VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0324/01 1430644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 230644Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5682
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0880
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR XB
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED BRIEFS NATO PERMREPS ON SECRETARY'S 
CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW 
 
Classified By: EUR A/S Fried for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On May 16 Assistant Secretary Fried told 
NATO PermReps that US-Russian relations, Kosovo, and the 
internal Russian political climate were the principal 
subjects of the Secretary's discussions with President Putin, 
FM Lavrov, and others in Moscow.   The Russians took on board 
the message that they needed to cool their rhetoric against 
the U.S.  The Secretary found little common ground on Kosovo 
and much concern about precedent despite her concerted 
push-back that Kosovo is sui generis.  She argued Kosovo had 
to be resolved on its own merits.  A strong message of EU 
unity from Chancellor Merkel in Samara will be a key next 
step.  Fried said the challenge of dealing with a more 
assertive Russia was to pursue partnership where possible and 
to push back when necessary.  In response to questions from 
Permreps Fried reported the Russians said little about CFE 
and U.S. missile defense. End Summary. 
 
RUSSIA AGREES TO COOL THE RHETORIC 
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) EUR/AS Fried briefed Allied PermReps on the 
Secretary's meetings with President Putin, FM Lavrov, former 
 
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PM Primakov, and civil society representatives in Moscow that 
had concluded the day before.  Fried's briefing and the 
following lively Q and A, focused on Kosovo, frozen 
conflicts, CFE, Iran, and Russian domestic politics.  Fried 
said the Secretary had made clear that the U.S. could manage 
relations with Russia that included areas of disagreement as 
well as cooperation, but would not tolerate constant 
rhetorical attacks that had risen to an offensive pitch.  As 
evidence the message got through, FM Lavrov publicly admitted 
that the tone needed lowering. 
 
MANAGING KOSOVO DIFFERENCES 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Fried told NATO PermReps the Secretary had long, hard 
discussions on Kosovo with both Putin and Lavrov.  They 
firmly opposed both the draft UNSC resolution and the core 
concept of supervised independence for Kosovo.  They 
expressed continued concern about the precedent that an 
independent Kosovo would pose for other separatist regions, 
arguing that either territorial integrity or 
self-determination needed to be applied consistently across 
the board.  They asked rhetorically how they could explain to 
Abkhaz separatists why they could not have independence if 
Kosovars did.  The Secretary pointed out that the world was 
full of separatist movements, and there was no single formula 
for resolving them all.  Kosovo, she insisted, had to be 
settled on its own merits and was sui generis. 
 
¶4. (C) Fried told NATO PermReps that none of the Secretary's 
interlocutors showed their cards regarding a UNSC veto. 
However, Lavrov said again that Russia would not be "more 
Serbian than the Serbs."  Putin and Lavrov seemed to 
acknowledge that if Serbia was willing to give up Kosovo as 
the price of joining the West, they would not stand in its 
way.  Fried judged that Serbian President Tadic might accept 
such an outcome, but Prime Minister Kostunica never would. 
More broadly, it was clear that the Russians have not yet 
decided what they will do in the UNSC endgame. 
 
EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY ESSENTIAL 
----------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Fried urged the Europeans, particularly Germany as EU 
President, to hold firm on Kosovo at the upcoming EU-Russia 
Summit.  He credited EU unity, along with U.S.-EU solidarity, 
for steadily building support in the Security Council for the 
draft resolution.  By U.S. count, he said, UNSC votes in 
favor had risen from 5-6 to 11-12 in recent weeks, adding 
that Russia's Balkans director D/FM Titov did not dispute 
that assessment. 
 
OTHER SEPARATIST CONFLICTS 
-------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Fried cited some easing of hard-line positions in 
Moscow, noting that Russia had criticized South Ossetian 
separatist leader Kokoity after his forces had humiliated 
Russian peacekeepers, forcing them to the ground in a recent 
encounter.  Fried said the Russians did not want a crisis in 
either of the separatist regions of Georgia.  Russia had 
allowed the rollover of the UNOMIG mandate and was showing a 
more positive attitude toward Georgia overall.  One of the 
Russians acknowledged that their confrontation with Georgia 
last fall had revealed "a lack of elegance." 
 
LETTING UKRAINE CHART ITS OWN COURSE 
------------------------------------ 
¶7. (C) Responding to questions from NATO PermReps about 
Russian attitudes toward Ukraine, Fried said Moscow had not 
recently complained about U.S. interference.  Genuine 
 
blue-orange differences had emerged in Ukraine, and Fried 
said the U.S. would not try to manipulate those (as Russia 
had done during the Orange Revolution).  He commented that PM 
Yanukovych was "growing into his own person" since his 
initial role as Russia's stooge in Kyiv. 
 
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ON IRAN, MD, CFE 
---------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) NATO PermReps asked principally about current Russian 
thinking on the CFE moratorium, Iran, and U.S. missile 
defense.  Fried said Russia also seemed prepared to deal more 
firmly with Iran.  Lavrov told the Secretary that they would 
support Solana in his upcoming talks with the Iranians in 
advance of a possible third UNSCR on Iran's nuclear 
obligations.  Despite recent high-volume protests on U.S. 
missile defense plans and Putin's call for a "moratorium" on 
observing CFE treaty provisions, Fried said neither issue 
featured high on the Russians' agenda with the Secretary. 
Fried noted that Secretary Rice had repeated Secretary of 
Defense Gates' offer of MD cooperation and to listen to 
Russia's concerns on CFE.  Fried commented that Russia could 
meet its Istanbul CFE obligations by pulling out of their one 
remaining base in Georgia (Gudauta), and might be enticed to 
accept a face-saving settlement on Transnistria, such as 
replacing their forces there with an international 
peacekeeping operation. 
 
RUSSIA'S "MANAGED DEMOCRACY" 
---------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Fried said that Putin appeared genuinely concerned 
about public opinion in the run-up to Duma elections and the 
Presidential succession.  While the West focused on 
government control of the media, the Russian leadership 
seemed fixated on managing what they did not fully control. 
They appeared concerned about the public's tendencies toward 
excessive nationalism and about anti-reformist forces.  One 
of the civil society reps told the Secretary that Russia's 
growing middle class was the best hope for moving from the 
current "managed democracy" toward the real thing.  The 
Secretary, Fried said, had assured Putin and Lavrov that the 
 
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U.S. supported a strong, democratic Russia.  Fried concluded 
that the best approach for handling a new, more assertive 
Russia was to simultaneously pursue partnership where 
possible and to push back against Russian excesses when 
necessary. 
NULAND