VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #2787/01 1711006
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201006Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUCNSTF/TERRORISM FINANCE PRE NOTIFICATION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1808
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3567
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4680
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNSE/US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T TOKYO 002787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR JENNIFER FOWLER, SECRET SERVICE FOR CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION 
 
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 06/21/2017 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KH KS SZ JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL DPRK INTEREST IN 
CURRENCY PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 061051 
     ¶B. BERLIN 000963 
     ¶C. SECSTATE 71148 
     ¶D. BERN 00543 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joe Donovan. 
Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 6. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary:  In a series of recent meetings, embassy 
officials raised the DPRK,s possible procurement of 
Japanese-manufactured currency counterfeiting equipment with 
the government of Japan.  We explained that, given the 
unlikeliness of competing firms selling any high-end currency 
production equipment to the DPRK,s Central Bank (refs A and 
D), there is a significant chance of the DPRK approaching 
Japan,s Komori company to procure an offset/intaglio press 
for the purposes of counterfeiting U.S. currency. GOJ 
officials have responded that there is no legal basis for 
them to prevent the sale of currency printing machinery to 
the DPRK. METI officials have asked if the USG has worked 
with other countries to prevent such equipment from reaching 
the DPRK. End Summary. 
 
¶3. (S) POLOFF delivered ref C on DPRK currency production 
equipment to the Foreign Ministry,s Asian and Oceanic 
Affairs Bureau, Northeast Asia Division on May 25.  The 
Bureau asked for additional time to study the information and 
to determine, in coordination with the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI), the Japanese laws that Tokyo 
might use to restrict the export of the equipment, adding 
that they planned to share the information with the National 
Police Agency (NPA). 
 
¶4. (S) On June 14, ECONOFF met with officials from METI's 
Trade Control Policy Divison, which takes the lead on export 
control issues.  METI noted that while the ministry can 
approach Japanese currency production equipment manufacturer 
Komori to let them know that the DPRK may be trying to obtain 
advance equipment, there is nothing METI can do to officially 
restrict the export of the equipment.  Japan,s export 
control regime is divided into two categories: items 
controlled for security reasons (i.e. relating to WMD) and 
items controlled because Japan is a signatory to a particular 
treaty.  Printing machines do not fall into either category. 
Printing machines are listed on Japan,s catch-all list, they 
said, but this nomenclature is so broad that, in practical 
terms, customs officers would be unlikely to inspect outgoing 
items labeled as such. 
 
¶5. (S) When asked about the list developed to comply with 
UNSCR 1718, METI stated that getting the machines placed on 
that list would take the effort of the entire Japanese 
government and require the Prime Minister,s office to issue 
an ordinance instructing METI to act.  According to the 
officials, this would be very difficult, and they were vague 
regarding their intention to pursue any contact with Komori. 
 
¶6. (S) Action Request: The METI officials would like to know 
if the U.S. Government has worked with any other countries 
that manufacture currency production equipment.  If so, they 
would like to know in what way.  Post seeks guidance as to 
whether we can share general aspects of the Drent Goebel case 
with the Government of Japan.  If permissible, Post seeks 
information on how the U.S. Government and the Government of 
Germany cooperated/are cooperating to ensure Drent Goebel 
machinery does not get exported to entities of concern. 
 
¶7. (S) FINATT, ICE, and LEGATT met with Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), Financial Bureau, Treasury Division Director Takeshi 
Uera, and Director for Currency Policy Shunshuke Shirakawa on 
 
SIPDIS 
June 20. While the meeting was ostensibly to learn more about 
MOF,s newly announced counterfeiting office (to be opened 
next month with a staff of eight and a director to be named 
shortly), the discussion centered around the non-paper (ref 
C). 
 
¶8. (S) While Director Uera pledged that MOF would make its 
best effort to prevent any transaction of this nature, 
Shirakawa confirmed that there was no legal basis preventing 
 
the sale of currency-printing machinery to the DPRK. 
Shirakawa also disclosed that Japan,s National Printing 
Bureau procures its yen-production machinery from Komori, 
raising the prospect of yen counterfeiting. Upon further 
discussion, MOF agreed that DPRK counterfeiting could 
represent a series of risks, including financial system 
stability and use of illicit funds for the purpose of weapons 
proliferation.  Upon LEGATT,s suggestion that Komori might 
face considerable reputation risk in the event of a 
publicized sale of such a product to North Korea, and that 
the DPRK might resort to using a front company to veil their 
activities, MOF suggested that the matter be taken up with 
the NPA. 
 
¶9. (S) Comment: We have not fully satisfied the demarche,s 
objective to obtain assurances from Japanese government 
officials that they will use their influence and legal 
authorities to prevent the sale of currency production 
equipment to North Korea.  Despite the steady state of 
anxiety in Japan over North Korea,s WMD activities, 
counterfeiting, BDA funds, and criminal enterprises, the 
disclosure of this information did not appear to prompt any 
sense of urgency, with the possible exception of the Ministry 
of Finance, which lacks the tools to take concrete measures. 
It is possible that the NPA may take a more active, 
law-enforcement approach to this issue, and Post will 
immediately report developments following an upcoming meeting 
with the police. 
DONOVAN