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Viewing cable 07VATICAN47, HOLY SEE: NEA DAS DANIN DISCUSSES LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07VATICAN47 2007-03-01 10:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Vatican
VZCZCXRO1393
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHSR
DE RUEHROV #0047/01 0601028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011028Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0666
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0696
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL LE VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE:  NEA DAS DANIN DISCUSSES LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST 
WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
VATICAN 00000047  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Sandrolini, Charge d'affaires, EXEC, 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
1. (C) Summary.  NEA DAS Danin discussed Lebanon, 
Israel/Palestinians, and Holy See relations with Israel with 
Deputy FM Parolin on Febaruary 23.  On Lebanon, Danin shared the 
USG analysis of the situation, and clarified USG perspective on 
Syria's role.  Parolin emphasized the need for Christian unity, 
for all Lebanese to work for the common good, and implied that 
the US should engage Syria further.  Parolin said the Holy See 
has been debating whether to send an envoy to Lebanon to address 
political issues, but had doubted that the time was right. 
Danin strongly encouraged such a move, and toward the end of the 
conversation Parolin seemed to have been at least partly won 
over.  On Middle East issues, Danin provided an update on the 
NUG and Secretary Rice's recent trilateral talks, and explained 
the USG perspective on Hamas.  Parolin, accentuating the 
positive in the Hamas/Fatah talks, thought Hamas should not be 
kept isolated. On the Holy See's bilateral relations with 
Israel, Parolin said the Holy See saw no political will from 
Israel to make progress on the Fundamental Agreement.  He sought 
Danin's advice on the Rome Palestinian rights conference.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Danin met 
Monsignor Pietro Parolin, the Holy See's Under Secretary for 
Relations with States (i.e., Deputy Foreign Minister) on 
February 23 to discuss Lebanon, Israel/Palestinians, and 
bilateral Holy See relations with Israel.  Also present were 
Charge d'affaires and Monsignor Franco Coppola. 
 
Lebanon 
------------- 
3.  (C) Danin called the situation in Lebanon very delicate; 
last summer's conflict had come as a disturbing surprise to the 
USG, and we are working hard to stabilize the situation. 
Lebanon has international support, as illustrated by the success 
of the Paris donor conference.  The Siniora government has done 
well to hold on, but the sectarian nature of events is 
distressing.  The USG does not believe Lebanon is on the verge 
of civil war, but Sunni/Shia tensions are up sharply and 
divisions in the Christian community are troubling.  Danin 
described Patriarch Sfeir as effective, but aging and cautious; 
he remains a moral authority and figure of integrity across 
confessional lines. 
 
4. (C) Parolin said the Holy See shares the US concern and was 
glad to hear that civil war is not imminent, as that would be 
disastrous.  Lebanon is very important to the Holy See as a 
model for interreligious harmony.  Unfortunately there has been 
no sign that the contending parties in Lebanon are ready to 
reach a solution.  Divisions among Christians are worrisome, 
though there have been some good initiatives such as the 
Maronite bishops' statement.  Parolin said "outside forces" are 
destabilizing Lebanon, and asked whether the situation could be 
solved without talking to those outside forces. 
 
5. (C) Danin agreed that outside forces -- specifically Syria -- 
were at work and linked to violent attacks on political leaders; 
in all but two of the last 20 or so cases, the victims have been 
Christians.  The Christian split in Lebanon is an opportunity 
for others to meddle.  We have been very disappointed by Aoun, 
someone we've known for years as a nationalist who now seems 
driven only by ambition.  Parolin, noting that Aoun's 
aspirations have cost him his principles, agreed with Danin that 
Aoun had once been anti-Syria but has clearly changed.  Citing 
the Pope's statements on Lebanon emphasizing the need for all to 
work for the common good, Parolin said this would be the only 
way to ensure the survival of democracy there.  Christian unity 
is also essential to the survival of democracy in Lebanon, and 
to the survival of Christian communities in the Middle East. 
 
6. (C) Danin, emphasizing the moral authority of the Pope and 
the Church in Lebanon, suggested that the Holy See take a higher 
profile there.  Parolin observed that Aoun's relations with 
Cardinal Sfeir have been strained for a long time -- a 
complicating factor.  Cardinal Etchegaray had gone to Lebanon 
last year as a goodwill envoy; for some time the Vatican has 
been considering whether to take another initiative to 
demonstrate concern about the situation, but Parolin doubted 
whether conditions were ripe for a more political initiative by 
the Holy See.  Danin, however, endorsed the idea, saying that 
for the Holy See to send someone to Lebanon urging unity would 
indeed be positive. Christians have been fighting each other, 
and this is dangerous. 
 
