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DE RUEHCL #0064/01 0941005
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041005Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7665
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2880
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0765
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0265
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3714
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 2244
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7928
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2006
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0541

C O N F I D E N T I A L CASABLANCA 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA/NAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: MO PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MOROCCANS UNEASY THREE WEEKS AFTER BOMBING 
 
REF: A)  06 CASABLANCA 000409 
     B)  05 CASABLANCA 001304 
 
Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas C. Greene for Reasons 1.4 
(b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Three weeks after an Islamic extremist 
accidentally blew himself up outside an internet caf in the city's 
notorious slum, Sidi Moumen, the streets of Casablanca remain tense. 
Since the evening of March 11, when a 23-year-old unemployed Moroccan 
detonated a belt of explosives he was wearing outside an internet 
caf, Casablanca has been a city on edge despite the many prior 
public warnings and high alert status in advance of March 11.  The 
response of local Moroccans in the immediate aftermath was, 
understandably, fear.  However, fear was quickly replaced by anger 
directed at not only the bomber, but at the police, the Moroccan 
government, and even in hushed tones, the King himself.  Corruption 
is the main culprit according to many conversations on the streets of 
Casablanca and some blame the King and the system of royal amnesty 
that allowed the bomber to walk free two years earlier.  Despite the 
government's insistence that security authorities have the situation 
in hand, many Casablancans continue to be angry, fearful, and 
concerned about what the future holds.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Suspicions 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) For some time before the March 11 bombing, Casablancans 
appeared to be preparing themselves for the "inevitable." In 
conversations during the weeks prior to the bombing, talk often 
drifted to concerns about the probability of another terrorist 
attack.  Some Casablancans feared that a new attack would mark the 
anniversary of the Madrid train bombings, March 11, 2004.  Over a 
period of weeks, contacts speculated that the birth announcement of 
the King's second child could trigger an attack, much as the 
announcement of the birth of his first child was perceived to have 
done in 2003.  On that occasion, the announcement was followed 
shortly after by the attacks of May 16, when 45 people were killed in 
six explosions around Casablanca.  These predictions, added to daily 
reports (and rumors) of foiled attacks and arrests of Islamic 
extremists throughout the region, had many in Casablanca fearing that 
another attack was to be expected. 
 
---------------- 
 Fear and Rumors 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the period that followed the Sunday night explosion 
outside a small internet caf, many Moroccans compared notes about 
the days running up to the incident.  Rumors spread quickly, as they 
often do in the city, about how friends had heard that it was best to 
stay home the weekend of March 10.  Some friends and contacts claimed 
they were told to stay away from certain restaurants and hotels in 
the Casablanca and one longtime Consulate FSN confessed to have heard 
acquaintances say not to go out that weekend at all.  Many around the 
city remarked, in the days that followed the blast, that they had 
visited restaurants the night of the explosion, later rumored to be 
on a list of targets, only to find them closed. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Since March 11, there has been an increased level of 
security at many restaurants frequented by the international 
community and upper class Moroccans.  Many, formerly with no security 
at all, now boast uniformed guards at all entrances.  Restaurant 
owners and managers have also informed us that business, especially 
in the evening, has dropped off significantly since the March 11 
explosion.  Many in Morocco's privileged class still avoid shopping 
malls and movie theaters in upscale neighborhoods as well, out of 
fear of being targeted.  These reactions are similar, we are told, to 
those that occurred after the May 16, 2003 bombings. 
 
--------------- 
Then Came Anger 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) As word was released that the suicide bomber had been 
granted royal amnesty in 2005 after serving two years of a five-year 
sentence for terrorism, anger was added to fear.  Casablancans have 
told us that the number of amnesties given in recent years, under 
King Mohammad VI, is far greater than the number given by his father, 
Hassan II.  Just days before the bombing the King granted amnesty to 
nearly 9000 prisoners to celebrate the birth of his daughter.  To the 
surprise of many, 14 of the 9000 released had been sentenced to 
death.  Some political contacts saw this as an informal royal 
statement of support for the recent push to abolish the death penalty 
in Morocco.  Others saw it as a mistake.  Fuel was added to the fire 
when Casablancans learned from the media that the bomber had been 
planning terrorist attacks since November 2006, along with a group of 
former inmates living in the Sidi Moumen slum he called home. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Immediately after the incident the people of Sidi Moumen 
spontaneously protested against terrorism in front of the bombsite. 
In addition, in the days that followed other demonstrations occurred 
on the spot, which many speculate may have been encouraged by local 
government officials.  A few days following the bombing, a teacher 
from a nearby neighborhood told Poloff that her students were furious 
with the terrorists for once again bringing "shame" to Sidi Moumen 
but they are equally enraged with the GOM.  The teenage students said 
that the GOM promised to replace the slums with better buildings and 
new businesses creating more job opportunities.  In their experience, 
however, little seems to have materialized, leaving an angry and 
disenfranchised youth open to outside extremist influence.  Those, on 
the other hand, who do find new housing often are without jobs and 
are unable to pay new electric and water bills that were virtually 
unknown when they lived in the local slums -- leaving them once again 
in a desperate situation.  Jobs that are available in the area are 
low paying, leaving families like that of the March 11 bomber, 
Abdelfettah Raydi, to live in a space the size of a large closet. 
This situation often forces older children to live on the streets 
where they can easily fall pray to extremists eager to recruit new 
members to the jihad. 
 
--------------------------------- 
At the Root of it All, Corruption 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) According to many, any problem existing in Casablanca can 
be explained away in one word: corruption.  To nearly everyone with 
whom we spoke, the royal amnesties Morocco witnesses at nearly every 
large holiday or celebration are simply a way for prison guards and 
higher-ups to earn extra cash.  The system, they claim, is rife with 
corruption.  According to one contact, prison guards are bribed by 
the inmates' families, friends, or associates to have the prisoners' 
names put on the list for amnesty, as many suspect occurred in 
Raydi's case. The guards' wages are low and they are often eager to 
supplement their income and as one local put it, "why not, everybody 
in Casablanca wants to drive a Jaguar."  The list then works its way 
up the chain of command stopping at each level, for the possibility 
of compensation, until it reaches the King for his signature.  Most 
Moroccans understand that the King does not create the list.  Still, 
they hold him personally responsible when an amnesty-related problem 
occurs.  Raydi's case was not the first time that someone who 
benefited from amnesty was implicated in terrorism. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Political fallout from the bombing, especially in Casablanca, 
is surprising in at least one respect.  Distrust of the government, 
anger at the widening economic divide, and concern over an increasing 
terrorist threat - all have had an important impact on the views of 
non-elites in Casablanca.  With the September parliamentary elections 
fast approaching, many of the citizens  of the fifth largest city on 
the continent are looking for an alternative, and what we frequently 
hear as an alternative choice is the Islamic Party of Justice and 
Development -- a party that is seen by a growing number of 
Casablanca's non-elites as the only honest one and perhaps the party 
of hope for the future. 
 
 
GREENE