VZCZCXRO9530
RR RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKM #0854/01 1380916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 180916Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8761
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID KPKO MOPS ET SO ER KE UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/SOMALIA: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN VIEWPOINTS 
ON DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: KAMPALA 842 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: Support for Uganda's deployment to Somalia 
remains firm among Ugandan military and civilian officials. 
During Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary James Swan's 
visit to Uganda from May 7-9, the Minister of Defense, Chief 
of Defense Forces, and parliamentarians raised a number of 
political and security issues.  Ugandan officials view their 
role in Somalia as long-term and as one of delivering a 
government to stabilize the situation. To achieve this 
objective, Uganda wants its forces augmented by other troop 
contributors, an organized and wide scale humanitarian 
effort, and diplomatic pressure on the Transitional Federal 
Government to include all societal elements. 
Parliamentarians also voiced continued support for the 
Ugandan deployment, but urged the U.S. to play a low key role 
to preserve Uganda's neutrality as peacekeepers.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On May 7 and 8, Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant 
Secretary James Swan, Ambassador Browning, P/E Chief, and 
 
SIPDIS 
DATT discussed Uganda's deployment to Somalia with various 
government officials including parliamentarians, the Minister 
of Defense, and the Chief of Defense Forces. 
 
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UGANDA COMMITTED TO SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT 
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¶3.  (C)  On May 8, Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga and 
Chief of Defense Forces Aronda Nyakarima expressed optimism 
that the Somalia problem could be solved.  On the military 
front, Kiyonga stated that the arrival of other African units 
and a transition from an African Union to a United Nations 
force were critical elements to stabilizing the security 
situation.  On the political front, Kiyonga said pressure was 
needed to make the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
inclusive.  A strong message should be delivered to Eritrea 
to stop supporting subversive elements, according to Kiyonga, 
and the delivery of humanitarian and development projects 
would enhance support for the TFG among the population and 
help lower he level of societal tension.  DAS Swan informed 
Kiyonga that the U.S. would be providing $10 million in 
development assistance to Somalia, which would help cover the 
costs of the reconciliation conference.  The timing may not 
yet be right for a donors conference as some countries want 
to await the outcome of the reconciliation efforts. The U.S. 
also has requested additional funds for Somalia. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ambassador Browning asked Kiyonga if Uganda was 
reaching out to other potential troop contributors.  Kiyonga 
said yes, but the negative publicity of the situation was 
discouraging other contributors.  He stated that the Union of 
Islamic Courts was "good" at publicity.  He said that Ghana 
could deploy if provided more resources, including logistics. 
 Kiyonga also said that President Museveni raised the issue 
of other troop contributors with the African Union's General 
Secretary, Alpha Konare, when he visited Kampala in late 
 
SIPDIS 
April.  According to Kiyonga and General Aronda, the U.N. 
wanted peace established before it would come to Somalia. 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR TFG ENEMIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C)  Al Qaeda cells were recruiting fighters for $50 per 
hour during the last spate of serious violence, according to 
Kiyonga.  He stated that there was a lull in the fighting 
when the individual sent to Massawa, Eritrea to get more 
funds did not return and there was no money to pay the 
mercenaries to continue fighting.  Kiyonga stated that the 
fighters on the ground in Somalia were able to regroup 
quickly and did not need large numbers to create chaos.  TFG 
President Yusuf is vulnerable and his opponents only have to 
be lucky once to kill him.  However, Uganda had to be lucky 
every day in order to protect him.  Kiyonga said that the 
TFG's enemies almost captured the commander of the Ethiopian 
forces. In addition to Eritrea, Kiyonga said that members of 
the Arab League, Sudan, and Egypt were supporting the TFG's 
enemies.  Kiyonga reported that after President Museveni left 
Eritrea in March, President Isaias had "put out the red 
carpet" for the TFG's opponents. 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
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¶6.  (C)  From Uganda's perspective, there are internal 
problems that must be overcome to stabilize the situation in 
 
