VZCZCXRO0697
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2182/01 1830801
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020801Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1994
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE:  JUNE 30 MEETING 
 
Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  The fifth meeting of the political 
committee of the USG/Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 
strategic dialogue met for two hours on June 30.  Embassy 
Political Counselor headed the USG team, which included 
Deputy Political Counselor, Embassy Legal Adviser, and ORA 
representative.  Vice President Adil Abdel Mehdi headed the 
ISCI team, joined by ISCI Council of Representatives (CoR) 
members Humam Hammoudi and Jalaladin al-Sagheer.  ISCI is 
unhappy about what they perceive to be continuing USG 
"doubts" about them evidenced by continuing Coalition Force 
detentions of ISCI and ISCI-affiliated Badr Corps members. 
All three believe they have expended political capital to 
bring ISCI closer to the U.S. but have nothing to show for 
it.  ISCI wants the U.S. to deal with them in Shia-dominated 
areas the way it deals with the Kurds in the north.  ISCI 
representatives welcomed Political Counselor's proposal to 
consider focused, joint U.S./ISCI efforts in specific 
locations in Iraq to advance stability and promote 
redevelopment, and to use the political committee as a "think 
tank" to develop actual plans for cooperative action.  End 
Summary. 
 
ISCI Complains About USG "Doubts" and Detentions 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (S) VP Abdel Mehdi emphasized that ISCI is a disciplined 
party with a vision and defined program.  However, relations 
between ISCI and the USG are suffering from U.S. doubts about 
ISCI's independence from Iran; the VP denied that ISCI's 
"friendship" with Iran affects its independence.  The VP 
noted that the USG had quickly opened relations with Sunni 
tribes in Anbar that promised to fight al-Qaeda, and he 
claimed the U.S. had supplied them with arms and other 
benefits.  However, the U.S. military continues to target the 
ISCI-affiliated Badr Corps.  "This pains us," said Abdel 
Mehdi, and strengthens extremists.  The VP also called for 
discussion of what federalism vision each side has for Iraq. 
 
¶3.  (S) Hammoudi highlighted Coalition Force (CF) detentions 
of ISCI members.  Many are security detainees held without 
charges.  Al-Sagheer said the U.S. has an interest in good 
relations with ISCI because of its strong influence in Iraq, 
but the U.S. still doubts ISCI's intentions, based on 
"exaggerated" reports.  Both Hammoudi and al-Sagheer implied 
that they, as moderates, had expended political capital 
within ISCI to bring it closer to the USG, but had not seen 
any benefit from it.  Al-Sagheer also mentioned CF detentions 
of ISCI members and contrasted the U.S. supposedly arming 
Sunni Anbar tribes with what he portrayed as inadequate 
equipping of security forces in Najaf, an ISCI stronghold. 
VP Abdel Mehdi complained that detainee cases should be 
reviewed more frequently than every six months.  The VP hoped 
that the USG would explain to ISCI the reasons for detentions 
of ISCI members and would bring to ISCI information about 
suspect ISCI members before detaining them so ISCI could 
purge its own ranks. 
 
¶4.  (S) Political Counselor noted that the CF power to detain 
derives from UNSCR authority, and that the CF treat all 
detainees equally.  It is not possible to resolve the 
situation by simply having CF rely on ISCI's word; working 
this out is complex and will take time. 
 
Militias 
-------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Political Counselor noted that the USG and ISCI had 
the same overall strategic vision for Iraq as a democratic, 
stable country.  However, this did not immediately translate 
into cooperation on the street level.  Overwhelmingly-Sunni 
Anbar does not present the complexities of sectarianism 
present in provinces like Baghdad and Diyala, which have 
multiple Sunni, Shiite and al-Qaeda-linked groups.  Without 
uniforms, all armed men look alike, and the goal is to get 
armed men off the streets.  ISCI's expectation is that 
strategic dialogue would result in no detentions of those 
affiliated with ISCI, but it is difficult to translate 
political dialogue into dealings with armed men on the street. 
 
¶6.  (S) VP Abdel Mehdi said that Shiite-dominated southern 
Iraq is similar to Anbar in terms of the absence of sectarian 
conflict.  The VP argued that it is inconsistent for the U.S. 
to target Badr while (he claimed) arming Sunni Anbar tribes 
and tolerating the Kurdish peshmerga.  Even the Shiite Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, he claimed, could act freely.  "ISCI 
should be rewarded, not punished," the VP said. 
 
Reconciliation and Benchmarks 
----------------------------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002182  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (S) The VP complained that USG political benchmarks for 
Iraq are one-sided, only favoring Sunnis.  Political 
Counselor explained that Iraq's Sunnis feel excluded from the 
GOI and if not made to feel included, would continue to be a 
problem for Iraq and the region.  The process behind recent 
GOI political appointments has not been transparent and has 
fueled perceptions of sectarianism.  VP Abdel Mehdi defended 
current appointments as only a re-balancing of a system in 
which Sunnis for years enjoyed disproportionately high 
numbers of appointees. 
 
¶8.  (S) Al-Sagheer said his understanding of reconciliation 
is different that the USG's.  For example, in his view, 
de-Ba'athification has nothing to do with reconciliation; 
"many Ba'ath are already back." 
 
Way Forward on USG/ISCI Relations 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) The VP said that ISCI seeks the same type of 
relations with the U.S. that the Kurds have.  Both he and 
al-Sagheer said ISCI is not one side among many, but rather, 
the dominant Shia faction both prior to the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq and in the current Iraqi political scene, and the "main 
component" of the GOI.  The USG should consider ISCI's 
messages "essential." 
 
¶10.  (S) Political Counselor said the USG and ISCI should 
work toward political cooperation in specific geographic 
areas, and use the political leg of the strategic dialogue as 
a "think tank" to develop joint ideas and plans on large 
strategic issues including federalism, reconciliation, rule 
of law, elections and de-Ba'athification. 
 
¶11.  (S) The VP welcomed both ideas.  He suggested an area 
where ISCI has "political weight," such as the southern 
cities of Nasariyah, Kut, or Diwaniyah.  Al-Sagheer suggested 
Baghdad's Saidiya district. 
CROCKER