VZCZCXRO5805
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0049/01 1991220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 181220Z JUL 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0157
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0150
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0141
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0107
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD 
BAKU FOR HAUGEN; PARIS FOR WALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/18/2027 
TAGS: IR PREL PGOV KNNP
SUBJECT: "WELL-CONNECTED" IRANIANS GIVE DIFFERING VIEWS OF POWER 
STRUCTURE 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000049  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S)  Summary: Three Iranians who claim to be well-connected - 
a former IRGC official, a former Guardian Council staff member, 
and a leading businessman - gave contrasting views of the 
behind-the-scenes power structure of the Iranian regime. 
According to the former IRGC official, the bazaaris (traditional 
merchant class) run the country, having bought off the ruling 
clergy.  The former Guardian Council staff member claimed that 
the clerical elite in Qom make ultimate decisions on all major 
policies, because Supreme Leader Khamenei does not have 
sufficient religious credentials to make those decisions.  The 
businessman claimed that a group of 500 "fascist neocons" headed 
by 10-12 influential men run the country.  All three sources 
claimed the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba is an avenue to reach 
the Supreme Leader, although the IRGC official said Mojtaba is 
used by others and is not influential in his own right.  There 
have long been competing theories among Iran scholars and 
analysts about who actually wields authority in Iran.  Even 
these purported regime insiders differ on where ultimate 
authority resides, lending credence to the view that no one 
power center predominates.  End Summary. 
 
Bazaaris are in charge, says former IRGC official 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------- 
 
2.(S) Three Iranians who claim to be well-connected recently 
offered IRPO contrasting assessments of the behind-the-scenes 
structure of power and influence in the Iranian regime.  A 
former IRGC official maintained that the bazaaris, the 
well-established and traditionally influential merchant class, 
essentially run the country.  He claimed that they have placed 
"their people" in government offices and that they have bought 
off the ruling clergy.  The former IRGC official noted that 
bazaaris have long collected alms on behalf of the clerics.  He 
added that since the Islamic revolution, the bazaaris have been 
permitted to invest alms on behalf of the clerics, who would, 
theoretically, redistribute the profits to the poor.  The 
contact claimed that much of this money is invested or held in 
Dubai. 
 
3.(S)  The former IRGC official described the bazaaris as 
different from the rest of the private sector, saying that the 
bazaaris are generally a well-established and well-organized 
group of mostly traders that are present in every major city. 
He said that banks will not loan money to ordinary people 
without a bribe, but that bazaaris will get bank loans and then 
re-loan the money.  The contact claimed that bazaaris, IRGC and 
other groups offer loans at very high interest rates (60% or 
more), notwithstanding the Islamic prohibition on usury.  Asked 
why the bazaaris would not force the privatization of the oil 
industry in order to gain control of it, he said that they are 
traders not producers, and that they make money selling 
equipment to the government.  The bazaaris will resist change 
unless it benefits them economically, but are adept at deriving 
business advantage from changes in Iranian domestic and foreign 
policy.  For example, asked how President Ahmadi-Nejad's 
anti-Israel and Holocaust rhetoric serves bazaari interests, the 
contact said that it increased their trade with Arab 
businessmen, with whom Ahmadi-Nejad is popular. 
 
4.(S) The former IRGC official claimed that the Supreme Leader's 
son, Mojtaba, is well-placed but is not powerful himself.  The 
contact alleged that Basij commander Hejazi and other members of 
the Supreme Leader's office use Mojtaba as an avenue to 
influence his father.  The former IRGC official claimed that the 
Supreme Leader discourages his sons from entering business or 
politics. 
 
Former GC staff member says clerics in Qom and their hardline 
supporters run the country 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------ 
 
5.(S)  A former staff member on the Guardian Council where he 
was an aide to Presidential Office spokesman Gholam Hossein 
Elham, maintained that Supreme Leader Khamenei does not have 
sufficient religious credentials to make authoritative decisions 
and that he relies on the senior clerics at the seminaries in 
Qom to bolster and sometimes make major policy decisions.  The 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000049  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
contact said that the religious community is divided between 
supporters of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri - a noted critic of the 
regime and the concept of absolute rule by the jurisprudent 
(velayat-e-faqhi) - and the more hard-line pro-government 
clerics associated with the Qom Theological Lecturer's 
Association (QTLA).  He said that these hard-line clerics have 
influential advisers, some of whom are bazaaris. 
 