KAMPALA 00000854  002 OF 003 
 
 
Somalia, according to Kiyonga.  The first problem was 
President Yusuf's historically bad relationship with the 
Mayor of Mogadishu.  A second problem was the presence of 
profiteers, such as the former Defense Minister who 
controlled the port and airport at Kismayo and who views the 
TFG's attempts to gain control over strategic locations as 
limiting revenue-making activities.  A third obstacle was 
that young Somalis do not know what a government was or does 
for its people.  Uganda wants to create a situation that 
demonstrates the benefits of government in terms of law, 
order, and prosperity.  A fourth reality was that the genuine 
resentment of Ethiopia by the Hawiya clan was hindering 
progress.  Kiyonga hoped that once a Ghanaian battalion 
arrived, one Ethiopian battalion could rotate out to lessen 
the antagonism.  Defense Minister Kiyonga said that he had no 
sense of when Ethiopia would pull out. 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT AU 
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¶8.  (C) General Aronda presented a long list of his 
impressions of the situation on the ground in Somalia.  He 
began with the African Union's shortcomings.  First, Aronda 
said there was a lack of a serious African Union political 
presence in Mogadishu.  Second, Uganda agreed with the U.S. 
and U.K. to help beef up the AU's strategic planning cell. 
As a result, Uganda transferred Director of its Command and 
Staff College, Major General Beno Birao, to Addis Ababa to 
strengthen planning for AMISOM.  (Note: The issue of the AU's 
non-payment of the peackeepers' salaries is being raised in 
the press and among some political figures in Kampala. 
Policymakers are alarmed by the AU's expectation that Uganda 
pay first and be re-imbursed later.  End Note.) 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT YUSUF AND GHEDI 
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¶9.  (C)  Aronda's next issues all related to the TFG.  Aronda 
advised that Yusuf needed to drop Prime Minister Ghedi, who 
is divisive and blocking dialogue.  Yusuf himself is 
violating the TFG charter and needs to be reined in.  Aronda 
said that the lack of a Somali transitional force also is 
problematic.  One needs to be trained and stood up to counter 
the negative influence of the militias that report to each 
subclan.  The Ugandans have asked Yusuf repeatedly for the 
plans for the preparation of the reconciliation talks.  He 
has yet to share them and he was losing credibility on the 
issue.  Aronda warned that there were signs that Yusuf was 
preparing to be a military, rather than civilian leader. 
Aronda proposed a contact group of regional presidents to 
move him in the right direction.  If no action was taken, 
Aronda was concerned that Yusuf would institute military 
rule.  Aronda warned that without an organized humanitarian 
intervention, Yusuf could continue to blame others for the 
desperate situation.  Kiyonga said Uganda sounded out Kenya 
about the idea of the Contact Group, but Kibaki was 
"unenthusiastic" and the chairmanship of the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development's move to Addis 
Ababa could undermine the group. 
 
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PLEA FOR MORE INTELLIGENCE 
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¶10.  (C)  Aronda's final pitch was for stronger intelligence 
sharing.  He said the Ugandans had taken U.S. advice and 
named experienced officers to key liaison and planning 
positions.  Aronda said a Lieutenant Colonel was sent to 
Djibouti to serve as a liaison officer to CJTF-HOA and that 
Birao's appointment to the AU in Addis Ababa was a sign of 
Uganda's commitment to making AMISOM effective.  Aronda said 
that Uganda appreciated the maps provided by CJTF-HOA, but 
was concerned that there was little intelligence sharing on 
Somalia with Uganda. 
 
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CIVILIAN VIEWS ON SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT 
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¶11.  (SBU)  Ugandan parliamentarians continue to support 
Uganda's deployment to Somalia.  Opposition leader Morris 
Onenga Latigo told DAS Swan on May 8 that he had personally 
"put his head on the block" within his party to support 
Uganda's deployment to Somalia.  Latigo expressed 
appreciation that Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga came to 
him twice to explain the modalities of the Somalia deployment 
and keeps him updated on developments.  Two weeks ago, he 
said, Kiyonga appeared before Parliament to give a situation 
update.  The MPs have asked to be notified when Ugandan 
 
KAMPALA 00000854  003 OF 003 
 
 
soldiers were killed so that the member representing the 
deceased can ensure the family was properly notified.  Even 
though the opposition had walked out of parliament during the 
period of the vote, opposition MPs participated in committee 
and caucus meetings on the issue.  Latigo issued a public 
statement of opposition support for the deployment.  Latigo 
stated that the opposition would continue to support the 
deployment. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Latigo stated that it was important that AMISON 
was to be augmented and that the TFG be pressured to reach 
out to all constituencies in Somalia.  Latigo said that this 
remains a contentious issue among Muslim members of 
Parliament.  U.S.-trained himself, Latigo also expressed 
appreciation for U.S. training for Ugandan soldiers because 
he said military officers trained in the United States behave 
differently.  It will be important to have U.S.-trained 
officers in Somalia because they have a different mind-set, 
are outward looking, and understand human rights and civilian 
control.  All of these factors help the military step back 
from participating in politics.  Latigo said that in his 
view, it was very important for the opposition to show 
support and understanding for the military. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Latigo was interested in the U.S. position on 
independence for Somaliland.  He said that Somaliland 
"appears to be working" and that the Ugandan MPs had received 
a delegation of Somaliland parliamentarians.  DAS Swan told 
Latigo that discussion of Somaliland's independence need to 
be driven by its neighbors and that the issue was presented 
regularly at African Union meetings.  Latigo expressed 
support for Somaliland's independence and said that 
Parliament might issue a resolution recognizing the progress 
that had been made. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  In a separate meeting with northern 
parliamentarians (Reftel), DAS Swan heard similar statements 
of support for Uganda's deployment to Somalia.  However, the 
MPs said that the U.S. should not play too public a role on 
Somalia.  They told DAS Swan that it was better if the U.S. 
kept its support for the Ugandan deployment behind-the-scenes 
rather than publicize it.  Parliamentarians supported 
Uganda's deployment because it was an African initiative to 
help another African country.  They expressed concern about 
Uganda's current reliance on Ethiopia as potentially 
jeopardizing Uganda's role as a neutral party.  Likewise, 
Uganda's neutrality could be undermined if it was perceived 
to be too close to the United States.  Nonetheless, the 
parliamentarians appreciated U.S. assistance.  They raised 
the issue of the African Union's non-payment of AMISOM 
salaries. 
CHRITTON