VZCZCXRO7518
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0608/01 0751208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 161208Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7855
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 0028
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNA/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0023
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0231
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0932
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0782
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0407
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0153
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0441

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INR/TNC AND IO/T 
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA 
LAGOS FOR DEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV PREL EAIR PU
SUBJECT: COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY FOR GUINEA-BISSAU 
 
REF: A. DAKAR 0381 
     ¶B. DAKAR 0124 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (S) Embassy, press and intelligence reporting over the 
past year have highlighted the growing problem of drug 
trafficking in Guinea-Bissau (see refs).  The international 
community watched and took no significant action as the GOGB 
lost sovereignty to drug traffickers.  Now Guinea-Bissau is a 
haven of lawlessness where the state is rapidly losing its 
ability to govern, and drug cartels operate openly without 
fear of prosecution or interdiction.  The open borders and 
lack of control over financial transactions that attract 
narcotics and human traffikers may also attract those engaged 
in other illicit activities such as arms smuggling and 
terrorism.  Embassy lays out a proposed coordinated strategy 
and action request for assistance from the Department, DEA, 
FBI, DOD, DOJ and the UN in paragraph 11.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
¶2.  (C) In the war on drugs a new front must be opened in 
Guinea-Bissau.  By most estimates, the country receives the 
highest volume of cocaine traffic in all of West Africa 
because of the ease with which traffickers can operate. 
Intelligence and anecdotal reporting suggest processing may 
be happening in Guinea-Bissau as well.  Intelligence analysts 
at the DEA and UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are 
unable to say for certain what happens to the drugs after 
they are stored and broken down into smaller packages in 
Guinea-Bissau, but most agree they go to Europe.  It is, 
however, possible that mules are using the three daily 
non-stop flights from Dakar to Atlanta, New York and 
Washington, respectively.  Money from the transactions goes 
back to traffickers in Latin America to help fuel production. 
 It is not yet known if those same funds are used to smuggle 
drugs into the United States or if they directly contribute 
to conflicts in Latin America through the purchase of arms 
and ammunition. 
 
¶3.  (U) Europe, which has been late to raise its defenses 
against cocaine trafficking from Africa, is now getting on 
board.  According to press reports, a Maritime Analysis 
Operations Center based in Lisbon will be set up next month 
with law enforcement agencies from eight European countries. 
Navy, police, and customs officials will attempt to identify 
and interdict shipments. 
 
¶4.  (C) Fighting drug trafficking has replaced security 
sector reform as post,s top policy priority in 
Guinea-Bissau.  No progress can be made toward achieving U.S. 
goals of peace and security, governing justly and 
democratically, and economic recovery and poverty reduction 
without a serious, sustained, and coordinated anti-narcotics 
trafficking program.  This cable outlines our proposed 
strategy for assisting those elements in Guinea-Bissau that 
have not yet been corrupted and want to fight traffickers. 
 
STICKS 
------ 
¶5.  (C) Embassy, DEA Lagos, and UNODC officials have 
communicated concerns to the GOGB and the response is always 
the same: &We know we have a problem, give us materials, 
money and training to fight it.8  This was reiterated most 
recently by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes in a letter to the 
Ambassador dated February 13.  It is accurate to say the GOGB 
has no capacity or resources to fight traffickers, but still 
there are steps the GOGB can take starting with appointing a 
focal point in the government and identifying "vetted" 
 
DAKAR 00000608  002 OF 003 
 
 
individuals or units in the police, military, and judiciary. 
A legal review should be conducted to identify and study the 
laws which could be used in putting away traffickers and 
efforts should be made in conjunction with the National 
Popular Assembly to draft new legislation.  Embassy will 
continue to reiterate these messages through diplomatic 
channels in coordination with allies and international 
organizations. 
 
¶6.  (C) There must be consequences for any GOGB failure to 
take appropriate steps, but USG assistance is small and so 
leverage is limited.  The first step that post will implement 
immediately is the suspension of participation in programming 
by the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), which 
sends high level military officers to regional trainings. 
Over the past year, ACSS has sponsored Bissau-Guinean 
civilian and military participants for courses in Atlanta, 
Algiers, and Addis Ababa.  Persistent allegations of 
high-level military involvement in trafficking, including 
from some ministers, necessitate this step.  The next step 
would be the loss of International Military Education and 
Training assistance geared toward mid and lower level 
officers. 
 
¶7.  (C) It is not clear at this time if there is enough 
information about the drug traffic to place Guinea-Bissau on 
the Major,s List as a transit country that &significantly 
affects the United States.8  Embassy, the Department and 
interagency groups should review the data through the annual 
reporting of the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report and make a determination.  The stigma of being named 
to the list and possibly de-certified is a stain the GOGB 
does not want. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
--------------- 
¶8.  (S) There is not enough information about trafficking 
through Bissau to make arrests.  Post's request for a law 
enforcement official seconded to the UNODC in Bissau (Ref A) 
will help provide more information and meanwhile send a 
message that the international community is taking action. 
DEA advises that if it had assets on the ground, it might be 
able to gain enough information for indictments under Title 
21, Sections 959 and 960.  Indicting a Latin American or 
Nigerian trafficker or a Bissau-Guinean government official 
would send a powerful message.  Even if no extradition were 
possible, the indicted would not feel safe traveling outside 
the country; given the austere conditions of Bissau, this 
would be a significant punishment. 
 
¶9.  (C) Embassy will coordinate with EUCOM to request U.S. 
military ships that navigate near Guinea-Bissau as part of 
their scheduled itinerary to linger off the coast for an 
additional length of time.  This will send a strong message 
to traffickers and the GOGB.  Such action may also generate 
telephone based intelligence as contacts communicate to 
change course or suspend shipments.  Embassy has provided to 
DEA Lagos cell phone numbers of reputed drug kingpins 
Minister of Defense Helder Proenca and the Chief of the Navy 
Jose Americo Bubu Na Tchuto. 
 
CARROTS 
------- 
¶10.  (C) Embassy has requested INL funds but has been told 
that none are available.  In any event, UNODC Chief Antonio 
Mazzitelli does not recommend training in the current 
environment, which he says is like a vacuum.  Trained agents 
would not have the equipment, political support, or personal 
security guarantee to make any difference.  A more robust 
program carried out in coordination with other donors and 
possibly under the auspices of the UN is required. 
 
 
DAKAR 00000608  003 OF 003 
 
 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
¶11.  (C) Embassy requests that the Department identify 
alternative sources of funding such as the UN Democracy Fund 
or earmarked contributions to the United Nations to address 
Guinea-Bissau's grave narcotics problem.  We will continue to 
coordinate diplomatic efforts with allies and international 
organizations, but diplomacy without well-funded, concrete 
action will yield few results.  END COMMENT AND ACTION 
REQUEST. 
JACOBS