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DE RUEHFR #0861/01 0651501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061501Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5395
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3722
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1165
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1950
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINS EAID KDEM GV FR
SUBJECT: GUINEA:  FRANCE OFFERS NEW ASSISTANCE AS "CARROT" 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  France was quick to respond to the 
February 25 naming of Lansana Kouyate as Guinea's Prime 
Minister, sending Minister-Delegate Brigitte Girardin 
(Cooperation, Development, Francophonie) to Conakry for a 
lightning visit on March 1.  She met with Kouyate and 
announced a 1.1 million euro French assistance package (1 
million euro for specific water management projects and 
100,000 euro to assist those most in need as a result of the 
general strike/state of siege).  The MFA recognizes that the 
GOF could be criticized for acting prematurely, but notes the 
strong urging of President Chirac's office that Girardin 
visit Guinea and provide the assistance package ("carrot") as 
a sign of support for Kouyate and encouragement for Guineans 
after the turmoil of the past several weeks.  At the 
working-level, the MFA remains concerned that Guinea could 
readily backslide into another round of unrest and that 
Kouyate's selection may raise expectations that he will find 
difficult to meet.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA desk officer Damien Syed on March 1 (and in a 
follow-up conversation on March 2) reviewed events in Guinea 
since the naming of Lansana Kouyate as PM, the lifting of the 
"state of siege," and the ending of the general strike.  He 
said that the GOF was pleased that tensions had lowered 
significantly and that "normal" life was returning to Guinea. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Notably, Syed commented on the decision to send 
Minister-Delegate Brigitte Girardin (Cooperation, 
Development, Francophonie) to Conakry on March 1 (her arrival 
there was taking place at the same time we were meeting with 
Syed).  Girardin was already scheduled to hold consultations 
on Cote d'Ivoire in Burkina Faso and then travel to Abidjan 
on March 1 in order to take part in the planned March 2 IWG 
meeting.  Syed said that on February 27, the French 
Presidency "firmly suggested" (Syed refrained from using the 
word "ordered") that Girardin stop briefly in Conakry.  Her 
purpose was to show French support for the naming of Kouyate 
as PM (who would take office on March 1 prior to Girardin's 
arrival) and the steps both government and opposition had 
taken to end the "state of siege" and general strike. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Girardin met with Kouyate on March 1, Syed reported 
the next day.  They had known each other from previous 
experiences, including the Cote d'Ivoire IWG process, in 
which they had both been involved at various points. 
According to Syed, Kouyate made a positive impression on 
Girardin, seemed committed, but at the same time was under no 
illusion about the difficulty of the tasks before him. 
Kouyate had made a similar impression on France's ambassador 
in Conakry when the two met earlier in the week. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Girardin announced a new package of French 
assistance while in Conakry.  This package consists of 1 
million euro specifically earmarked for water resource 
management and 100,000 euro to assist those "most in need" as 
a result of the "state of siege" and general strike.  Syed 
took care to note that the 1 million euro water resource fund 
was very specific in nature, and, for example, provided that 
specific types of water pumps would be installed in specific 
facilities in specific villages.  He said France had done its 
utmost to ensure the money would not be misspent or diverted 
elsewhere for other purposes. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Anticipating our question, Syed said that the GOF 
well understood that others might wonder if this largesse was 
premature inasmuch as Kouyate had just been named and there 
was no clear indication that positive change would occur in 
Guinea, notwithstanding the reduction in turmoil caused by 
the ending of the "state of siege" and general strike.  He 
said that "we believe it an appropriate moment to provide 
'carrots' instead of 'sticks' and that this relatively small 
package will not only serve to validate the choice of Kouyate 
but also provide encouragement that Guinea has taken at least 
one step -- an important step -- in the right direction." 
 
¶7.  (C)  Syed readily acknowledged that Guinea's situation 
remained precarious.  "Naming Kouyate was a good first step, 
which we want to recognize, but will he have real power? 
Will he be manipulated by Conte and his followers, as Konan 
Banny has been manipulated in Cote d'Ivoire?  Will the army 
remain quiet?"  Syed observed that much remained to be 
determined and that Guinea could easily backslide into 
turmoil if there were not visible steady progress, even if 
 
PARIS 00000861  002 OF 002 
 
 
only slow progress.  He cautioned that Guineans might think 
that Kouyate's arrival signaled an imminent improvement in 
their lives, something not likely in the short-term, Syed 
noted, "or ever, if Guinea does not deal with its real 
underlying problem -- the incompetence and cynicism of the 
Conte regime."  He said that the GOF viewed the naming of 
Kouyate as an important step that might help Guinea address 
its fundamental problem and assist it in moving out of the 
Conte era. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON