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DE RUEHC #0918 1250014
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P 041752Z MAY 07
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UNCLAS STATE 060918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY 
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY 
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID 
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND THE  G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: UK 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 000845 
 
¶1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political 
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal 
(coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency support) 
to expand and extend the G8 Global Partnership Against 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) for 
another 10 years (2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; 
other GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging 
global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. 
This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27 
Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April 
23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG) 
(reftel).  All GP members recognize the evolving 
global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to 
our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost 
and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in 
Russia and the former Soviet Union.  The UK and 
Canada are the most supportive.  Russia poses the 
strongest opposition to the proposal and has 
expressed that the original Kananaskis priorities 
must be completed before moving forward.  Germany 
has expressed similar concerns.  Therefore, the 
U.S. has decided to increase senior diplomatic 
outreach to G8 partners on this proposal, 
emphasizing that this commitment will help 
address critical global proliferation challenges 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (Global Initiative), and other G8 priorities. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 
2002 to address the spread of WMD, and now 
includes the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations 
and the EU.  2007 marks the halfway point for the 
Global Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion 
commitment.  GP donor pledges to date come in at 
over $17 billion (including $10 billion from the 
U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion from Russia, 
which was not included in the initial $20 billion 
commitment.  The current GP scope addresses WMD 
threats only within Russia and other former 
Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes all former 
Soviet nations as GP recipients, but so far 
only Russia and Ukraine are officially recognized 
as recipient states by the entire Partnership). 
The Kananaskis document anticipated an expansion 
by mandating that GP programs begin &initially in 
Russia8 but not be limited to Russia.  In the 
context of the G8, the GP is handled by the GPWG, 
which reports to the Nonproliferation Directors 
Group (NPDG).  The GP is a unique model of 
multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and 
missile threats and has made great progress 
in its first five years to reduce the 
proliferation threat, including chemical 
weapons destruction; redirection of former 
WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; 
improving security for fissile nuclear materials, 
chemical weapons stocks and biological agents; 
and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear 
submarines. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and 
extend the GP to combat new and emerging 
global WMD threats includes four components: 
1) Immediate expansion of geographic scope 
outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union 
(to include the broadest possible participation 
of new recipient states worldwide); 2) Immediate 
inclusion of broadest possible functional scope 
to include all chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and missile threats; 3) Extension of 
time commitment for an additional 10 years 
(2012-2022); and 4) Increased financial commitment 
of an additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with 
the same parameters as original commitment (U.S. 
$10 billion; $10 billion from other donors). 
The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at 
the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8 
committed to coordinate activities to reduce 
the global WMD threat through the GP.  Note 
that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably 
Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis 
Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was 
formed, already include a broad interpretation 
of threats (chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly 
argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important 
priorities of chemical weapons destruction and 
nuclear submarine dismantlement. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) After working this proposal at the 
level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the 
U.S. has gained strong support from the UK and 
Canada and more modest support from Japan and 
France for the first two objectives (geographic 
and programmatic expansion), with limited to no 
support for the 10-year extension and additional 
financial commitments at this time.  Russia 
objects to the entire proposal. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
UK POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The UK has been a strong supporter of 
the U.S. proposal with avid interest in the need 
to geographically and programmatically expand the 
GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats. 
The UK has indicated that the proposal has been 
sent to the Prime Minister level for consideration, 
but so far the UK has stopped short of being able 
to specifically endorse new financial commitments 
and the 10-year expansion at this time.  Continued 
outreach on the proposal might help bring the UK 
around in their support for the entire proposal, 
and may strengthen their resolve to push hard with 
other G8 nations for geographic and programmatic 
expansion. 
 
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to 
reach out, at the highest appropriate level, to 
the UK to thank them for their outstanding support 
for geographic and programmatic expansion of the 
GP and press for support for the entire proposal 
as part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, statement. 
The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the U.S. 
for inclusion in the Nonproliferation statement will 
follow as an attachment by email to Post. 
 
Recommended talking points are included in Para 8. 
 
¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND 
APPROPRIATE: 
 
--We have greatly appreciated the UK,s strong 
support for our proposal to expand the Global 
Partnership to combat new and emerging global 
WMD threats.  Your support in the GPWG and 
through your Political Director and Sherpa 
has been critical. 
 
--We now have Japan and France expressing interest 
in our proposal, but Germany is still cool to the 
proposal.  We seek your continued strong support 
at the highest possible levels to garner stronger 
support from Germany, to maintain the support we 
have from Japan and France, and to press the 
Italians to come around. 
 
--We are also reaching out to Russia in hopes that 
they can come to the table with us as a partner in 
a geographic expansion and time extension of the 
GP ) especially given Russia,s solid support for 
joint initiatives to combat WMD worldwide, such 
as the Global Initiative and United Nations 
Security Resolution 1540. 
 
--However, without new funding commitments to the GP 
to go along with the geographic expansion, Russia,s 
support will be more difficult, and global programming 
will take more time. 
 
--We recognize that the funding commitment is the 
most difficult part of the proposal, but we hope 
that you will be able to join us in supporting the 
full proposal, including the financial commitment 
and 10-year extension. 
 
--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate 
activities to reduce the global WMD threat through 
the GP.  It is time now to take the next step to 
continue and expand the GP. 
 
--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10 
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that the UK 
and other GP donors can together agree to be 
able to match this commitment. 
 
--We greatly appreciate your continued strong 
support for geographic and programmatic expansion, 
and we hope that you will strongly consider the 
financial commitment and time extension. 
 
--Can we count on you to strongly endorse this as 
an integral part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, 
statement? 
 
--If possible, UK outreach to Germany and other G8 
nations to support inclusion of this language in 
Nonproliferation Leaders statement and GP Midpoint 
Review document would be especially helpful. 
 
END POINTS 
 
¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this 
action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), 
NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen 
Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, 
Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans), E (John Duncan and 
Benedict Wolf), P (Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and 
Jim Timbie), S/P (Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, 
Lisa Benthien), DOE/NNSA (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey), 
and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber). 
RICE