VZCZCXRO1343
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0205/01 0681611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091611Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7621
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0812

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: HOPES HIGHER FOR LEDRA STREET REOPENING, BROADER 
UN PROCESS 
 
REF: NICOSIA 21 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On President Tassos Papadopoulos's command, 
Greek Cypriot workers late March 8 demolished a wall and 
viewing platform on Ledra Street, raising hopes that a Buffer 
Zone crossing in the heart of Old Nicosia might soon open. 
T/C leaders greeted the wall's fall with guarded optimism, 
while the international community welcomed the action and 
called on the sides to engage immediately with the UN to 
accomplish the security measures needed to open the crossing 
point.  Most analysts attribute the demolition to 
Papadopoulos's desire to regain moral high ground, since 
external parties (the EU and USG, for example) as well as 
Cypriot coalition mates were blaming RoC intransigence for 
stalled talks on Ledra and for unclear intentions on broader 
CyProb negotiations.  Taken together with a recent Greek 
Cypriot effort to jump-start the July 8 process, the 
President's about-face -- he earlier promised the wall would 
remain until Turkish troops abandoned the area -- leaves us 
guardedly optimistic as well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
All Were Stunned by the News 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Night-owls catching the 11 o'clock news March 8 
watched with great surprise as RoC-contracted bulldozers and 
jackhammer-armed work crews began to demolish the barrier, 
which Turkish Cypriots had called the "Wall of Shame."  The 
structure dated to the early 1960s, when the start of 
intercommunal violence resulted in the barricading of Ledra 
Street, Old Nicosia's primary north-south thoroughfare and 
once the commercial heart of the city.  One hundred yards to 
the north, Turkish Cypriots had erected a similar wall, and 
the area between the two became a disputed no-man's land and 
UNFICYP patrol route. 
 
¶3.  (U) Buffer Zone crossing points to the east and west 
opened in 2003 after then-Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Denktash liberalized "border" regulations.  Demand for Ledra 
Street's reopening subsequently grew among pro-solution 
forces on the island, both to revitalize commerce in the 
economically depressed center city and to send a symbolic 
message of unity.  In preparation for an eventual opening and 
to try to propitiate a balky Turkish Army, Turkish Cypriots 
constructed a footbridge on Ledra over a perpendicular street 
on which Turkish Forces patrolled.  Greek Cypriots protested, 
claiming the measure worked against the area's 
demilitarization, a G/C pre-condition. 
 
¶4.  (C) Defying the Turkish military, T/C leader Mehmet Ali 
Talat succeeded in removing the "offending" bridge in early 
January.  Understandably, he demanded the Greek Cypriots 
reciprocate, tearing down the "Wall of Shame" and adjoining 
G/C National Guard post.  Papadopoulos, supported by most G/C 
party leaders, refused.  "T/Cs cannot expect a concession 
from us in exchange for dismantling an 'illegal' structure 
that never should have been built," they screamed.  Only new 
Nicosia Mayor Eleni Mavrou and parliamentary opposition 
leader Nikos Anastassiades (DISY) praised Talat for taking on 
the generals; Anastassiades received withering criticism in 
the National Council as payback.  Papadopoulos later claimed 
the government remained interested in opening Ledra.  He 
would consider removing the wall, but only after Turkish 
Forces withdrew from the area and removed all "TRNC" symbols 
from the crossing route.  (In briefing the diplomatic corps 
today, MFA Cyprus Problem Division Chief Erato Marcoullis, in 
another apparent G/C concession, stated in response to a 
question that the RoC "today was not noting" the national 
symbols issue.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
In Hindsight, However, Something was Brewing 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Signs were pointing toward some sort of 
CyProb-related gesture from the Greek Cypriot side.  At a 
working lunch with the Ambassador a week before, G/C 
negotiator and intelligence service chief Tasos Tzionis, 
parrying the Ambassador's repeated urgings to take down the 
wall and find other ways to build confidence between the 
parties, hinted his community would attempt to spur movement 
on the stalled July 8 Process track (days later the G/Cs 
would deliver, via the UN, a bridging proposal which T/C 
counterpart Rasit Pertev is currently studying.)  Regional 
Affairs Chief subsequently met Tzionis in the latter's intel 
 
NICOSIA 00000205  002 OF 003 
 
 
chief role, and used the opportunity to urge the wall's 
immediate demolition. 
 