7. (C) Danin reviewed recent efforts by Amr Moussa, who has been 
reluctant to return.  There is a need for such efforts, as the 
current situation is stalemated and the public mood is 
increasingly negative toward both sides.  The USG view is that 
political compromise should be possible without affecting the 
status of the tribunal, which should proceed quickly.  We leave 
issues such as cabinet restructuring, elections, etc. to the 
Lebanese but do follow the tribunal issue carefully.  Parolin 
 
VATICAN 00000047  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
said Lebanese Christians feel the dilemma acutely -- they know 
the tribunal is essential for justice, but perhaps puts 
stability in jeopardy. 
 
8. (C) Parolin asked about engaging Syria.  Danin said Syria is 
very nervous about the tribunal.  We don't know what the 
tribunal will decide; we respect its integrity.  Danin 
elaborated on previous USG efforts to work with Syria, which 
have led nowhere; he concluded that we don't see utility in 
further engaging Syria now.  The Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, 
and others are also upset with Syria, which is isolated as a 
result of its support for Hezbollah and links to Iran;the Arabs' 
shunning of Syria is a powerful message.  Syria's obstructive 
attitude seems to be due to its appetite for influence in 
Lebanon, and the regime's corruption.  Any solution requires a 
regional element. 
 
9. (C) Parolin agreed but wondered what alternatives existed in 
Syria.  Danin made clear that the US does not seek "regime 
change" in Syria, but rather "behavior change".  Syria wants 
talks with Israel, but it is doubtful that Syria would actually 
negotiate in good faith.  Opening such talks in the current 
environment would only serve to make Lebanese fearful of 
possible abandonment.  That some Lebanese see Syria as a 
protector complicates matters, observed Parolin.  Danin said it 
would be natural, and fine with the US, for a free Lebanon to 
maintain friendly and historic ties with Syria, but Lebanon must 
be independent. 
 
10. (C) Parolin hinted that the Holy See might take a more 
favorable look at the idea of sending an envoy.  Danin responded 
enthusiastically, noting that such an envoy would naturally face 
certain limits on what he could expect to achieve.  He urged 
Parolin to let the US know if we could help.  The Pope's 
messages are strong and clear, but a visible, personal touch 
such as sending an envoy would have a unique strength of its own. 
 
Israel/Palestinians 
-------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Danin described the Mecca agreement on the Palestinian 
NUG as having complicated the situation. The way in which a new 
government emerges will be very important.  Palestinians tell us 
not to rush in; our remaining patient will strengthen Abu Mazen 
and put pressure on Hamas.  Ismail Haniya as the Prime Minister 
is a serious problem.  Still, we have taken a low-key approach 
so far.  The recent Rice/Olmert/Abbas talks were challenging; 
Israel is very uncomfortable with the current situation, fearing 
Hamas will weaken previous Palestinian commitments to Israel. 
The situation in Gaza is chaotic and we need to do something. 
But the US Congress is very wary of the situation and will be 
reluctant to provide funds to security forces that are 
subordinate to a NUG. 
 
12. (C) Parolin suggested that a small step forward would help, 
noting that Hamas had seemed to accept agreements with Israel. 
Danin clarified that Hamas said it would "respect" those 
agreements by letting Abu Mazen deal with Israel, but did not 
say it "accepted" them, and this is an important distinction. 
(Hamas has also recently said it would "never" recognize 
Israel.)  This ambiguity is unsatisfactory for us. 
 
13. (C) Parolin felt that there had in fact been some progress 
nonetheless.  Should Hamas be so isolated?  Danin framed the 
issue in terms of a negotiation.  Hamas wants to end its 
isolation; we think that can be achieved but Hamas must provide 
commitments to the Quartet principles in return.  In bazaar 
terms, the price must be right.  It isn't even clear exactly 
what Hamas is -- is it more like the PLO, or more like the 
Muslim Brotherhood?  What are its real objectives?  Can it ever 
accept Israel? 
 
Holy See/Israel 
----------------------- 
 
14. (C) Parolin mentioned the Palestinian rights conference to 
be held in Rome in March.  The Holy See is considering how to 
respond to an invitation to attend; what would the US recommend? 
 Danin said the conference is not balanced and is too one-sided. 
 Danin praised Holy See efforts over the years to strengthen its 
ties to Israel, something very much appreciated by the Israelis. 
 They are proud and independent, but seek international 
acceptance. 
 
15. (C) Parolin noted that while bilateral Holy See-Israel 
relations were good, there remained the difficult issue of the 
Fundamental Agreement.  There had been recent talks in November, 
December, and January, and a plenary session is scheduled for 
March 29.  So far,  there has been zero progress; the Israelis 
show no political will to advance the process.  Danin noted he 
had discussed the issue some months ago with Father Jaeger, a 
 
VATICAN 00000047  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Holy See negotiator, and said the USG had raised the issue with 
Israel.  He promised to look into the issue further and raise it 
again with Israel.  Parolin appreciated the offer and said he 
hoped for progress at the March plenary. 
 
16. (U) DAS Danin has cleared this cable. 
SANDROLINI