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DE RUEHC #0919 1250019
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P 041756Z MAY 07
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UNCLAS STATE 060919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY 
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY 
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID 
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND  THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 000845 
 
¶1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political 
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal 
(coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency 
support) to expand and extend the G8 Global 
Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction (GP) for another 10 years 
(2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other 
GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging 
global WMD threats.  This proposal was also raised 
at the April 26-27 Sherpas meeting and more 
extensively in the April 23 Global Partnership 
Working Group meeting (GPWG) (reftel).  All GP 
members recognize the evolving global WMD threat, 
but most have been resistant to our proposal ) 
largely due to worries about cost and potential 
for dilution of ongoing efforts in Russia and 
the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada and the 
UK are the most supportive.  Russia poses the 
strongest opposition and has expressed that 
the original Kananaskis priorities must be 
completed before moving forward.  Germany has 
expressed similar concerns.  Therefore the U.S. 
is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8 
partners on this proposal, emphasizing that this 
commitment will help address critical global 
proliferation challenges, including the requirements 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
and other G8 priorities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002 
to address the spread of WMD, and now includes the 
G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the EU. 
2007 marks the halfway point for the Global 
Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion 
commitment.  GP donor pledges to date come 
in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion 
from the U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion 
from Russia. The current GP scope addresses WMD 
threats only within Russia and other former Soviet 
states (the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations 
as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and Ukraine 
are officially recognized as recipient states by the 
entire Partnership).  The Kananaskis document 
anticipated an expansion by mandating that GP 
programs begin &initially in Russia8 but not be 
limited to Russia. In the context of the G8, the 
GP is handled by the Global Partnership Working 
Group (GPWG), which reports to the Nonproliferation 
Directors Group (NPDG).  The GP is a unique model 
of multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and missile 
threats and has made great progress in its first five 
years to reduce the proliferation threat, including 
chemical weapons destruction; redirection of former 
WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; improving 
security for fissile nuclear materials, chemical 
weapons stocks and biological agents; and dismantlement 
of decommissioned nuclear submarines. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend the 
GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats 
includes four components: 1) Immediate expansion 
of geographic scope outside of Russia and the former 
Soviet Union (to include the broadest possible 
participation of new recipient states worldwide); 
2) Immediate inclusion of broadest possible 
functional scope to include all chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile 
threats; 3) Extension of time commitment for an 
additional 10 years (2012-2022); and 4) Increased 
financial commitment of an additional $20 billion 
for 2012-2022 with the same parameters as original 
commitment (U.S. $10 billion; $10 billion from other 
donors).  The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement 
at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8 
committed to coordinate activities to reduce the 
global WMD threat through the GP.  Note that the 
U.S. and other G8 donors (notably Canada and the 
UK) believe that the Kananaskis Guidelines and 
Principles, on which the GP was formed, already 
include a broad interpretation of threats (chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile); 
however Russia has strongly argued to limit scope 
to Russia,s most important priorities of chemical 
weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) After working this proposal at the level 
of the GPWG and Political Directors, the U.S. has 
gained some support from most G8 members for the 
first two objectives (geographic and programmatic 
expansion), with limited to no support for the 
10-year extension and additional financial 
commitments at this time.  Russia objects to 
the entire proposal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
JAPAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Japan has participated in the GP, but 
has not committed much funding.  Japan initially 
expressed its concern about justifying an expansion 
of the GP when the program is so associated with a 
now oil rich Russia. However, we are working to make 
it clear to Japan that a geographic expansion of the 
GP would include Asia and could help address some of 
Japan,s regional security concerns.  Japan was 
recently supportive of the geographic expansion 
at the April 23 GPWG, but did not endorse the 
financial commitment or specific time extension. 
 
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to reach 
out, at the highest level, to Japan to garner support 
for this proposal.  The Draft G8 Leaders' language 
proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the 
Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in 
the points below) will follow as an attachment 
by email to Post. 
 
Recommended talking points are included in Para 8. 
 
¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE: 
 
--In addition to meeting or exceeding our current 
Global Partnership commitments laid out at Kananaskis, 
the global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving, 
and our collective peace and security depends on our 
response and leadership.  Therefore, we must act 
immediately and provide that leadership to address 
the threats that all our nations face. 
 
--Expanding the geographic scope of the Global 
Partnership to focus on worldwide threats beyond 
Russia and the former Soviet Union - with all G8 
nations (including Russia) as partners - would 
allow for greater attention to combat emerging 
terrorist threats in Southeast Asia and other 
terrorist hotspot regions. 
 
--In fact, the U.S. is already beginning to address 
global WMD threats, including important work to 
combat nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological 
threats in Southeast Asia. 
 
--Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s 
future within the Global Partnership Working Group 
and general support for the ideas we are proposing, 
our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not 
reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s 
midpoint 5-year review document or the NPDG,s 
broader nonproliferation statement. 
 
--We understand that the financial commitment we 
are asking for - another $10 billion from other 
GP donors - is substantial.  We recognize that 
it will not be easy and will take time for many 
GP members to develop mechanisms to fund projects 
to combat the global threat. 
 
--This is precisely why we must act now to begin 
the expansion and extension process. 
The global threat we face is too important 
to delay, and we have a chance to show 
important leadership. 
 
--All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation, 
including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on 
halting the spread of WMD, related materials and delivery 
systems after the Kananaskis documents, terms expire in 
¶2012. 
 
--The original Kananaskis document stated a vision 
for the future, and we are asking Leaders to reaffirm 
a commitment for a vision of the future beyond 2012. 
 
-- Global security demands that we help to eliminate 
chemical weapons worldwide, reduce dangerous nuclear, 
radiological, chemical, and biological materials, and 
secure those which remain.  In doing so, we will greatly 
reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation and terrorism. 
Even as we do so, we will also facilitate access worldwide 
to the economic and social benefits of the peaceful use of 
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials. 
 
--We have also committed to help the nations of the world 
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation 
prevention around the world. Expansion and extension 
of the GP would provide us with a way to help fill these 
gaps. 
 
--The GP has been successful and effective despite 
numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which 
have been overcome.  The Partnership works without 
any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and 
is a positive model of cooperation for combating 
global proliferation threats.  This makes the GP 
an effective mechanism for providing assistance to 
reduce global proliferation threats, including by meeting 
our 1540 obligations in addition to other 
critical G8 commitments, such as the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
 
--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to 
coordinate activities to reduce the global 
WMD threat through the GP.  It is time now 
to take the next step to continue and expand 
the GP. 
 
--We have drafted Leaders, language for your 
consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation 
statement and we hope you will support us. 
 
--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10 
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP donors 
can also be able to match this. 
 
IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE 
CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT 
STATES: 
 
--We feel that the current mechanism for admitting 
new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not 
serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat. 
Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only 
allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to 
formally benefit from the GP. 
 
--When countries ask us for assistance in combating 
terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an 
important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting 
for a formal process before we act. 
 
--Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest 
possible participation of states when the geographic 
scope of the GP is expanded. 
 
END POINTS 
 
¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this action 
request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), NSC (Mary 
Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen Newhouse), 
ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, Elizabeth Cameron, 
David Evans), E (John Duncan and Benedict Wolf), P 
(Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and Jim Timbie), S/P 
(Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, Lisa Benthien), 
DOE (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey), and DoD/CTR 
(Jim Reid, Monette Melason, Andy Weber). 
RICE