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Viewing cable 07TOKYO2190, JAPANESE PLEASED WITH PRIME MINISTER ABE'S TRIP TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO2190 2007-05-15 09:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO5302
PP RUEHDE RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2190/01 1350927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150927Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3612
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0208
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0179
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0287
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0243
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7015
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0227
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0249
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2129
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0444
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0230
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1980
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0475
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0330
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1790
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0151
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1653
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0076
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0149
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5471
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0283
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0509
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0089
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3078
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0686
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0243
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0065
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 1093
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0055
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0314
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 3529
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 4645
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 1986
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFITT/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 002190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 
TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD ENRG XF EG KUNC QA SA AE JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE PLEASED WITH PRIME MINISTER ABE'S TRIP TO 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 1760 
 
     B. RIYADH 965 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  PM Abe's April 28-May 2 visit to the Middle 
East was a "great success" which enabled Tokyo to advance its 
"Japan and the Middle East: Entering a New Level" policy 
goal, according to MOFA contacts.  National Security Advisor 
Koike told Charge d'Affaires that Abe enjoyed the trip, which 
took him to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt. 
During his trip Abe announced two major initiatives: a 
Japanese-Saudi agreement to allow Saudi Arabia to store oil 
in Okinawa storage tanks, and a $1 billion Japanese loan to 
Abu Dhabi.  In return for both, Japan received assurances of 
stable flows of oil.  In Egypt, the two sides discussed plans 
to collaborate on a science and technology university and the 
upcoming Japan-Arab Conference.  PM Abe was accompanied by a 
business delegation of over 180 high-level representatives. 
In addition to advancing commercial interests, PM Abe 
discussed with his counterparts political challenges facing 
the Middle East region, including Iraq and Iran.  Koike said 
her impression is that the Gulf states, while concerned about 
the situation in Iraq, are more preoccupied by Iran.  Abe 
reiterated Japan's support for the Maliki government and all 
of the joint statements issued after each of the five stops 
called upon Iran to comply with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions.  The joint statements also reflected 
Japan's concerns about global warming, North Korea and the 
status of abductees, the Middle East Peace Process and 
Lebanon, and Japan's desire to obtain a permanent seat on the 
Security Council.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
"JAPAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST: ENTERING A NEW LEVEL" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C)  Prime Minister Abe's April 28-May 2 visit to Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt was characterized 
in very positive terms by National Security Advisor Koike and 
as a "great success" by MOFA Second Middle East Division 
Principal Deputy Director Motosada Matano in separate 
readouts provided to Charge and political officer, 
respectively.  (Note: Commercial and energy aspects of the 
visit will be reported septel.)  Abe's meetings with the 
leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt 
were very positive, and the Japanese were impressed by the 
 
TOKYO 00002190  002 OF 006 
 
 
warmth and high level of the receptions they received at all 
their stops.  Matano said that MOFA believes the trip 
successfully advanced Tokyo's theme for the visit, which was 
"Japan and the Middle East: Entering a New Level."  It is 
Japan's hope, he explained, to take its relations with the 
oil producing states of the Middle East beyond the 
"supplier-buyer" level, and to establish a "multi-layered" 
relationship that also includes enhanced commercial relations 
as well as increased political dialogue, both on bilateral 
and regional issues. 
 
3. (C) During the visit, two substantive agreements were 
announced.  The first involves a deal between Japan and Saudi 
Arabia, whereby the Saudis will store approximately 5.25 
million kiloliters, an amount equivalent to 10 days of 
Japan's consumption, in tanks located on Henza Island in 
Okinawa Prefecture. The second involves an agreement with Abu 
Dhabi in which Japan will extend a $1 billion low-interest 
loan in return for a steady supply of oil for the next ten 
years. 
 
4. (C) With regard to PM Abe's brief stop in Cairo, MOFA 
First Middle East Division Director Hideo Sato told political 
officer that while he recognized the "real hidden agenda" of 
the trip was to assure a steady flow of oil to Japan, he 
considered the Egypt portion to be the most important for 
establishing long-term Japanese connections to the Middle 
East.  Underscoring Japan's goal of developing human 
potential through education, the two sides discussed plans to 
expedite the establishment of the Egypt and Japan University 
for Science and Technology (E-JUST).  According to this plan, 
Egypt will provide the infrastructure while Japan will 
provide the faculty.  PM Abe and President Mubarak also 
discussed the Japan-Arab Conference slated to be held in 
Alexandria in November.  According to Sato, the plan is bring 
over 200 prominent politicians, businessmen, and academics 
from around the Arab world to meet with 50 Japanese 
counterparts in a "Davos-like" gathering.  Sato conceded the 
plan is ambitious, but is hopeful that it will help start to 
build long-lasting bridges between Japan and the Arab world 
that will transcend the current "oil sales only" 
relationship.  Egyptian Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Salah 
El-Sadek had very little to say about the visit, telling 
political officer that the trip to Cairo was really just a 
sideshow for the main event: PM Abe's courting of the 
oil-rich and commercially prosperous Gulf states. 
 
---------------------------- 
 
TOKYO 00002190  003 OF 006 
 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ AND IRAN 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Iraq and Iran figured prominently in the discussions 
Abe had with all the leaders he met.  With regard to Iraq, 
Koike explained that most of the Gulf leaders are willing to 
offer public support for Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and his 
government, even though in reality their feelings about him 
are lukewarm.  The exception is Saudi Arabia.  King 
Abdallah's disdain for Maliki, both personally and for his 
government, was open and evident, Koike told Charge.  The 
King told Abe that Iraq's constitution should be amended and 
a new leader found.  Matano echoed this report, telling 
political officer that the King has very negative views of 
Maliki, is suspicious of his capabilities to govern, and is 
doubtful about whether supporting him is in the best 
interests of Iraq.  Saudi Arabia believes Maliki leads only 
the Shia, is under the influence of Iran, and is not capable 
of leading all Iraqis. 
 
6. (C) UAE's Prime Minister Muhammad asserted to Abe that the 
only country in the region that truly supports the Maliki 
government is Iran, according to Matano.  Muhammad said the 
Gulf countries all believe that Iran is exercising too much 
influence in Iraq and that the smaller countries of the 
region all defer to Saudi Arabia's lead regarding attitudes 
toward Iraq and Maliki.  That said, the GCC countries will 
continue to support Iraq, as they have no other choice, and 
are hopeful that eventually the situation there will improve. 
 Muhammad commented to Abe, reported Matano, that although 
the United States may have the power to defeat a country, it 
lacks the power to rebuild one. 
 
7. (C) Koike reported to Charge that although Iraq is of 
concern to the Gulf Arabs, they are more preoccupied with 
what is taking place with regard to Iran.  In all the 
discussions Abe had with the heads of state, it was clear 
they are concerned about Iran's rising influence in the 
region.  They are apprehensive about Tehran's efforts to 
become a nuclear power and believe Iranian activists are at 
work in their countries sowing the seeds of dissent and 
rebellion.  That said, they are unsure what to do.  They do 
not want to further provoke Tehran and are ambivalent about 
whether a new, stronger UN Security Council resolution will 
be helpful, Koike stated.  According to Matano, Egypt shares 
the concerns of the Gulf states about Iran, but when 
discussing its nuclear program stressed that Israel should be 
held to account also.  The Qatari leadership delivered the 
 
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same message to Abe. Interestingly, Matano reported that 
Saudi King Abdallah, while expressing strong concerns about 
Iranian intentions, seemed to be less concerned about 
Tehran's nuclear program.  The King reportedly told PM Abe 
that since the Koran prohibits nuclear weapons, he is certain 
Iran's nuclear intentions are purely peaceful.  Nevertheless, 
the joint statements issued following the visits to all five 
countries contained language urging Tehran to comply with 
Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. 
 
--------------------- 
BUCKING UP THE TROOPS 
--------------------- 
 
8. (C) PM Abe took advantage of his presence in the region to 
visit Japanese Self Defense Force units supporting both 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.  In 
Abu Dhabi, he visited with the crews of two Japanese Maritime 
Self Defense Force vessels, a destroyer and a supply ship, 
which are currently deployed to the Indian Ocean.  In Kuwait, 
he journeyed to Ali Al Salim Air Base to inspect Air Self 
Defense units deployed to support the United Nations and 
Coalition Forces in Iraq.  Matano said both visits generated 
the hoped-for media coverage and photo ops.  Koike told 
Charge that the morale of the Japanese troops in both locales 
is very high. 
 
---------------- 
OTHER KEY ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
9. (C)  Japan succeeded in winning recognition for its role 
in the Middle East Peace Process, making sure that all the 
joint statements issued (except the one with Qatar) referred 
to its Corridor of Peace and Prosperity initiative in the 
West Bank.  Support for democracy in Lebanon was also 
included in all except the statement with the UAE.  The need 
for North Korea to address the abductee issue was highlighted 
in all, and each of the Arab countries except for Kuwait in 
some form pledged support for Japan's bid to win a permanent 
seat on the Security Council.  Support for the Japan-GCC Free 
Trade Agreement, currently being negotiated, was mentioned in 
all the statements except for Egypt's, which was also the 
case for references to concern about global warming. The full 
texts of all the joint statements are available on MOFA's 
website, www.mofa.go.jp. 
 
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UNHAPPY BUSINESS DELEGATION 
--------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  Accompanying Abe to the Middle East was a delegation 
of over 180 Japanese businessmen, including nearly 70 CEOs, 
who traveled on a government-charted 747. Isao Iijima, policy 
secretary to former Prime Minister Koizumi, told us prior to 
 
SIPDIS 
the trip that Keidanren -- the preeminent Japanese business 
federation -- was not happy about having to send a 
delegation, but was effectively dragooned into doing so, as 
Abe wanted to make a big impression on his hosts.   Keidanren 
Director General Nakamura described the trip - his first to 
the Middle East - to Economic Minister Counselor as 
"mind-boggling."  The heat, the religioisity, the perceived 
low local work ethic, the enormous contrast in development 
across the region all provided points for astonishment. 
Nakamura reported that the Japanese executives did not meet 
even one local businessman as all their meetings took place 
with government officials only.  Consequently, although the 
impressions of the trip were vivid, the nature and pace of 
the trip -- five stops in as many days with only 11 hours in 
Cairo -- lead to no noteworthy commercial development. 
Matano, commenting to political officer, expressed relief 
that none of the business delegation had suffered health 
problems due to the heat and pace of the trip.  He brushed 
off the fact that no deals were made by observing the purpose 
of taking the delegation along was simply to familiarize them 
with the commercial opportunities to be found in the Gulf 
region. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) Japan clearly wishes to play a more prominent role in 
the Middle East. However, PM Abe's whistle-stop tour seemed 
high on symbolism but short on substance.  It gave him the 
chance to discuss issues of concern with Gulf and the 
Egyptian heads of state and to modestly advance bilateral 
relations.  The presence of a huge business delegation was 
meant to signal Japan's serious intent to take advantage of 
commercial opportunities in the Gulf region, but given the 
high-speed pace of the trip the impressive list of 
businessmen really had no time to do anything other than act 
as members of an entourage.  For the immediate future, we 
predict Japan will continue to support the Maliki government 
and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, continue to urge a 
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear standoff, play a 
 
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modest role in attempts to broker useful deals between 
parties to the Peace Process, and attempt to take advantage 
of commercial opportunities that become available.  Tokyo's 
major interest in the region will remain ensuring conditions 
that enable a steady flow of oil to Japan. 
SCHIEFFER