¶6.  (C) Tzionis telephoned the Ambassador at 2200 March 8 and 
broke the news, trumpeting Papadopoulos's decision as a 
gesture of goodwill toward his Turkish Cypriot compatriots 
and seriousness of political purpose to the international 
community.  The RoC's press and public affairs staffs had 
already engaged, and by 2300, as demolition work commenced, 
both local and international media were on hand for the 
spectacle.  The situation at 0730 March 9 appeared quite 
subdued in comparison.  Replacing the fortress-like wall and 
visitors platform -- once adorned with "Nothing is Gained 
Without Sacrifice, or Victory Without Blood" -- was a simple 
temporary barrier that blocked views into the buffer zone.  A 
handful of police in dress blues milled about, attempting to 
attract the attention of the few remaining journalists. 
 
--------------------------- 
Positive Spin on Both Sides 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Media carried the story front-and-center, reporting 
early impressions from leaders on both sides.  President 
Papadopoulos, in Brussels for the weekend meeting of the 
European Council, repeated Tzionis's "goodwill gesture" 
explanation but cautioned that the RoC's pre-conditions 
remained:  without withdrawal of Turkish troops and removal 
of symbols, there would be no Ledra Street crossing.  Most 
party leaders welcomed the government's move and demanded the 
T/Cs reciprocate.  Only opposition DISY criticized 
Papadopoulos, accusing the President of making an unwarranted 
concession. 
 
¶8.  (C) Turkish Cypriot authorities greeted the news 
optimistically.  In comments to media, negotiator Pertev 
voiced hope that crossings via Ledra might soon start.  "It 
was the Greek Cypriots' turn, and they did the right thing," 
he added.  Pertev later told us that Tzionis had telephoned 
him with news of the demolition; subsequently, he and other 
"TRNC officials" visited Lokmaci (Ledra's northern Nicosia 
extension), where they discussed removing G/C-baiting 
propaganda banners there.  "President" Talat, traveling in 
Azerbaijan, reportedly delighted in the news, while "PM" 
Ferdi Soyer labeled the development positive.  Nationalist 
Turkish Cypriot parties termed the wall's removal a "shallow 
move to obtain political kudos," however, arguing the G/Cs 
had no intention ever to open the crossing. 
 
¶9.  (U) Early March 9, the Ambassador visited Ledra Street to 
observe developments personally.  In an impromptu press 
conference with dozens of reassembled reporters, he welcomed 
the wall coming down, as well as the Turkish Cypriots' 
earlier bridge demolition.  The moves were a welcome effort 
toward opening Ledra and reuniting Europe's last capital; he 
urged the parties to work with the UN to accomplish the 
practical steps needed to fully open the crossing point. 
Concluding, the Ambassador called on both communities to take 
advantage of the positive momentum by launching the technical 
talks process envisaged in the July 8 process.  The UN, UK, 
EU Presidency and Perm-5 Ambassadors delivered similar 
messages locally. 
 
------------------------------ 
Behind the Scenes Maneuverings 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Despite Papadopoulos claiming from Brussels that he 
earlier had consulted UNFICYP, UN personnel informed us they 
were taken completely by surprise.  Briefing PolChief and 
British DCM Rob Fenn on March 9, Chief of Staff Peter 
Fraser-Hopewell revealed that the GCNG had alerted UNFICYP at 
1900 the previous day, just four hours before demolition 
commenced.  Only four in the government had knowledge of the 
operation, Fraser-Hopewell learned:  Papadopoulos, Tzionis, 
and the chiefs of the GCNG and Cypriot Police.  He commended 
their operational security. 
 
