VZCZCXRO1505
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0754/01 0601133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011133Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9963
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I - KHOURY-KINCANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
 
SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT: PARTIES AGREE TO FORMAL 
NEGOTIATIONS, NO MOVEMENT YET 
 
REF: A) 06 KIRKUK 172 
 
 B) 06 KIRKUK 177 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Calls for "joint administration" dominated a 
January 12 meeting called to find an end to the Arab-Turkoman 
boycott of the Kirkuk Provincial Council.  Despite apparent 
agreement at that meeting, the Arab and Turokman blocs have failed 
to follow up and appear to be uninterested in serious negotiations 
to end the boycott.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) As reported in reftels, since November 2006, most Arab and 
Turkoman Kirkuk Provincial Council (PC) members have boycotted its 
weekly sessions and select committee meetings, presenting varied and 
shifting demands.  Without the boycotting members, only PC members 
elected on the Kurdish-dominated Kurdish Brotherhood List (KBL) have 
participated in PC business.  PC Chairman Rizgar Ali Hamajan (PUK) 
is unwilling to use the KBL's majority to play hardball with 
boycotters, claiming that doing so would fatally harm relations 
among the communities.  He has said that the KBL is willing to 
continue governing without the boycotters indefinitely, though he 
has consulted informally with boycotting members on issues 
concerning them, such as public-works projects. 
 
¶3.  (U) In December 2006, the Arab and Turkoman blocs called on CF 
to help enforce an August 8, 2005 agreement among the blocs 
requiring "joint administration" (division of provincial jobs among 
Kirkuk's major ethno-religious communities).  Since the boycott 
began, PRT staff have encouraged all parties to find a solution, and 
the members of the blocs have been negotiating informally behind the 
scenes.  On February 1, 2007, the KBL began a very public campaign 
to end the boycott, issuing, at a televised event, an open letter 
inviting boycotting blocs to enter into a public dialogue with the 
KBL to resolve all outstanding issues.  This drew no response and, 
on February 12, CF called the blocs to a meeting in an attempt to 
clarify the boycotters' demands and move forward. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
THE FEBRUARY 12 MEETING: WHAT IS IT YOU WANT? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (U) Talk of joint administration dominated the meeting.  Though 
long a touchstone and rallying cry for boycotting Turkoman PC 
members, when asked about it individually, their ideas of what it 
would mean in practice vary widely, with most calling for a 32-32-32 
percent split of provincial Director General (DG) positions among 
Kurds, Turkomen, and Arabs (with the remaining 4 percent going to 
Chaldo-Assyrians).  At the February 12 meeting, this understanding 
seemed to prevail, with the Turkoman bloc pushing the point.  Arab 
bloc concerns centered on alleged extra-judicial detentions of Arabs 
by Kurdish security forces in the KRG and implementation of Iraqi 
constitution Article 140. 
 
¶5.  (U) PC Chairman Rizgar proposed a "reconciliation" committee 
composed of one representative from each bloc to "coordinate" future 
negotiations, to which the Arab and Turkoman blocs agreed.  He also 
agreed to provide a written KBL response to the Arab and Turkoman 
blocs.  The KBL response on February 13 was largely an extension of 
the August 8, 2005 agreement, proposing a form of joint 
administration, offering to continue cooperation on detainee issues 
and project allocation (which it was already doing), and reaffirming 
its support for Article 140. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
TURKOMEN RAISE THE STAKES, KURDS HOPEFUL, ARABS HAPPY TO KEEP 
BOYCOTTING 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6.  (U) On February 16, Turkoman member of the reconciliation 
committee Hasan Torhan (Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF)) rejected the 
KBL's reply as nothing more than a rehash of the August 8, 2005 
agreement, which the Turkoman bloc had abandoned because the KBL had 
failed to implement it.  He said that the Turkoman bloc would not 
consider distribution of DG positions until the KBL had agreed to an 
equitable division of positions in higher tiers of the provincial 
government, such as the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and the PC 
Chairman positions.  He denied that this was a change from previous 
proposals and insisted that the KBL would have to address this 
demand. 
 
¶7.  (U) On February 18, KBL member of the reconciliation committee 
Awad Amin Mohammed (Kurdistan Toiler's Party, KBL) dismissed 
Torhan's demand that the highest tiers of the provincial government 
be equally distributed among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen and rejected 
a 32-32-32-4 percent split of DG positions as a starting point for 
negotiation, as such positions ought to be granted according to 
qualification rather than ethnicity.  Though he said that the Arab 
bloc appeared more flexible than the Turkoman bloc, Awad said that 
 
BAGHDAD 00000754  002 OF 002 
 
 
KBL would not pursue separate agreements as all parties had agreed 
to resolve the boycott through multilateral talks and the KBL was 
committed to the process. 
 
