VZCZCXRO6651
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLG #0320/01 1151529
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251529Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4133
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0971
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEPGCA/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0544

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000320 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/S 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
STATE FOR AF/RSA 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IO MI
SUBJECT: MALAWI PKO - MOD RULES OUT SOMALIA, SUDAN A 
POSSIBILITY 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 51828 
     ¶B. LILONGWE 84 
     ¶C. LILONGWE 203 
     ¶D. LILONGWE 299 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Eastham met with Minister of 
Defense Davies Katsonga and separately with Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Henri Mumba on April 24 to renew our 
request that Malawi commit to sending a battalion of 
peacekeepers to join either the AMISOM or AMIS peacekeeping 
operations.  Both officials effectively ruled out Malawi's 
participation in AMISOM, while Katsonga (as he has often 
done) assured the Ambassador that Malawi is "ready for 
Darfur." He could not, however, provide a timeline for 
joining the mission.  Mumba was much more conservative, 
noting that any decision to join the AMIS mission would have 
to be made above the ministerial level, by the President and 
his Cabinet.  Katsonga, who has previously gotten himself 
into trouble by getting too far ahead of President Mutharika 
on peacekeeping deployments (reftel B), however promised to 
have a timeline for deployment to the Ambassador within a 
week. We,ll be seeing him again on Thursday, April 26, at 
his request.  In a subsequent meeting on April 25, Chief 
Secretary Bright Msaka suggested that once financial details 
 
SIPDIS 
were ironed out for an AMIS deployment, a push by Assistant 
Secretary Frazer might finally persuade Mutharika to act.  We 
 
SIPDIS 
still hold out hope that if financial and equipment issues 
can be addressed, the Malawians could eventually decide to 
put a battalion into AMIS.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Eastham first met with MOD Katsonga, who 
had returned April 23 from a trip to Addis Ababa to discuss 
peacekeeping operations.  The Ambassador complimented the 
Malawi Defence Force,s abilities, noting the substantial 
investment made by the United States to prepare Malawi,s 
forces for PKO operations.  He used the points in ref A to 
urge Malawi to decide favorably as soon as possible, and if a 
decision was made to send troops to AMIS, to make a public 
announcement of the decision.  The Ambassador reiterated (per 
emails from AF/RA Bittrick) that some U.S. funding, up to $1 
million per battalion, could possibly be made available for 
equipment needed by the MDF to support the deployment.  The 
Ambassador said we could work on what form this (no 
weapons/no ammunition) would take, perhaps by providing it to 
the MDF in situ in Darfur or by delivering it in Malawi to 
replace consumables. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  As Katsonga described his meetings in Addis, it 
became clear that the GOM has substantial reservations about 
the Somalia mission.  Katsonga said that the African Union 
was not prepared for what is now happening in Somalia.  He 
strongly stressed the point that not enough is being done 
diplomatically to bring the two sides together, with the 
result that the prospects are good for continued lethal 
combat.  This, he said, meant that any troops sent into the 
present situation would be engaged in combat, not 
peacekeeping.  He also complained that during that trip to 
Addis, the Director of the Peace and Security Committee 
claimed he had no information regarding casualties in 
Somalia. Katsonga said he found this exceedingly strange, 
that the AU would not be able to describe to a potential 
contributor the scale of the violence in terms of casualties 
suffered by  Finally, Katsonga said there seemed to be a 
reluctance by the U.N. to fund AMISOM, which did not lend 
confidence to the mission.  For these reasons, Katsonga said 
the GOM had decided that it would be better to attempt to 
positively influence the political dialogue, rather than to 
deploy its forces to join the mission. Katsonga said the GOM 
had requested a meeting of the Peace and Security Committee 
within the next three weeks to discuss these issues. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Katsonga then moved on to the AMIS mission in 
Darfur, first discussing the various political issues 
surrounding the conflict.  He again expressed concern that 
not enough effort had been made at "bringing together" the 
various factions, stating that while a lot of pressure had 
been put on the government of Sudan, equal pressure had not 
been placed on the "rebel Forces."  Katsonga then 
contradicted himself, stating sympathy for those who have 
 
LILONGWE 00000320  002 OF 003 
 
 
lost their lives, criticizing President Bashir and asking 
"when is enough enough?"  The Ambassador reminded the 
Minister that a decision by Malawi to send its forces to AMIS 
would answer the question, putting Malawi on the side of 
those who wanted peace in Sudan and who were willing to 
protect the civilian population in Darfur. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Addressing the AMIS mission itself, Katsonga said 
the GOM wanted to see "how serious Bashir is in agreeing to a 
hybrid force."  However, he went on to state that the GOM has 
a "full battalion trained and on stand-by to deploy." 
Katsonga noted there were some equipment issues the MOD was 
waiting to resolve, particularly the receipt of a number of 
Armored Personnel Carriers the MOD had ordered from South 
Africa (Comment: 12 APCs funded by Taiwan).  Katsonga said it 
should be weeks, not months, before the MDF is fully ready to 
deploy.  Katsonga said that he would meet with Malawi Defense 
Force Commander Gen. Marko Chiziko shortly to determine when 
the MDF will be "action-ready" for the mission.  Katsonga 
promised to come back to the Ambassador by May 2 with a 
timeline for the next steps towards deployment.  The 
Ambassador urged Katsonga to get a firm decision, communicate 
it to the AU and the UN, put forward a timeline, and announce 
it publicly in order to enable us to begin to identify what 
support we might be able to provide. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During this conversation, Katsonga said that Malawi 
has "50" milobs deployed in Darfur at present, and that to 
his great surprise, during the trip to Addis he had learned 
they were not being paid.  According to Katsonga, the answer 
received from the AU when he raised this question was that 
the money was on hand but "we need to develop a system to 
disburse the funds".  Katsonga speculated that lack of pay 
and the recent casualties among AMIS forces were demoralizing 
the troops in that mission. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador Eastham then met with the Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Henri Mumba on the same issues.  Mumba 
confirmed the message Katsonga had given regarding possible 
Malawian participation in AMISOM, and reiterated President 
Mutharika's statements on the mission (reftel B).  Mumba, 
however, expressed greater reservations than Katsonga had 
regarding MDF participation in Darfur, 
stating that the GOM had not discussed additional troop 
commitments among the ministries.  Mumba said he would pass 
along the request that the GOM make a public statement on 
their readiness to commit troops, but noted that the decision 
to deploy peacekeepers would be made above the ministerial 
level, by the President in consultation with his Cabinet. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Finally, on April 25, Ambassador and DCM met over 
lunch with GOM Chief Secretary Bright Msaka.  Msaka confirmed 
extreme reluctance on AMISOM and a continuing somewhat 
positive attitude toward Darfur.  He believed that if a clear 
understanding of how the deployment would be funded could be 
reached (and this is a pre-condition for the deployment), 
President Mutharika could be persuaded to issue the 
deployment order.  He thought that a meeting between 
President Mutharika and AF Assistant Secretary Frazer might 
seal the deal - once funding is worked out. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ambassador,s Comment: It,s now clear that Somalia 
is a non-starter, and the show-stopper is the prospect of 
heavy casualties in combat.  But on the other hand, I think 
we are inching very slowly, one step at a time, toward a 
Malawian contribution to AMIS in Darfur.  It is difficult to 
assess to what degree Malawi,s equipment shortages will have 
to be addressed before the MDF leadership and the Ministry 
would recommend a "go" decision; we hope to obtain some 
additional information on what the MDF actually thinks it 
needs when we see the Minister again on Thursday afternoon. 
Assuming that part is reasonable, that would leave the actual 
movement and sustainment costs to be addressed; as President 
Mutharika told me (ref C), he does not want to spend any of 
Malawi,s money for this.  Addressing how this deployment 
will be funded is a key prerequisite to any high-level push 
directly toward Mutharika directly.  He has high regard for 
Assistant Secretary Frazer and we would certainly recommend 
that she be engaged, perhaps by phone, in the effort, if/if 
 
LILONGWE 00000320  003 OF 003 
 
 
we can get some additional clarity and assurances regarding 
funding.  End Comment. 
 
EASTHAM