VZCZCXRO8015
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #3378/01 1690930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180930Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7705
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4402
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7299
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3263
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9415
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, S/CT, INR (VINCENT) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINR KHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NEW VIOLENCE STATISTICS; MORE 
DEADLY AMBUSHES 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 03092 (PATTANI MOSQUE PROTEST) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 01675 (RISING USE OF PARAMILITARY FORCES) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 01572 (SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING) 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 01390 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR 
        2006) 
     ¶E. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS) 
     ¶F. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  While the number of violent attacks and 
deaths in Thailand's southernmost provinces have not 
dramatically risen in 2007, the casualty rate through April 
has increased, suggesting a qualitative shift in the 
violence.  Indeed, the insurgents appear to be more confident 
in their attacks on security patrols, with at least three 
instances since May where separatists "wiped out" an entire 
government unit.  End Summary. 
 
NO MAJOR INCREASE IN ATTACKS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) As an update to refs (D-F) analysis of violence 
statistics, we recently received Prince of Songkhla 
University Professor Srisomphop's latest report.  Covering 
the period from January through April 2007, this report 
(which includes slight revisions to some 2005 and 2006 data) 
highlights a continuation of 2006 trends:  no dramatic 
increase in the number of incidents (as often claimed in the 
media) but more focused and brutal attacks. 
 
¶3. (C) According to this update, 2173 people have been killed 
in separatist violence since 2004, with 3633 people wounded. 
While the average number of attacks per month in 2007 (181) 
is an increase over 2006 (149 incidents), it is consistent 
with 2005 (180).  The average number of deaths per month in 
2007 (62) is slightly higher than the last three years (56, 
48, and 57, in reverse chronological order).  The most 
dramatic shift, however, lies in the average number of 
injuries per month:  from January to April of this year, an 
average of 158 people were wounded each month.  In 2006 this 
number was only 98; in 2005, 89; and in 2004, 63. 
 
¶4. (C) Of note, the percentage of victims who are Buddhist 
also appears to be rising slightly.  While the number of 
Buddhists injured has traditionally been greater than Muslims 
injured (and the number of Muslims killed greater than 
Buddhists), in the first four months of 2007, Buddhists led 
in both categories.  Of those injured, 65 percent were 
Buddhists.  Of those killed 59 percent were Buddhists. 
(Note: this interim report did not provide specific 
breakdowns on the backgrounds of victims, i.e. civilians vs. 
security forces and other officials.) 
 
BOLDER SEPARATIST ATTACKS ON PATROLS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Coordinated raids across the three provinces (and in 
certain districts of Songkhla), attacks on economic targets, 
and particularly brutal murders (e.g. beheading Buddhist 
monks) have occurred since at least 2004.  Likewise, 
insurgents have consistently focused attacks on elements of 
the state, such as teachers and the security forces.  Several 
recent attacks, however, suggest that the separatists are 
increasingly confident and gradually improving their tactical 
prowess. 
 
¶6. (C) For example, separatists have long sniped at small 
Army or police patrols, particularly on isolated backroads. 
Over time, these fire fights have grown longer, with the 
insurgents not always withdrawing after first contact, even 
against larger units.  On March 21, a patrol of 10 soldiers 
was ambushed in the Bacho district of Narathiwat.  One 
soldier was killed and two wounded in a nearly 10-minute 
firefight.  An even larger contingent of troops was similarly 
attacked on April 23 in the Sungai Padi district of 
Narathiwat,  with at least 18 soldiers wounded after a 
sustained fire fight 
 
 
BANGKOK 00003378  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) The mostly deadly--and dramatic--innovation in 
insurgent tactics has been the combination of IEDs and 
set-piece ambushes on moving security patrols.  Again, the 
use of buried IEDs against both mobile and static government 
targets is not new, but several recent incidents show the 
deadly effectiveness of focused IED attacks against an 
isolated security unit, followed by a sustained fire fight 
 
¶8. (C) On May 9 a seven-man Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special 
Forces (Psyop) unit left a village in the Rangae district of 
Narathiwat.  This unit had been working in the area for 
several months, and, unlike many regular RTA units, included 
soldiers conversant in the Malay-Muslim Yawi language. 
Shortly after their departure, a well-placed and timed IED 
detonated under their pick-up truck, flipping the vehicle in 
the air.  While some details remain unclear, all seven 
soldiers were found dead beside the wreckage, with gunshots 
to the head.  Only two days later, two policeman in a 
checkpoint in the same district were attacked by six 
separatists in a truck.  The insurgents threw a burning can 
of kerosene into the police bunker, forcing the officers out 
where they were killed and their bodies burned. 
 
¶9. (C) Such incidents have not been limited to Narathiwat. 
On May 31, eleven rangers were similarly killed in Banang 
Sata district of Yala, when their truck was hit by a roadside 
IED.  RTA leaders told reporters that those that survived the 
blast were either shot point-blank or strangled by their 
attackers.  Most recently, on June 15, a seven-man RTA patrol 
was hit by an IED on a back road in the same district. 
Initial reports indicate that the seven were killed in the 
blast and subsequent fire fight.  Two separate police patrols 
have similarly been attacked in the Yaring district of 
Pattani, although in both incidents, insurgents failed to 
kill the entire unit. 
 
WHILE "REGULAR" VIOLENCE CONTINUES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The vast majority of deaths in the south remain 
attributable to singleton killings, often in brutal fashion. 
Notable incidents in the last few weeks include the murder of 
police officer on June 7 in Rusoh district of Narathiwat. 
The policeman, who was dropping his wife off at the local 
market, was surrounded by eight pistol-wielding separatists 
in the busy marketplace and executed.  On June 11, insurgents 
walked into a local school's breakroom in Srisakorn, 
Narathiwat and calmly shot two teachers eating lunch. 
Photographs of their bodies on the floor graced the cover of 
local newspapers the next day. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Srisomphop's statistics remain a useful sanity check 
on more sensational analysis in the media (sometimes aided by 
RTG officials), but the rise in the number of injuries per 
month is worrisome.  Separatists have slowly and naturally 
improved their ability to effectively kill security 
patrols--indeed several of our contacts have been warning for 
years that the RTG was likely to have entire unit wiped out 
someday.  This spike in Army and police casualties could lead 
to calls for more aggressive (and potentially heavy-handed) 
tactics, or just as dangerous, an increased unwillingness 
among local units to leave base, effectively ceding more 
territory to the insurgents. 
BOYCE