¶8.  (U) Awad felt that all blocs had passed a "psychological 
barrier" and were ready for open and honest discussion.  However, 
reaching an agreement might take several months, and Awad urged CF 
patience; he added that any resolution would be short term because 
Kirkuk's future status has yet to be determined.  He said that the 
PC can alleviate Arab and Turkoman "fears" about Article 140; 
however, Awad suspects that some really wish to stop Article 140 
altogether, which is beyond the PC's authority and cannot be solved 
in Kirkuk. 
 
¶9.  (U) On February 19, at the weekly meeting of the Hawijah Area 
Council (Hawijah is a district in the western, Sunni Arab-majority 
part of the province) the Arab member of the reconciliation 
committee, Rakan Saed Al-Jabouri, said that the boycott had been 
productive, "reversing four years of mistakes," and pointed to the 
CF-organized February 12 meeting as evidence.  Chairman and 
influential sheikh Hussein al-Jubouri (a.k.a. Abu Saddam) said that 
it was irrelevant whether Arab PC members attend PC sessions, as the 
KBL has a majority and can do what it pleases.  Later, in a rare 
candid moment, he told PRT staff that the goal of the boycott is to 
de-legitimize PC decisions by withholding minority participation. 
 
¶10.  (U) On February 18, KBL member of the reconciliation committee 
Awad had complained that he had been trying to meet his Arab and 
Turkoman counterparts, but they had stood him up more than once.  On 
February 20, PC Chairman Rizgar reiterated that Awad was in Kirkuk 
and available to meet; however, the other two members of the 
committee had gone to Baghdad, visiting Prime Minister Maliki "to 
complain about the Kurds." 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Though Hasan Torhan is the titular head of the Turkoman 
bloc in the PC, at the February 12 meeting that bloc was obviously 
led by Ali Mehdi (Turkoman Eli party), who is known for his 
ideological aggressiveness rather than his flexibility and is widely 
regarded as a paid agent of Ankara.  Moreover, at the meeting, 
Turkoman bloc member Zhala al-Nafitchi (ITF) accused the Kurds of 
"playing games," a remark regarded locally as a deliberate and 
particularly bold insult.  In addition, Turkoman PC members later 
made press statements complaining that KBL was "not trustworthy." 
Torhan then raised the stakes by demanding an equal division of the 
province's top political offices even before discussing the division 
of DGs, yet has failed to attend reconciliation committee meetings. 
Taken together, these acts indicate that the Turkoman bloc is 
uninterested in negotiating seriously.  This could be because what 
it wants -- a reversal of Article 140 -- is not available to them in 
Kirkuk, as Awad suggests. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) What the Arab bloc wants is unclear.  Its members are 
extremely individualistic, rarely presenting a united front and 
typically preoccupied with their own particular complaints.  Though 
Rakan is emerging as Kirkuk Arabs bloc's man in the PC, the bloc 
lacks leadership.  His and Abu Saddam's remarks indicate that the 
Arab bloc has no program and no reason to end its boycott.  In 
conjunction with Rakan's absence from reconciliation committee 
meetings, these suggest that the Arab bloc is uninterested in 
negotiating.  Additionally, Abu Saddam's remarks support PC Chairman 
Rizgar's opinion, expressed privately, that the elites among 
Kirkuk's indigenous Arabs will never accept being equal to and 
sharing power with Kirkuk's other communities. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Despite this opinion, Rizgar is pragmatic in dealing with 
Arab leaders, though he prefers (and has asked the PRT to support) 
non-sheikh Arabs such as Rakan.  Rizgar is a shrewd politician who 
understands that he needs some minority support to see Article 140 
through, and one of his consistent public themes is minority 
acceptance.  His ability to deliver Kirkuk to the KRG will make or 
break him within the PUK.  At the same time, as suggested by Awad's 
remark that any solution to the boycott will be short-term, Kurds 
are unwilling to buy Arab or Turokman support at too high a price. 
That is, for the sake of ending the boycott now, they will not make 
precedent-setting deals (such as giving up the Governor or PC 
Chairman positions) that they might regret later, after provincial 
elections and Article 140 implementation, when their control of the 
province will be reinforced.  The KBL's February 13 response 
reflects this, offering almost nothing new, and is probably the 
furthest that the KBL is willing to go.