VZCZCXRO4291
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #0594/01 0530700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220700Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5375
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1147
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0121
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2012 
TAGS: PREL EAID MOPS MA RP
SUBJECT: MILF WELCOMES US ASSISTANCE BUT WANTS HELP ON 
POLITICAL SOLUTION 
 
REF: 06 MANILA 4802 
 
Classified By: DCM Paul W. Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  In a meeting in Sultan Kudarat with 
Embassy delegation led by DCM on February 15, MILF Central 
Committee members expressed appreciation for U.S. assistance 
programs in Mindanao, including our military's 
civil-humanitarian and medical programs and ship visits. 
However, they underscored that developmental assistance would 
not be successful without a political "solution" in Mindanao. 
 They urged that the USG convince the Philippine government 
to take a more sympathetic look at MILF territorial claims, 
while expressing interest in the government's recent 
"self-determination" proposal.  The International Monitoring 
Team remains optimistic about the cease-fire, and looks 
forward to eventual Swedish and Canadian participation. 
Cotabato City Mayor Sema described ongoing MILF/MNLF dialogue 
and greater internal MNLF unity, but downplayed the prospects 
for a campaign by MNLF founder Nur Misuari as governor of 
Sulu.  Our ongoing dialogue with the MILF leadership appears 
to be bearing fruit, as the MILF is clearly opening up and 
seeking to involve other parties in securing peace.  The 
Central Committee remains narrowly focused on maximizing 
territory under a new Muslim political entity, however, and 
was not yet ready to accept our initiatives to inaugurate 
local USAID development projects or tour the visiting USS 
Blue Ridge in General Santos City.  End Summary. 
 
BRIEFING THE MILF CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  DCM on February 15 led an Embassy delegation 
composed of Pol/C, USAID director, DATT, JSOTF-P commander, 
and A/RSO to meet with members of the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front's Central Committee at the MILF headquarters in Sultan 
Kudarat in Shariff Kabunsuan province.  Although Chairman 
al-Hadji Murad Ebrahim did not appear as promised, Vice 
Chairman Ghazali Jaafar, Chief peace negotiator Mohagher 
Iqbal, MILF peace panel member Attorney Lanang Ali, Foreign 
Affairs chief Ahmad Uli, and Education chief Ustadz Adul 
Salam Mohammed were present for the two hour meeting. 
 
¶3.  (C)  At the DCM's request, the USAID director outlined 
our current and planned developmental programs throughout 
Mindanao.  He noted that 60 pct of our overall assistance is 
targeted on Conflict Affected Areas of Mindanao, totaling 
about US$250 million over the past six years.  He highlighted 
successful partnerships, including with the private sector, 
and noted the upcoming beginning of the third phase of the 
Growth with Equity in Mindanao program.  He emphasized that 
our assistance did not depend on an eventual Philippine/MILF 
peace accord but was already widespread and multi-faceted. 
He reaffirmed that USAID would launch a 
livelihood/reintegration program within two weeks of the 
signing of a peace accord, working with the Bangsamoro 
Development Agency and the MILF leadership.  He described the 
integrated approach involving diplomatic, political, 
economic, military, and assistance components as well as 
international donors through the Mindanao Trust Fund.  (Note: 
 We had invited MILF Central Committee members to join DCM 
and delegation to inaugurate a near-by USAID-funded trading 
center immediately after our meeting, but they did not take 
us up on the opportunity.  End note) 
 
¶4.  (C)  Pol/C noted that the USG was not playing a role in 
the peace negotiations under the mediation of the Malaysian 
government and was not taking sides on the shape or 
composition of the eventual outcome, just as the USG did not 
take sides in Philippine elections or on domestic political 
issues such as charter change.  He emphasized our concern for 
fair, legal, and constitutional processes.   He underscored 
that the overall USG goals for Mindanao and all of the 
Philippines were peace and prosperity, and that we were 
working with partners to achieve this wherever conditions of 
peace and security permitted and where communities had made 
this their choice, rather than violence, insurgency, or 
terrorism.  He cited growing zones of peace and prosperity, 
which would be a green light for additional domestic and 
foreign investment to provide better lives for peace-loving 
families throughout Mindanao and rest of the Philippines. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The JSOTF-P commander described the U.S. military's 
training of and assistance to the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines to improve our and their capabilities and to help 
Philippine residents with medical, engineering, and logistics 
projects, including under the Balikatan umbrella.  He 
discussed eight medical missions that would take place in 
 
MANILA 00000594  002 OF 004 
 
 
Central Mindanao under BK 07, as well as an upcoming visit to 
Cotabato City by the USS Peleliu, including medical and 
engineering projects locally. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The D/RSO discussed the USG's Rewards for Justice 
program and provided printed materials to distribute in MILF 
areas, which the MILF leaders promised to do.  DCM cited in 
particular rewards for wanted terrorists Zukifli bin hir (aka 
Marwan) and Abdul Basit Usman, who were believed to be hiding 
in areas under the control of MILF base commands.  Jaafar 
insisted that Basit was not and had never been a MILF member 
but was a native, unlike the Jemaah Islamiyah's Marwan, 
Patek, and Dulmatin, for whom he promised the MILF would be 
on the lookout.  Iqbar noted the "mysterious" circumstances 
under which Basit had escaped from a Philippine jail in 2002, 
implying that Basit may have links to the Philippine 
government.  (Comment;  We have no/no reason to support this 
view.  End comment) 
 
¶7.  (C)  The DATT discussed the ongoing visit of the Seventh 
Fleet's flagship USS Blue Ridge, including a stop in General 
Santos City, as part of the Pacific Command's "Pacific 
Horizon" program.  The DCM extended invitations for the MILF 
leaders to a special tour and to attend the reception aboard 
the Blue Ridge on February 17.  Jaafar thanked the DCM for 
the invitation, saying he would contact DCM if they could 
attend (but never did). 
 
MILF RESPONSES 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Vice Chairman Jaafar expressed appreciation for 
these briefings.  He emphasized that the "MILF knows best" 
regarding the needs of its people and should play a central 
role in determining developmental programs.  DCM pointed out 
USAID's close cooperation with the Bangsamoro Development 
Agency, which Jaafar acknowledged was under the direct 
supervision of the MILF Central Committee. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Chief negotiator Iqbar insisted that the MILF 
leadership was more interested in political rather than 
economic aspects, and claimed that developmental programs 
absent support for a political solution was a form of 
counter-insurgency effort that would never succeed.  He 
commented that all parties needed to resolve the central 
political issues first, otherwise there would be no lasting 
peace, citing the example of the Moro National Liberation 
Front.  Jaafar agreed that, while the MILF "did not object" 
to what USAID and other donors were doing in Mindanao, a 
political solution must come first.  He admitted that the 
MILF would always "support projects that benefit our people." 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  Jaafar insisted that the USG could offer its "good 
ideas" on the peace talks to the Philippine government.  He 
said that this should not be seen as interference or a breach 
of Malaysia's facilitation role -- but even if it was, "we 
don't care."  Attorney Ali also commented that "if we settle 
the political issue, assistance and other programs could 
continue."  He urged the USG to offer any "bright ideas" that 
would move the Philippine government toward a "favorable 
settlement" because the Philippine government would "listen 
to the U.S."  He added that "your commitment to help the 
talks succeed will help."  Iqbar cited the MNLF peace accord, 
which had left the MNLF "defeated politically."  Jaafar 
admitted that development projects were part of a political 
solution, but that development itself would not "solve" 
political problems. 
 
¶11.  (C)  DCM asked about the MILF's response to the 
Philippine government's recent "self-determination" proposal. 
 Attorney Ali said it was a very intriguing proposal.  Jaafar 
explained that self determination was a long-standing MILF 
demand the government had previously rejected.  Jaafar 
quickly turned the conversation back to territory, 
reiterating that the MILF wanted the Bangsamoro Juridical 
Entity to include "all areas traditionally occupied by the 
Bangsamoro people" in a contiguous territory that would 
include majority Christian localities.  The government would 
have Muslim-governed areas divided into a patchwork, he said. 
  He denied that resolving territorial issues in mixed 
Christian-Muslim areas was difficult, claiming "it is very 
simple!"  Attorney Ali noted that the Philippine government 
had to "figure out how" to deliver Christian majority areas 
to a Muslim juridical entity, whether by Constitutional 
processes or Executive action.  Iqbar reminded the delegation 
about earlier Philippine promises over territory to the MNLF, 
which were then defeated in referendums.  Jaafar claimed that 
 
