VZCZCXRO2789
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1598/01 1730702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220702Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2705
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 2916
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV NATO OSCE AJ AM GG RU TU ZJ
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETINGS WITH MFA CAUCASUS DG UMAN AND 
POLICY PLANNING DG CENGIZER 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 b, d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  DAS Matt Bryza met in Ankara on June 14 
with MFA Director General for Caucasus and Central Asia 
Resit Uman and MFA Director General for Policy Planning Altay 
Cengizer.  DAS Bryza shared his views on the previous week's 
disappointing meeting of the Azeri and Armenian Presidents on 
Nagarno-Karabakh.  The two sides also discussed democracy and 
missile defense in Azerbaijan, as well as the Abkhaz conflict 
and Georgia's NATO accession.  DAS Bryza underscored U.S. 
support for Georgia,s NATO aspirations and requested Turkish 
assistance in encouraging dialogue between Tbilisi and 
Sukhumi to advance a peaceful settlement of the Abkhazia 
conflict.  DG Cengizer was pleased with bilateral 
consultations on policy planning and stressed the need for 
Turkey to do a better job describing the full historical 
picture in eastern Anatolia in 1915.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) DAS Bryza welcomed the June 18-20 visit of Deputy U/S 
Cevikoz to Washington, and looked forward to the 
opportunity to "think things through systematically" with the 
GOT. 
 
¶3.  (C) On Nagorno-Karabakh, Uman informed Bryza that Minsk 
Group co-chair Fassier was "cautiously optimistic" about the 
prospects for agreement on the Basic Principles during the 
French Co-Chair,s visit to Ankara a month earlier.    Uman 
asked why there was a perception of no progress on N-K at St. 
Petersburg.  Bryza said Kocharian had led the Co-Chairs and 
Aliyev to believe he (Kocharian) would energize his effort to 
reach agreement on the Basic Principles following Armenia,s 
May parliamentary elections. The FonMins, said Bryza, had 
said they had carried the negotiating process as far as they 
could, and to the point at which decisions by the Presidents 
were required for further progress.  Bryza said he expected 
the Presidents to reach agreement on the nature of the vote 
that would determine NK,s status, e.g., plebiscite or 
referendum.  Aliyev, however, was willing to negotiate 
(though his tactics were a bit passive-aggressive); Kocharian 
was not.  Kocharian indicated he might pass this issue on to 
his successor after the February 2008 presidential elections, 
but agreed to consider another possible meeting with Aliyev 
at the CIS summit in October in Tajikistan.  Bryza assessed 
that deliberations on Kosovo were also influencing 
Kocharian's calculus on N-K. 
 
¶4.  (C) Uman confirmed that FonMin Oskanian was coming to the 
BSEC Summit in Istanbul on June 25, and was planning a press 
conference, as well as delivering remarks to the Turkey 
Economic Relations Board.  Uman hoped this visit would be 
positive, but regretted that Kocharian is not coming. 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Uman asked how U.S. missile defense plans (MD) would 
effect the region.  Bryza said Putin's offer to 
incorporate Azerbaijan,s radar at Gabala into U.S. MD 
planning was a big surprise, which he stressed to Aliyev in 
St. Petersburg.  Aliyev indicated he realized the U.S. was 
taken by surprise and not talking about Azerbaijani military 
assets with Moscow over Baku,s head.  Azeri FM Mammadyarov 
had confirmed with Bryza that Azerbaijan wished to explore 
the project, and saw potential benefit in it by virtue of 
signaling Iran to back off from pressuring Azerbaijan while 
breaking Russia,s monopoly over use of the Gabala radar. 
 
PRESS FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN AZERBAIJAN 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Uman raised the issue of the assault on press freedom 
in Azerbaijan.  Bryza characterized Aliyev as irritated and 
"emotionally wounded" when Bryza raised this matter in Baku. 
Aliyev claimed Azerbaijan is the only 
real democracy in the region, but he is widely perceived to 
be anti-democratic.  He feels beaten right now, and DAS 
Bryza recommended that his "Turkic brethren" reach out to 
him.  Uman noted that many saw the Armenian elections as 
having been well-administered, and suggested that Armenia has 
a democratic perception edge over Azerbaijan.  Uman said 
Turkey will communicate to Azerbaijan that it needs to work 
on its democratic credentials, less it arm Armenia with a 
potent issue. 
 
GEORGIA, RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA 
---------------------------- 
 
ANKARA 00001598  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) On Abkhazia, Uman said the situation is increasingly 
tense, as Russia threatens to recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia if others recognize Kosovo,s independence.  Turkey 
understands but does not fully agree with those who warn 
against affording Russia a de-facto veto against Georgia,s 
NATO aspirations by demanding resolution of the "frozen 
conflicts" first.  Uman said Georgia's potential NATO 
membership needs to be weighed against all consequences and 
implications for the region.  Bryza countered that there is 
no status quo in Abkhazia; if Georgia loses hope in its NATO 
prospects, the chance of armed conflict will increase; 
conversely, as Georgia feels more securely anchored to NATO, 
its behavior will grow increasingly tempered.  Bryza said the 
U.S. will insist that Russia fulfill its Istanbul 
commitments.  Bryza said weakness only feeds Russian 
aggression, and Russia cannot have a veto on Georgia,s NATO 
membership.  He pointed out that Azerbaijan has been 
successful vis-a-vis Russia by being firm yet respectful.  He 
noted that Baku has used the cutoff of Azeri oil exports to 
Russia in response to Gazprom,s bullying of Baku on natural 
gas supplies to soften Moscow,s approach to Azerbaijan. 
Bryza said that the UN "Friends" group on Georgia will meet 
on June 26-27 in Vienna or Geneva to explore ways to reduce 
tension in the Gali District, implement CBM,s, and 
rejuvenate the settlement process in light of UN 
deliberations on Kosovo.  Bryza noted that Georgian President 
Saakashvili was ready to meet with Abkhaz de-facto 
&President8 Bagapash without preconditions; but Bagapsh 
refused any Abkhaz contact with the Georgians unless Georgia 
withdrew governmental structures from the Upper Kodori 
Valley, which was a non-starter.  Bryza requested that Turkey 
encourage the Abkhaz de-facto leaders to engage Georgian 
leaders. 
 
POLICY PLANNING AND ARMENIA WITH DG CENGIZER 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) MFA Policy Planning Director Altay Cengizer told 
Bryza that his main project in the next year -- which he is 
spending at Harvard,s JFK School of Government and Center 
for International Affairs -- is to deepen the GOT,s thinking 
on energy security matters and the Armenian genocide issue. 
Concentrating on Armenia, Cengizer said he wants to expand 
the dialogue both in Turkey and the U.S. on the events of 
1915, with an eye toward a deeper understanding of the full 
range of tragic events transpiring in eastern Anatolia during 
World War One.  Cengizer said his goal was genuine 
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia as both countries 
come to terms with their common history.  Cengizer believed 
Turkey,s current, doctrinaire approach to the events of 1915 
was not working.  Bryza agreed, and suggested that rather 
than insisting that Ottoman Turks did nothing terrible but 
Armenians destabilized eastern Turkey (e.g,. &no, but(,) 
Turkey might consider acknowledging in a more formal way that 
Ottoman troops committed terrible acts and Armenians may have 
as well (e.g, &yes, and(8).  Cengizer concurred that 
Turkey,s position should be "yes, and;" that is, terrible 
events (though short of genocide) occurred in 1915 -- 
perpetrated by some in authority in the dying Ottoman Empire 
-- and these events took place in a complex political 
environment in which both sides share responsibility. 
 
¶9.  (C) Cengizer hoped that such a process -- which he 
admitted would require significant advancement on the part 
of Turkish intellectuals and the media -- would create the 
space necessary for Turkey and Armenia to make political 
progress.  Bryza agreed, but added that in the short run an 
Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) will likely resurface 
during the next 12 months.  Cengizer agreed that his project 
was unlikely to make sufficient progress in such a short 
time, but cautioned that an AGR would make it impossible for 
years to come.  Cengizer added that he is "unabashedly" 
committed to the U.S.-Turkey relationship, and asserted that 
the AGR issue presents an even greater threat to the 
relationship than disagreements over Iraq. 
 
¶10.  (C) Cengizer reported that there will be a gap over the 
summer until his replacement -- as yet unnamed -- is in 
place.  He said Turkey was gratified by February policy 
planning talks, and believed they should be held if possible 
twice a year rather than annually.  He suggested that the 
next round expand their view of the world.  He admitted that 
Turkey,s policy planning staff does not have the 
intellectual strength to think creatively about the Far 
East and Pacific regions, as well as Latin America.  He asked 
for a more fulsome picture of the USG,s worldview. 
He added that this perspective would help MFA more usefully 
understand globalization and how it benefits Turkey.  As a 
 
ANKARA 00001598  003 OF 003 
 
 
larger democracy with an economy of scale, Turkey is already 
a winner from globalization, but anti-EU and 
anti-U.S. attitudes are feeding a negative Turkish view of 
the outside world, which Cengizer finds vexing and 
frightening. 
 
¶11.  (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON