VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1107/01 1550550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040550Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8445
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL GM
SUBJECT: CFE: GERMANY PUSHES FOR BEING FORWARD-LEANING ON 
A/CFE RATIFICATION AT UPCOMING EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE 
 
REF: STATE 75293 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOHN BAUMAN. REASONS: 
1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Germany believes that at the June 12-15 CFE 
Extraordinary Conference, a point-by-point rebuttal of 
Russian concerns about CFE could prove counterproductive and 
play into the hands of hardliners in Moscow.  Instead, 
Germany believes that NATO should be forward-leaning and take 
"an orchestrated, step-by-step approach" that demonstrates to 
Moscow that all the Allies are genuinely committed to 
ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty once Russia has fulfilled 
the Istanbul commitments.  Germany continues to take a more 
restrictive view of the Istanbul commitments with regard to 
Russian troops in Moldova than is accepted by the rest of the 
Alliance.  End Summary. 
 
Favors an earlier HLTF meeting 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Post delivered reftel talking points June 1 to MFA 
Envoy for Disarmament and Arms Control, Amb. Friedrich 
Groening, who promised to study them carefully before next 
week's HLTF meeting.  Given an extensive discussion of these 
issues with the Embassy just the day before (see below), 
Groening offered no substantive comments on the U.S. 
nonpaper, but did express concern about the possibility that 
the HLTF meeting may slip to Friday, June 8.  With informal 
consultations for the Extraordinary CFE Conference beginning 
Monday, June 11 in Vienna, Groening was afraid that there 
would be very little opportunity for "mending fences" before 
the conference if the HLTF meeting did not go well. 
Therefore, he argued for holding the HLTF as previously 
scheduled on Thursday, June 7 and the Quad pre-coordination 
meeting the day before. 
 
Engage Russians rather than rebut their arguments 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) On May 31, prior to the arrival of reftel, Groening 
called in the political minister counselor and polmil chief 
to register concern about the U.S. approach at the previous 
day's Deputy HLTF meeting in Brussels.  Also attending on the 
German side was MFA Office Director for Conventional Arms 
Control Michael Biontino.  Based on German reporting from the 
meeting, Groening characterized the U.S. line as "the usual 
tough stuff," which he thought would be counterproductive if 
used with the Russians.  He agreed that the six points put 
forward by the Russians in their diplomatic note were 
basically groundless -- the first three (concerning groups of 
parties) will be automatically resolved when the A/CFE comes 
into force and the other three do not make much sense. 
Nonetheless, rather than rebutting the Russian arguments 
point-by-point, Groening thought it would be better to 
"engage the Russians" so we can "move forward." 
 
Key is giving assurances on A/CFE ratification 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C) Groening claimed to have already discussed some ideas 
for an "orchestrated, step-by-step approach" with ISN A/S 
John Rood, whom he met in Washington two weeks ago, before 
the Russians called for the extraordinary conference on CFE. 
The key to success, according to Groening, is giving the 
Russians assurances that NATO is ready and committed to 
ratify the A/CFE Treaty.  He claimed that the Russians are 
genuinely convinced that the Allies will not ratify the 
A/CFE, even if Moscow does everything we are demanding 
regarding the Istanbul commitments.  According to Groening, 
the Russians believe the Allies are deliberately sabotaging 
the A/CFE because the new agreement is, on balance, more 
favorable to Russia than to the West.  Groening argued that 
"different streams" of Russian elite opinion have come 
together to call for the extraordinary CFE conference, 
including many who want to use it to avoid flank limits or to 
get out of the CFE treaty altogether.  A confrontational 
stance by NATO would just play into the hands of the 
hardliners. 
 
Disagreement over the Istanbul commitment for Moldova 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (C) We assured Groening that the U.S. too wanted to engage 
the Russians and to try to move forward.  We pointed out that 
it has long been our policy to actively help the Russians 
meet their Istanbul commitments, for example, by helping 
financing the withdrawal of ammunition from Moldova.  Along 
the same lines, the U.S. has made it clear that we are ready 
to work with the Russians to help internationalize the 
peacekeeping force in Moldova to make it acceptable to 
Chisinau.  Groening argued that the Russian peacekeepers in 
Transnistria are not part of the Istanbul commitments, since 
their presence is covered by the 1992 cease-fire agreement 
which, according to Groening, remains in force and has never 
been abrogated by Chisinau.  Only the ammunition and the 
Russian soldiers guarding the depot (about 500) are covered, 
according to Groening.  Regarding the U.S. offer to help the 
Russians internationalize the peacekeeping force in 
Transnistria, Groening claimed that this was unlikely to get 
anywhere since, in his opinion, the Russians would never 
accept such a change absent a solution to the whole status 
issue.  He thought we would never get past the Istanbul 
commitment issue in Moldova if we linked it to resolution of 
the underlying conflict. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) Although Groening never really spelled out his 
"step-by-step approach," it seems to be based on the idea 
that in return for the Russians making progress on their 
Istanbul commitments, the Allies would begin the process of 
A/CFE ratification, on the understanding, of course, that 
ratification would not be completed until the Russians have 
fully complied with their Istanbul commitments.  Groening 
believes the main objective of the Russians at the upcoming 
extraordinary conference will be to see what the Allies are 
willing to do to get the A/CFE ratification process started. 
Groening fears that if the Allies are not forward-leaning on 
the issue of ratification, the Moscow hardliners could use it 
as an excuse to push for Russian abrogation of the CFE Treaty. 
TIMKEN JR