VZCZCXRO1899
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0978/01 1721309
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211309Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7672
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND AF/SPG, NSC 
FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2035 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM EIAD SU
SUBJECT: (C) SAF WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE WILL BE MISSED, BUT 
SPLA WON'T MOVE EITHER 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will not 
complete the withdrawal of their troops from southern Sudan 
by the July 9 deadline mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement.  Moreover, UNMIS recalculation of figures 
tied to earlier troop movements now places the total 
percentage of redeployed SAF at 69%, well below earlier 
estimates.  Non-functional Joint Integrated Units in the 
Upper Nile region of southern Sudan have weakened SPLA 
confidence in the CPA's redeployment timeframes.  Political 
decisions taken to freeze SPLA redeployment until after 
credible JIU formation have now been exacerbated by 
logistical impediments imposed by the rainy season.  Khartoum 
contends that its compliance with the July 9 deadline is 
dependent upon "credible commencement" of SPLA withdrawal 
from the North. The UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military 
Commission is paralyzed by the stand-off, and has passed the 
issue to the Ceasefire Political Commision for resolution. 
The SPLM is less worried about the deadline that the risk of 
a slow drift into unintentional violence.  A modified 
redeployment timeline hinges upon agreement within the 
Presidency.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) UNMIS officials told the Assessment and Evaluation 
Commission June 18 that they had "no confidence" that the 
Sudanese Armed Forces would meet the July 9 redeployment 
deadline from southern Sudan.  Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) 
Commander Thomas Cirillo noted the same to PolOff in 
conversations in Juba on June 13.  Official UNMIS 
redeployment totals for the SAF's withdrawal from the South 
now officially stand at 69%.  The onset of the rainy season, 
and flagging political will by Khartoum to adhere to the CPA 
deadline, make it improbable that total redeployment will 
occur on schedule.  JIU Commander Cirillo, based on 
discussions during the March Joint Defense Board meeting, 
believes SAF redeployment will not be finalized until year's 
end.  SAF/SPLA mistrust and tension in the aftermath of what 
constitutes a CPA violation is likely to be high, and beyond 
the reach of what Cirillo termed to be "an overly 
politicized" Joint Defense Board.  Although the Commander 
does not forsee outright conflict on the order of the 
December 2006 ceasefire violation in Malakal, the missed 
deadline compounds difficulties dogging JIU establishment 
along the 1956 border.  Absent functional JIUs in the 
near-term, he cautioned, UNMIS remains the only neutral 
military force in the South. 
 
¶3. (C) The National Congress Party and Sudanese Armed Forces 
contest UNMIS' most recent recalculation of SAF redployment 
totals.  UNMIS Force Commander Lidder ordered a numbers check 
in the run up to the two year anniversary of the Government 
of National Unity.  Concurrently, the UN-chaired Ceasefire 
Joint Military Commission accepted the SPLA's challenge of 
SAF redeployment totals that included newly-aligned militias 
or "other armed groups" (OAGs).  (NOTE: SAF and SPLA 
redeployment totals are based on fixed figures established 
during the Naivasha peace process.  The SPLA argues that 
including OAGs in SAF redeployment totals unfairly inflates 
the percentages monitored and reported by UNMIS. END NOTE) 
UNMIS reassessed its interpretation of SAF redeployment 
totals at the request of the CJMC. The UN now cites SAF 
withdrawal from the South at only 69% complete, well below 
previous estimates. 
 
¶4. (C) The disagreement between the UN and Khartoum over the 
current status of SAF redeployment stems from the UN's 
challenge of claims, by SAF leadership, that Khartoum has 
successfully demobilized and disarmed 100% of the SAF-aligned 
OAGs in the South.  The SAF recently undertook a unilateral 
weapons buy-back program near Malakal, supported logistically 
by UNMIS and UNDDR.  Khartoum claims its 100% success rate as 
"valid and accurate," and argues the exercise was monitored 
by UNMIS in accordance with the CPA.  UNMIS representatives 
publicly stated at the June 18 AEC meeting that the UN 
believes the Malakal exercise resulted in disarmament of 
less-than 10% of the of the accepted-total of SAF-aligned 
OAGs in the South.  The UN's decision to "observe and report 
on" -- not monitor -- the exercise was predicated on the fact 
the SAF's disarmament campaign was done in the absence of 
coordination of either the Other Armed Group Coordinating 
Council or the National DDR Commission or its two regional 
sub-counterpart commissions. According to the UNMIS 
representative, "not only did this result in a significant 
flow of cash into a formerly heavily-weaponized community but 
also 'demobilized' militias without the benefit of a regional 
or national strategy for their subsequent peaceful 
re-integration into society." 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000978  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (C) SPLA redeployment from areas North of 1956 is on hold, 
as well.  While the SPLA has moved troops to CPA-mandated 
assembly areas, withdrawal from Northern border-line states 
cannot move forward as a result of the rainy season.  GNU 
Minister for Trade and Investment (and probably future 
governor of Blue Nile State) Malik Agar told PolOff June 17 
that, regardless of inclement weather, SPLA would not fully 
return to the South until "JIUs are credibly assembled." 
Agar claimed the SPLA had made a good faith effort in March, 
redeploying 90% of its forces 24km south of Blue Nile state, 
leaving only heavily mechanized forces in Kormuk.  Despite 
this, he argued, the move did not generate SAF reciprocity, 
particularly with respect to expedited JIU formation within 
the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan. Agar repeated the 
90% SPLA redeployment claim at the June 18 AEC, and 
emphasized its accuracy to a skeptical NCP delegation. The 
NCP reiterated to the assembled AEC its belief that SAF does 
not need to wholly comply with the July 9 deadline in the 
face of SPLA instransigence. (NOTE: UNMIS has pledged that it 
will monitor the development and report back to the AEC. END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (C) SPLM insider Deng Alor, the GNU's Minister of Cabinet 
Affairs, told the Charge on June 21 that he was less 
concerned about a missed deadline than the possibility of 
intentional or accidental violence breaking out between 
undisciplined OAGs and the SPLM.  "It is true that the SAF 
does not fully control them," he noted but they have had some 
kind of relationship in the past." He added that the SPLA 
will not move further until the SAF does -- and that may be 
after the rainy season ends. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ceasefire Joint Military Commission (CJMC) has 
been paralyzed by the parties' mutual stubborness and 
creative interpretation of the CPA's security arrangements. 
Policy directives on how to handle North/South redeployment, 
DDR, and OAG integration have now been passed to the 
Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) jointly chaired by 
President Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir, who are 
already dealing with major substantive issues.  An 
alternative to the CPC handling any of these issues would be 
the Joint Defense Board.  The JDB last met in March. 
Subsequent meetings have all been postponed, to include the 
one that was to occur this week. 
FERNANDEZ