VZCZCXRO5928
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNO #0112/01 0541200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231200Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0519
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0079
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0298
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0177
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0539
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0501
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MASS KPAO AF JA
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: INFORMAL MEETING OF REGIONAL COMMAND 
SOUTH MISSIONS YIELDS IDEAS 
 
REF: A. USNATO 109 
     ¶B. 22FEB07 COCKRELL/MOELLER/JOHNSON/SHEA EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: 
 
-Force Generation: RC/S missions agreed that there was a 
general lack of clarity on just what CJSOR shortfalls 
remained post Seville, and several RC-S allies intend to ask 
the SYG for a clear list from SHAPE.  Canada and the UK noted 
progress on the sensitive issue of bringing the UAE and 
Jordan, respectively, into ISAF.  Denmark will boost its ISAF 
presence. 
 
-Public Diplomacy: The group endorsed NSA Hadley's idea for a 
NATO Strategic Communication Task Force, presented earlier in 
the day during his coffee meeting with the North Atlantic 
Council (Ref A). 
 
-ANSF Train/Equip: RC-S Allies would welcome a NAC briefing 
in ISAF format on current CSTC-A efforts. 
 
-Japanese PRT Assistance Offer: Agreement that Embassies in 
Japan should encourage the GOJ to spend the $20 million 
earmarked for NATO PRT proposals (Ref B) in the south where 
development can impact security, or in under funded provinces 
elsewhere. 
 
-- COMMENT: After a somewhat slow start, the RC/S grouping is 
now beginning to show utility as a forum for generating and 
exchanging ideas.  END COMMENT. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) UK Ambassador Eldon hosted the February 21 informal 
biweekly meeting of RC-S ambassadors.  Charge Olson attended 
for USNATO. 
 
¶3. On force generation, the Netherlands in particular 
expressed frustration that Ambassadors have not yet seen a 
definitive view of where the Alliance stands on filling CJSOR 
shortfalls, and stated this weakens Ambassadors' ability to 
support NATO in their capitals.  The UK also noted that such 
a list needs to be carefully produced, with particular 
attention paid to how requirements shortfalls are prioritized 
- Ambassadors find the rug taken out from under their feet 
when they convey to capital a particular set of information 
at one point in time, only to have the information change 
unexpectedly shortly thereafter.  Several RC-S ambassadors 
intend to ask the SYG to obtain a more user-friendly list 
from SACEUR.  The UK and Canada noted their ongoing talks 
with Jordan and the UAE, respectively, to bring forces into 
ISAF, and the sensitivity of those discussions; DCM Olson 
echoed the need for discretion.  The Danish ambassador 
informed the that Denmark plans to withdraw from Iraq, and 
predicted ISAF deployment would increase by 200, from 
approximately 400 to 600 soldiers, by August 2007. 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to public diplomacy, RC-S allies endorsed NSA 
Hadley's call earlier in the day for a NATO Strategic 
Communication Task Force to enhance the PD efforts of NATO 
and ISAF.  The UK noted, though, that all Allies must first 
agree on common messages; not all Allies are necessarily in 
agreement with many of the themes that the RC-S group views 
as important.  (Comment: such as NATO's role in 
reconstruction and development, and the manner in which NATO 
should interact with other international actors such as the 
UN and EU.  End comment.)  The U.S. made the point that 
Washington was looking closely at PD models involving a 
single, dynamic spokesman, along the lines of the "Jamie Shea 
model" that was developed in the Kosovo crisis.  Estonia 
stressed the need for consistency in media messages from both 
NATO HQ and ISAF military spokesmen.  The UK Ambassador 
summed up, noting the group agreed that moving ahead on the 
basis of the three strands outlined by the UK, U.S., and 
Estonian representatives would be a good start.  COMMENT: If 
the U.S. can now quickly present the SYG and Allies with a 
clear vision of how the proposed Strategic Communications 
Task Force would work, NSA Hadley's NAC briefing and this 
 
USNATO 00000112  002 OF 002 
 
 
solid RC-S backing provide us some traction to work the 
issue.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶5. (C) The UK opened discussion on training and equipping the 
ANSF with a readout of a recent discussion between MOD Browne 
and Afghan MOD Wardak.  Wardak did not support the idea of a 
regional ANA training center in the south, and again lobbied 
for UK equipment donations to the ANA.  The UK believed that 
Wardak's request was not part of an integrated approach to 
ANSF equipping.  DCM Olson suggested that it might be useful 
to arrange a NAC briefing by CSTC-A, perhaps in conjunction 
with ACO and ACT, on current ANSF training and equipping 
efforts, in light on NATO's ongoing equipment support to the 
ANA and deliberations on a greater training role.  RC-S 
allies welcomed this, and suggested a brief should also 
include ISAF non-NATO troop contributors.  The UK ambassador 
also made the point that it was time to start "twisting arms" 
at NATO to fill NATO's commitment to staff embedded trainers 
(OMLTs) with select ANA units, thus far unmet. 
 
¶6. (C) RC-S allies agreed that follow-up by NATO SCR in Kabul 
Daan Everts to a recent Japanese proposal to funnel $20 
million of development assistance to small, humanitarian 
projects identified by NATO PRTs would be beneficial.  DCM 
Olson noted that the U.S. would like to see this money 
channeled to projects in RC-S, where development could help 
influence the security situation, and to traditionally under 
funded provinces such as Ghor.  RC-S allies concurred that 
asking Embassies in Tokyo to pass this message to the 
Japanese could be beneficial.  COMMENT: Details on the 
Japanese proposal have been passed to the Department in ref 
email.  Our PRTs stand to have an opportunity to direct 
"free" money to worthy local organizations and projects in 
their provinces.  The NATO stamp on the process - something 
explicitly requested by the Japanese - is of great benefit to 
our partnership goals at NATO, and NATO's budding 
relationship with Japan.  An appropriate instruction to 
Embassy Tokyo, vetted closely with our PRT officers and 
Embassy Kabul, noting USG enthusiasm for the Japanese offer, 
and initial thoughts on worthy provinces and PRTs could be 
beneficial in continuing to steer the Japanese in the right 
direction.  Meanwhile, the faster that U.S. PRTs can get 
proposals to the Japanese, via the NATO SCR in Kabul, the 
greater the chance we have of seeing our proposals funded. 
END COMMENT. 
 
 
OLSON