¶11. (C) The GCNG had come with list of precise demands, 
Fraser-Hopewell divulged.  UNFICYP should brief the Turkish 
Forces "at the highest levels" of the pending demolition, to 
ensure the TF would not react rashly.  The UN should erect a 
barrier to prevent the TF from viewing the operation from 
ground-level.  And armed UN troops should be present in the 
BZ throughout the six-hour duration.  As requested, UNFICYP 
Force Commander MF Rafael Barni delivered the messages to the 
TF Chief of Staff in Cyprus, MG Memisoglu, one hour before 
destruction commenced.  Fraser-Hopewell claimed that 
 
NICOSIA 00000205  003 OF 003 
 
 
Memisoglu succeeded "in spades" in briefing down the chain of 
command, and there were no incidents.  He thought the Turkish 
two-star would consult with superiors in Ankara over the 
weekend to determine next steps. 
 
¶12.  (C) Significant work remained before the crossing could 
open, he noted.  UNFICYP experts immediately would deploy to 
the buildings along the Ledra corridor, searching for (and, 
if necessary, neutralizing) unexploded ordnance.  Engineers 
from UNDP would began preparations for shoring up the 
decrepit structures abutting the street.  Difficult 
negotiations awaited as well, Fraser-Hopewell predicted. 
Just what did troops "withdrawing from the immediate vicinity 
mean?" for example.  And the parties involved continued to 
dispute "ownership" of 30 meters of the proposed route, an 
issue relevant to G/C demands to move both sides' security 
forces back 100 meters from the crossing.  MG Barni hoped to 
raise these issues with Memisoglu the week of March 12. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Why He Acted, and What Comes Next 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) With characteristic bluster, Papadopoulos dismissed 
Talat's January bridge demolition, assuring Greek Cypriots 
their wall would stand until Turkish troops departed Ledra's 
confines.  Why, then, the apparent "concession?"  Despite 
Papadopoulos's still-solid polling numbers, more than a whiff 
of Cypriot dissatisfaction has emerged of late.  Party mate 
and EU Commissioner Markos Kyprianou publicly criticized the 
President for his handling of the Cyprus Problem; Government 
Spokesman Christodolou Pashiardis and Tassos's other 
spin-meisters proved unable to counter the respected 
Kyprianou's observations.  Further, coalition mate Dimitris 
Christofias, Communist Party AKEL's secretary general, 
assured media recently that the President should not take his 
party's support for granted (while we continue to believe 
AKEL will come around, Christofias is feeling heat from 
pro-solution AKEL voters angry with Papadopoulos's CyProb 
slow-rolling.) 
 
¶14.  (C) External pressures are mounting as well, demanding 
the President engage Turkish Cypriots in real dialogue.  The 
Ambassador harangues RoC Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas 
and Tzionis at every opportunity to make positive gestures to 
jump-start the UN process.  Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly President Rene van der Linden, visiting Cyprus in 
late February, called for Ledra's immediate opening.  UK 
sources reveal that Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, in a 
letter to Lillikas, echoed van der Linden's call and urged a 
quick resumption of UN-brokered negotiations.  European 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn is sticking to his 
"G/C-unfriendly" interpretation of the EU's Direct Trade 
Regulation, and this week blasted the RoC-dominated Cypriot 
media for their attacks on his impartiality and 
professionalism. 
 
¶15.  (C) Papadopoulos needed to win back the white hat.  Ever 
the tactician, he has struck on multiple fronts.  The latest 
G/C proposal to end the impasse on the July 8 talks -- in 
which each side would propose one technical committee and one 
substantive working group to begin work immediately -- 
appears difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to dismiss 
out-of-hand.  Similarly, who could criticize his order to 
demolish the wall, an action he'll no doubt trumpet for weeks 
to come (regardless of whether he orders the checkpoint to 
open)?  We've even noticed a charm offensive on the RoC's 
front, evinced best by Tzionis's recent chumminess on 
political as well as intelligence/law enforcement matters. 
Unsure how long this opening will last, in public comments 
and private diplomacy the Embassy will push hard for serious 
give-and-take in the UN talks and greater bilateral security 
cooperation. 
SCHLICHER