8.(S) The former Guardian Council staff member said that 
Habibollah Asgaroladi, the head of the Islamic Coalition Party, 
is an influential figure, and also listed some key members of 
the QTLA.  These include: Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad 
Jannati; Ayatollah Momammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi; Ayatollah Hossein 
Rasti Kashani; Ayatollah Mohammad Emani-Kashani; Ayatollah 
Mohammad Yazdi; Grand Ayatollah Lotfallah Safi Golpayegani; 
Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi; Tehran Friday prayers 
leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami; Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan 
Taheri Khorram-Abadi; Ghazi Khorram-Abadi; Hojatoleslam 
Husseini-Bushehri; Ayatollah Reza Ostadi; Majid Momen; Ayatollah 
Gholamreza Rezvani; FNU Ghadari; Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani; 
Ayatollah Abbas Vaez Tabasi; Ayatollah Mohyeddin Haeri Shirazi; 
Ayatollah Ali Meshkini; Grand Ayatollah Nouri-Hamedani (who was 
accused of being in charge of the "chain killings" of prominent 
Iranian reform activists during the Khatami period). 
 
9.(S) The contact said the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba plays a 
role, but does not have an independent power base.  According to 
the contact, the ruling clerics operate on the basis of 
self-preservation and personal interests instead of national 
interests. 
 
10.(S)  Speaking about the nuclear issue, the former Guardian 
Council staff member said he believes Iran wants to develop a 
nuclear bomb for deterrent purposes, but that no one would be 
foolish enough to use it.  He said he believes that developing a 
nuclear weapon and maintaining the status quo in Iraq are two of 
the ruling elite's top goals.  The contact maintained that the 
"semi-government," such as Rafsanjani and Khatami, support 
suspension, but the senior clerics in Qom oppose it, and the 
latter's views are Iran's declared positions.  Regarding future 
elections, he said that in a country of 70 million people, there 
are 90 million identity cards (which is the only documentation 
required for voting).  If the QLTA and their hardline supporters 
decide to manipulate the next election, he said, Ahmadi-Nejad 
could be returned for a second term as president. 
 
Khamenei relies on group of 500 "neocons" says businessman 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (S) The third contact is a leading businessman whose company 
is among the top three soap and detergent companies in Iran.  He 
claimed that a group of 500 "fascist neocons" led by 10-12 men 
actually run the country.  He described the group of 500 as the 
people that the ruling clerics have always relied upon to "carry 
out their dirty work," and said that they report to a group of 
10-12 men, specifically naming IRGC commander Rahim Yahya 
Safavi, Deputy IRGC commander Mohammad Baqr-Zolqadr, Basij 
commander Mohammad Hejazi, and Keyhan editor Hossein 
Shariatmadari.  These men report to the Supreme Leader through 
his son, Mojtaba, the businessman claimed.  The contact 
recounted that the 1999 student protests worried Khamenei, 
because taken to its logical conclusion, the student movement 
advocated an Iran without a Supreme Leader.  After 1999, 
Khamenei relied more on conservative factions to suppress 
popular uprisings, alleged the businessman. 
 
12.(S)  Regarding the 2005 presidential election, the 
businessman claimed that the group of 500 were under the 
impression that they would be voting - and encouraging others to 
vote for - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, but that they were instructed 
at the last minute to vote for Ahmadi-Nejad. 
 
13.(S) Comment:  While IRPO cannot independently assess the 
validity of these contacts' claims, we have heard each of these 
general theories about the power structure before from other 
Iranian contacts.  All appear to agree that Supreme Leader 
Khamenei does not exercise absolute authority.  It is noteworthy 
that each of the three separate contacts described the Supreme 
Leader's son, Mojtaba, as an avenue to reach Khamenei.  It is 
IRPO's analysis that the bazaaris and the clerical elite both 
exert a strong influence on policy.  The Supreme Leader 
meanwhile maintains an array of tools to balance the needs of 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000049  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
these and other constituencies and his priorities for the 
regime.  What is clear is that the key levers of power are 
exercised behind the scenes, through informal contact, and that 
even those who claim to be well-connected differ on where the 
power and influence in the regime truly lies. 
ASGARD