VZCZCXRO3986
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #1892/01 1340858
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140858Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7110
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0992
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ADDIS ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PHUM PINR CN FR
SUBJECT: COMOROS:  FRANCE SHARES U.S. ASSESSMENT AND 
OBJECTIVES 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 452 
 
     ¶B. PRETORIA 1675 
     ¶C. STATE 60497 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  MFA AF DAS-equivalent Jean-Claude Brunet 
on May 10 said that France shared USG views (refs A and B) 
on the current situation in the Comoros.  The situation had 
calmed in the past few days, but much depended on how 
President Sambi now responded to Anjouan "President" Bacar's 
conditions.  Brunet said that France generally shared U.S. 
objectives concerning the stability of the islands, their 
unity and integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes.  It 
was critical that upcoming elections take place peacefully 
and transparently.  He indicated the importance of working 
with the IMF,  World Bank, and African Development Bank 
(AfDB) to help the Comoros develop economically, particularly 
in the agricultural sector.  Brunet encouraged an active U.S. 
role regarding the Comoros and the broader region.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA DAS-equivalent for Southern Africa/Indian Oceans 
Jean-Claude Brunet met with Embassy Africa Watchers on May 10 
to discuss the situation in the Comoros (ref C).  MFA 
deskofficer Stephane Le Brech also attended.  Brunet said the 
GOF much appreciated the Department spokesperson's May 4 
statement calling for calm and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.  We shared with Brunet the substance of refs A and 
B, noting the apparent lessening of tension over the past few 
days.  Brunet and Le Brech said that the GOF had the same 
assessment of the current situation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Brunet said that much hinged on how Sambi would 
respond to the "conditions" Bacar had set for his cooperation 
in resolving the crisis.  Brunet did not speculate on what 
Bacar might do.  Brunet suggested that the scheduling of the 
elections in order to avoid a long delay between the 
expiration of Bacar's term of office and the vote for new 
leadership could have been handled better.  Brunet also 
thought that Sambi would have avoided trouble had he not 
named as interim Anjouan president a former head of the 
Assembly, whom Bacar had previously forced from office. 
Brunet observed that such machinations were standard fare in 
the Comoros; given the history of repeated coups, the level 
of trust among leaders was not high. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Brunet said that France and the U.S. appeared to 
share similar objectives regarding the Comoros -- support for 
democracy, unity and territorial integrity, and peaceful 
resolution of disputes.  Brunet indicated that the U.S. could 
play a very positive role and he welcomed what he believed 
was a relatively new U.S. presence in the islands (referring 
to the locally-hired staff member reporting to Embassy 
Antananarivo). 
 
¶5.  (C)  Brunet stressed the importance of the upcoming 
elections and the need to ensure their fairness and 
transparency.  He said that France was going to send a 
military logistical support unit from Reunion to assist 
elections observers from neighboring states who would be 
present for the vote.  He stressed that this military unit 
would perform logistical support only.  He indicated, 
however, that the French and EU were considering how best to 
observe and otherwise support the elections.  Africa Watchers 
mentioned briefly the recent diplomatic note received at 
Embassy Paris (forwarded to the Department) in which the 
Comoros asked for various forms of USG elections support. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Brunet noted the important strategic location of the 
Comoros and concerns that it not be allowed to become a 
failed state and a potential locus of criminal or terrorist 
activity.  In that regard, he noted President Sambi's 
background and uncertainty about the eventual policies he 
might come to support -- Sambi was of Yemenite origin, had 
studied in Saudi Arabia (from which he was apparently 
expelled for reasons that remain obscure), and had finished 
his studies in Tehran.  Given this background, Brunet said 
that Sambi was a bit of a cipher and warranted attention.  He 
noted that the Anjouan island itself had a substantial Shiite 
population. 
 
 
PARIS 00001892  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  France's specific priorities centered on:  (1) 
successful elections in June; (2) a final and effective 
reorganization of the islands' security forces and their 
structure; (3) revitalized economic development, particularly 
in the agricultural sector; and (4) arrangements with the 
IMF, World Bank, and AfDB to boost the economy.  Concerning 
the latter issue, Brunet said that the Comoros carried an 
international debt of about USD 32 million, which he thought 
could be reduced to about USD 10 million.  He indicated that 
France would work with the IFIs on debt reduction. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Brunet said that France-Comoros relations were still 
characterized by suspicion and lack of trust on the part of 
the Comorans and enduring bitterness about Mayotte's 
perceived privileged status.  Brunet stressed, however, that 
the "old days" (i.e., the chaotic period of coups, 
counter-coups, and players such as Bob Denard) were long past 
and that France hoped to develop balanced and positive 
relations.  He regretted that a recent seemingly innocuous 
event -- a change in Mayotte's telephone area code, which 
Brunet said was necessary for purely technical reasons to 
meet the demand for more phone numbers -- had reignited 
Comoran suspicion of the French.  He observed that despite 
the change in area code one could -- sometimes -- 
successfully make inter-island calls using the old area code. 
 Brunet indicated that this typified the way that things 
often work (and do not work) in the Comoros. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  One of Brunet's recurring themes was his 
encouragement for the U.S. to take a more active and 
positive role in the Comoros.  He said several times that the 
U.S. could have strong influence and that Comorans would 
likely pay very close attention to anything the U.S. did or 
said regarding the region.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON