VZCZCXRO9451
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSQ #0295/01 1081558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181558Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5961
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (DAS DICARLO) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS ROSEMARY 
DICARLO'S VISIT TO SKOPJE, APRIL 22-24 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Welcome back to Skopje!  Your visit allows us to 
reinforce messages to both government and opposition 
delivered during recent stops in Skopje by A/S Fried, DASD 
Fata, and Staffdel Killion. Those messages are: 
 
--Continue political dialogue to achieve concrete results and 
end DUI's boycott of Parliament.  Appreciate GOM flexibility. 
 DUI must match flexibility, be ready to compromise to move 
the national agenda ahead. 
 
--Continue to focus on implementation of priority laws and 
programs related to NATO accession: Framework Agreement (FWA) 
implementation; combating TIP and corruption; passing a 
liberal religious freedom law. 
 
--Appreciate Macedonia's support for Ahtisaari plan, 
constructive ties with Pristina, and low-key approach on 
border demarcation.  Will look for your public support for a 
Kosovo UNSCR, when the time is right. 
 
--Continue low-key approach on name issue, avoid provoking 
Greece, and consider a "unilateral cease-fire" on further 
public reactions to perceived or real Greek provocations. 
 
DIALOGUE MOVES AHEAD 
 
¶2. (SBU) Since the political dialogue process was 
reinvigorated in early March, PM Gruevski and DUI leader 
Ahmeti have met on three occasions, while lower-level working 
groups have met 7 times, to discuss a compromise on a list of 
laws requiring Badinter (double majority) voting.  To date, 
they have reached agreement on 39 of 127 laws proposed by 
DUI, and will continue high-level discussions next week to 
close out that issue.  In the meantime, Gruevski has offered 
DUI a reasonable compromise on the composition of the 
parliamentary Inter-ethnic Relations Committee (IEC), a key 
DUI demand. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ahmeti has accepted Gruevski's IEC offer, but has 
insisted on resolving two additional issues -- a law on use 
of languages, and a law to give NLA veterans social and 
financial benefits -- before he returns to Parliament. 
Gruevski is willing to review a draft law on languages, 
although he wants DUI to produce the first draft.  He also is 
willing to offer a compromise package of benefits, including 
state employment, for NLA veterans and their families, but 
has ruled out for political reasons a law that would codify 
such benefits.  We have participated throughout the process 
as observers and occasional facilitators, together with our 
EUSR colleagues, and have told Ahmeti that he should return 
to Parliament once the list of Badinter laws and composition 
of the Inter-ethnic Committee is resolved. 
 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION -- GETTING BACK ON TRACK 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite some initial foot-dragging on FWA 
implementation, the GOM has begun moving in the right 
direction in recent months. It is preparing for Phase 2 of 
decentralization, due to begin this July (Phase 1 began in 
July 2005).  Under phase 2, fiscal responsibilities will be 
transferred to municipalities that meet certain criteria, 
some of which are considered too generic.  We are pushing the 
GOM to define sound, specific fiscal criteria for determining 
which municipalities will qualify to begin Phase 2 of 
decentralization this July, but have been rebuffed.  Overall, 
however, our assessment is that the government generally has 
been cooperative on implementation of decentralization. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The government also has addressed some of the 
initial International Community objections to elements of its 
strategy for equitable representation, adopted earlier this 
year.  Remaining concerns regarding the strategy include the 
continued lack of a mechanism for sanctioning ministries or 
agencies that fail to meet equitable representation goals. 
In addition, the GOM has failed to explain so far what impact 
its oft touted "tripling of the equitable representation 
budget" will have on increasing representation of ethnic 
minorities in the state administration, without sacrificing 
quality of personnel recruited. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS, TIP, CORRUPTION -- GENERAL IMPROVEMENTS 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000295  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (U) State's 2006 human rights report on Macedonia, 
released in early March, noted general improvements in the 
rights situation in 2006, including no reported instances of 
unlawful killings by security forces.  The report notes 
continued corruption and political pressure on the judicial 
system, while adding that some recently passed laws should 
help to reduce corruption and judicial inefficiency.  Our 
contribution to this year's anti-trafficking report for State 
highlights improved GOM efforts to prosecute traffickers and 
to work more closely with NGOs on TIP prevention and 
protection programs for TIP victims.  The government also has 
taken steps in recent months to aggressively investigate and 
prosecute selected corruption cases.  Although we applaud 
their resolve in doing so, we continue to press the 
government to go after the "big fish" corruption cases, and 
not to shy away from prosecuting cases involving former 
VMRO-DPMNE members. 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -- CHALLENGES FROM ESTABLISHED RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both PM Gruevski and FM Milososki have lobbied the 
established religious communities (mainly the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church -- MOC, Islamic Community of Macedonia -- 
ICM, Catholic Church, and Methodist Church) for a more 
liberal religious freedom law that would allow other 
religious groups, including those linked to the Serb Orthodox 
Church, to legally register and practice in Macedonia.  All 
four communities have opposed such an initiative, with the 
ICM arguing that it will open the door to radical Islamic 
groups, and the MOC arguing that it would undermine national 
identity by allowing the Serb Orthodox Church to establish a 
beachhead in Macedonia. 
 
¶8. (SBU) We continue to press for a religious freedom law 
that meets international standards, as described in the 
Venice Commission's recent comments on the GOM's draft law. 
The government will push back, arguing that this is an uphill 
battle against the entrenched nationalisms of the established 
religious communities. Our counter-argument is that Gruevski 
is riding high in the polls and can comfortably afford to 
expend some of the considerable political capital he controls 
among his core supporters in order to get a religious freedom 
law that will help strengthen the country's NATO candidacy. 
 
KOSOVO -- CONTINUED, LOW-KEY SUPPORT 
 
¶9. (SBU) The GOM continues to support the Ahtisaari proposal 
and maintains positive ties with Pristina.  PM Gruevski 
expects to meet with PM Ceku in the next 2-3 weeks, possibly 
in Pristina, although the planned meeting has not been 
publicized.  The GOM is particularly pleased with the 
Ahtisaari proposal's language on demarcation of the 
Macedonia-Kosovo border.  Recently, FM Milososki has made 
public statements that those living in the demarcated border 
areas would not be materially affected by the demarcation, 
and that Kosovar farmers who owned land on the Macedonian 
side of the border would be able to continue using that 
property after demarcation.  The government also is weighing 
the best timing of Macedonian recognition of an independent 
Kosovo.  The government prefers not to be in the vanguard of 
countries recognizing Kosovo, fearing a strong Serbian 
backlash, but also is wary of offending Pristina by bringing 
up the rear.  It has abandoned its earlier plan to coordinate 
with Montenegro on the timing of formal recognition. 
 
NAME DISPUTE -- AVOID PROVOCATIONS 
 
¶10. (SBU) You will be landing at "Alexander the Great 
Airport," the recent renaming of which strained relations 
between Athens and Skopje.  The GOM has since maintained a 
low profile on the issue and normal official and business 
exchanges continue; the CHOD is scheduled to attend a session 
on Balkan stability this week in neighboring Thessaloniki. 
The use of FYROM in the joint House/Senate Freedom 
Consolidation Act of 2007 (on NATO enlargement) caused some 
heartburn here, but your statement on the name last week has 
helped salve the wounds. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The government supports continued discussions on 
the name in the context of the UN talks in New York, but is 
standing fast on its "dual name" proposal to Athens -- one 
 
SKOPJE 00000295  003 OF 003 
 
 
mutually agreed-upon name for use in Macedonia-Greece 
relations, and the constitutional name for use in all other 
bilateral and multilateral fora.  Your message on the name 
issue should be for the GOM to continue to support the UN 
process, while avoiding further provocations toward Athens in 
the meantime and declaring a unilateral cease-fire on 
responses to perceived provocations from the Greek side. 
Ambassador Dimitrov told us in early March that Skopje and 
Athens had agreed to hold a round of talks on the name in 
Ohrid in April; we have not heard anything further on that 
plan since then. 
 
WANTING TO VISIT DC -- COME BEARING NATO CANDIDACY 
DELIVERABLES 
 
¶12. (SBU) FM Milososki may mention to you his proposal to 
visit Washington May 21-22, and his hope to meet with the 
Secretary at that time.  The GOM also wants to explore the 
 
SIPDIS 
signing during that visit, or during a late summer or early 
December visit by PM Gruevski, of a double taxation avoidance 
agreement, on which Treasury has the lead.  We have told MFA 
contacts that a visit should be built around delivery of a 
package of Macedonian accomplishments on the NATO front, 
including solid progress on combating TIP and corruption, 
passage of a liberal religious freedom law, and -- for PM 
Gruevski's visit -- a successful EAPC summit.  Regarding the 
double taxation issue, we are studying the Macedonian draft 
proposal and have advised the MFA that action on such 
agreements would require strong lobbying from US companies 
doing business in Macedonia, which has not yet been the case. 
MILOVANOVIC