providing the necessary 
support to encourage the LRA not to give up.  The 
Government's assessment of potential outcomes is shared by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), major 
non-governmental and human rights organizations such as 
International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, and other 
diplomatic missions. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
TIME IS ON WHOSE SIDE 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Many close observers argue that the peace process has 
given the LRA the time and space it needed to: 
A) get its commanders together at Garamba under the guise of 
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) (regroup); B) 
food and medical treatment for its combatants and 
non-combatants (resupply); C) a safehaven accessible for safe 
military resupply (rearm); and D) the opportunity to 
legitimize and "cleanse its image" for the international 
community (rebrand) at the peace table.  The GOU believes 
that the LRA is being re-tooled by Khartoum to undermine the 
Government of Southern Sudan.  Santa Okot, a member of the 
LRA's Juba delegation told us that the LRA believes it will 
take another year to conclude a peace agreement. That puts 
the process into July 2008, one year from elections in 
southern Sudan and three from the referendum on southern 
Sudan's independence called for in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
 
¶4.  (C) However, time is also on the Government of Uganda's 
side.  At the beginning of the process, northern Ugandans 
living in squalid camps, wanted peace at any cost.  At the 
time, the Government's position on justice issues coincided 
with public opinion in the north that traditional 
reconciliation mechanisms would be enough to end the war. 
The Government was unable to build enough confidence between 
the LRA leadership and Museveni to get a deal in late 
December.  Since then, outside influences, most notably 
Khartoum and the diaspora, have hardened the LRA's stance and 
led to many delays in the process.  The GOU wants to conclude 
a deal quickly.  In the meantime, northern Ugandans continue 
to return to or near their homes.  One year without an LRA 
attack in northern Uganda could be changing northern public 
opinion more in favor of justice.  In August 2006, it was 
common to hear that peace was the most important priority, 
even over justice.  Now, with one year of a peaceful 
situation on the ground, northerners appear to be thinking 
more about justice.  The consultation process will further 
illuminate current trends.  Another factor working in the 
Government's favor is growing economic opportunities in the 
north.  With each growing season, internally-displaced 
persons are gaining more economic independence and are 
well-placed to stock Juba's markets, which are already 
dominated by Ugandan traders. 
 
¶5.  (C) These trends also mean that time is not on the side 
of northern politicians, primarily from the opposition. 
Their popularity is based upon being anti-government.  With 
the movement of IDPs back to or near their homes, northern 
politicians will hear more and more about the needs for 
services from their constituents.  For now, the northern 
elected leaders have been able to blame the central 
government for lack of services.  In time, however, these 
same elected leaders will need to show that they stand for 
something, not just against Museveni.  Many astute northern 
politicians understand this, which is why they continue to 
 
KAMPALA 00001236  002 OF 002 
 
 
call for a U.S. Special Envoy on northern Uganda.  They fear 
that changing trends will weaken their position in the north 
and view a national reconciliation conference to address the 
north's marginalization as an opportunity to extract 
concessions from Museveni.  Without a national conference, it 
will become difficult to re-adjust changing trends in power. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Despite our continued misgivings about the importance 
of the agreements reached at the peace talks at Juba, the 
process has resulted in an improved security situation in 
northern Uganda, and for now, southern Sudan.  However, we 
still do not see indications that LRA leaders Joseph Kony and 
Vincent Otti, have decided what their end game is.  Without 
continued pressure, particularly military pressure, the LRA 
leaders are growing more and more comfortable at Garamba 
National Park, making alliances with other groups, and 
enjoying food and medical support provided by international 
donors.  One journalist argues that the fact that the LRA is 
getting more comfortable could actually sow the seeds of its 
own disintegration as fighters become complacent and lose 
their edge.  While this may be happening, we would prefer to 
see Kony and Otti persuaded to put an end to the conflict 
before the LRA transforms itself and commits fully to being 
used by external patrons in the region. 
BROWNING