MANILA 00000594  003 OF 004 
 
 
the MILF was in constant and increasingly "successful" 
dialogue with the MNLF, as well as NGOs and other Bangsamoro 
groups.  He admitted that there "cannot be two governments 
for one place" -- a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity could not 
co-exist with the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. 
Iqbar cited as an interesting model USG agreements with 
Native Americans, treating them as "nations," and said the 
Philippine government should agree on creating a "state 
within the state." 
 
¶12.  (C)  Jaafar forcefully denied the existence of an MILF 
Special Operations Group.  He pledged that the MILF was "very 
interested in peace" and that the Central Committee would 
"work hard to establish peace."  He welcomed the opportunity 
to continue dialogue with the U.S. Embassy. 
 
IMT Optimistic 
-------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  In a separate meeting at the Cotabato City 
headquarters of the International Monitoring Team, Head of 
Mission Major General Dato' Md Ismail "Smile" bin Ahmad Khan 
said that the cease-fire was "holding well," with 
dramatically fewer incidents and fewer internally displaced 
persons, and expressed optimism about the future.  He 
admitted that the peace process nonetheless remained 
"fragile," with many actors with suspicious motives.  The IMT 
now covers sixteen out of Mindanao's 22 provinces, with a 
total of 57 members, including the new Japanese development 
expert as well as the troops from Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Libya.  He said that Canada and Sweden were now finalizing 
details about their participation, focusing on governance and 
development, respectively.  He expressed eagerness to work 
with JSOTF-P on future medical missions. 
 
Mayor Sema and the MNLF 
----------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin Sema, a member of the 
MNLF's Council of 15, reaffirmed his commitment to security 
and counter-terrorism efforts in Central Mindanao.   He 
discussed the recent hostage-taking by MNLF elements of the 
AFP's Major General Dolorfino on Jolo, which he claimed had 
not been "planned" but erupted because Dolorfino did not come 
to the MNLF prepared with "blood money" for alleged MNLF 
troops killed by the AFP in a recent encounter.  He claimed 
that the MNLF had held a meeting during the week of February 
5 that had "reunited it," despite some minor "grey areas." 
He expressed worry about some new "violent factions" who 
believe that the MNLF had been "deceived" by the 1996 peace 
accord, which is why the MNLF looks forward to the upcoming 
review of implementation of the 1996 agreement in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, by the Organization of Islamic Collective, the 
Philippine government, and the MNLF.  He expressed a strong 
hope that MNLF founder Nur Misuari would not run for governor 
of Sulu, as rumored. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Sema confirmed that the MILF and MNLF continued a 
dialogue, but had not come to terms about a possible 
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.  He insisted that any future 
political arrangement should not result in "hamlet-ing" 
Muslim residents or isolating anyone, including Christians. 
He expressed a desire for an "inclusive" solution that would 
not be exactly either the ARMM or the MILF-envisioned BJE. 
He said that he had not read the Philippine government's 
latest self-determination offer, but commented that it was 
"potentially good." 
 
¶16.  (C)  Mayor Sema also expressed a warm welcome for 
upcoming ship visits and humanitarian projects. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  The MILF has also met in recent days with 
delegations from the European Union and Japan.  It is clearly 
opening up and seeking to involve other parties in 
influencing a final outcome that maximizes the territory 
under a new Muslim political entity.  The MILF leaders 
expressed surprisingly little interest in JSOTF-P and DAO 
programs, beyond a fairly warm welcome.  They were well 
versed on many USAID projects in their area, as well as 
insistent on their "right" to guide future development 
programs.  They appear nonetheless to be worried that the 
"political solution" they seek with the Philippine government 
is still out of reach, and want additional help from us and 
others. 
 
 
MANILA 00000594  004 OF 004 
 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
 
KENNEY