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Viewing cable 07SUVA61, TONGA REMAINS FRACTURED FROM 11/16 RIOT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SUVA61 2007-01-24 21:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Suva
VZCZCXRO7722
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0061/01 0242126
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 242126Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3701
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0242
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1536
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1118
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1310
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0330
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0736
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SUVA 000061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR EAID PHUM TN
SUBJECT: TONGA REMAINS FRACTURED FROM 11/16 RIOT 
 
REF: A. 06 SUVA 500 
     B. 06 SUVA 504 
     C. 06 SUVA 507 
     D. 06 SUVA 508 
     E. 06 SUVA 517 
     F. 06 SUVA 530 
 
Classified By: Amb. Dinger.  Sec. 1.4 (B,D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) This telegram sketches factors that appear to have 
contributed to the riot of Nov. 16 in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, an 
event that devastated the central business district (CBD) and 
has left deep scars on every Tongan's psyche.  Certainly on 
Nov. 16, Tonga's political process was at center stage, with 
Prime Minister Sevele seeking to harness the pace and extent 
of reform, probably in consultation with the Palace, and with 
pro-democracy activists on the other side striving to pile on 
people-power pressure to up the pace and ensure a rapid and 
definitively democratic outcome.  Some allege power 
jealousies within the pro-democracy movement played a part. 
Others allege a small-business group's unhappiness with 
Government policies played a significant role.  Most likely, 
the instigators, whatever their motives, did not intend the 
degree of devastation that occurred.  Police were 
ineffectual.  Armed Tonga Defense Service (TDS) troops 
eventually restored order.  Two months later, every Tongan 
remains shaken, and the CBD, now cleared of rubble, is an 
empty zone of concrete slabs.  Septel will discuss issues at 
play as Tonga attempts to punish wrongdoers, rebuild the 
economy, and decide on political reforms.  End summary. 
 
"16/11" - a day of devastation for Tonga 
---------------------------------------- 
2. (U) Reftels reported on the riot that devastated 
Nuku'alofa, the capital of Tonga, on Nov. 16, 2006.  Amb. 
Dinger visited Jan. 19-21 to gauge the current state of play. 
 Most everyone uses the shorthand "16/11" to refer to the 
day, and Tongans consider the riot to be their equivalent of 
"9/11" in the U.S.  The areas of the CBD destroyed that day 
are still sealed off by armed TDS troops.  Nearly all the 
burned-out buildings have been removed, leaving a vast open 
space of whitened-concrete slabs spread across approximately 
six square blocks.  The government buildings that suffered 
mob damage to windows and doors have been repaired.  Farther 
from the center, isolated buildings that were torched are 
gone, with vacant lots remaining. 
 
All sides remain angry 
---------------------- 
3. (C) While the ruined buildings are removed, deep scars 
remain within psyches.  Almost everyone is angry.  Government 
ministers and supporters remain deeply offended that rioters 
embarrassed Tonga to the world, destroyed many businesses and 
jobs, and have not been contrite.  Pro-democracy supporters 
remain deeply frustrated by royal and government failure, 
thus far, to enact far-reaching political reforms and by what 
they see as a heavy-handed, military-oriented response to the 
riot. 
 
Prosecutions pending 
-------------------- 
4. (C) The Government's efforts to determine who instigated 
the riot and press charges are well under way.  Up to a 
thousand people have been detained by the police and TDS 
under emergency powers.  Most have been subsequently 
released.  Court cases are beginning.  The Attorney General 
acknowledges a need to divert most cases to alternative 
resolution processes, including a youth diversion program. 
The AG expects about a hundred cases actually to go to trial. 
 Evidence in many cases will be video, including cell-phone 
video, of riot scenes, plus testimony of some participants. 
Extra prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges are being 
recruited from Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Pro-democracy MPs under fire 
---------------------------- 
5. (C) The Government expects all seven 
pro-democracy-oriented Peoples Representatives to Parliament 
to be indicted on sedition and other charges.  Thus far, two 
have been taken in.  Isileli Pulu remains in prison charged 
with sedition and being a party to murder.  He allegedly was 
caught on video in the midst of the riot pointing toward the 
King's Shoreline building.  The bodies of seven rioters, 
 
SUVA 00000061  002 OF 005 
 
 
apparently trapped in flames, later were found there.  The 
most famous pro-democracy MP, Akilisi Pohiva, was taken in 
just minutes before he was scheduled to meet with the 
Ambassador on Jan. 17.  Pohiva has since been released on 
bail after being charged with three counts of sedition.  The 
Ambassador was able to meet with Clive Edwards, another 
pro-democracy MP, who is convinced he will be detained, too. 
Edwards flatly denies engaging in any criminal planning or 
act, but he believes authorities are so angry about the riot 
that they will pursue all who had a role in organizing the 
political demonstration from which the riot exploded. 
 
Political reforms, Parliament, and Pressure 
------------------------------------------- 
6. (C) Per reftels, the atmosphere on Nov. 16 was highly 
charged.  A National Committee for Political Reform had 
submitted a report recommending an all-elected Parliament, a 
significant change from Tonga's current model that is 
dominated by the King's appointed cabinet and a group of nine 
elected Nobles.  Prime Minister Sevele tossed in a counter 
proposal that would have retained for the King the 
possibility of appointing enough MPs to join with Nobles to 
retain a majority in Parliament.  Pohiva and his 
pro-democracy colleagues, who had been relatively satisfied 
with the NCPR report, then offered up their own counter 
proposal.  The pro-democracy MPs insisted that Parliament 
take a vote on the way forward before adjourning for the 
year.  They orchestrated large and vocal demonstrations 
outside Parliament for several days. 
 
7. (C) Prime Minister Sevele, the Nobles, and most of Cabinet 
were wary of the crowds and wanted to defer decision-making 
to a calmer negotiating environment.  Sevele had proposed a 
few days before to have Parliament approve the NCPR report 
"in principle," and then create a nine-person committee (3 
pro-democracy MPs; 3 Nobles; 3 from Cabinet) to consider 
options and provide a solution when Parliament reconvenes in 
May.  Pohiva reportedly agreed, though he later could not win 
support from his colleagues.  The Speaker declined to convene 
a Parliament session Nov. 16, the last feasible day for a 
vote, citing the threatening tone of the demonstrations just 
across the street.  Instead, Sevele called a mini-Cabinet 
meeting in his office for mid-afternoon and invited some 
pro-democracy MPs. 
 
Politics, media, business motives 
--------------------------------- 
8. (C) In the meantime, the crowd at Pangai Si'i park just 
across from Parliament and next to the PM's offices was 
angry.  Most of the several thousand demonstrators were there 
to support pro-democracy, anti-monarchy themes; but another, 
smaller group was vocal in its opposition to change.  The 
groups exchanged insults, ramping up tension.  Pro-democracy 
leaders, including Pohiva, gave fiery political speeches. 
Some in the pro-democracy group had additional agendas. 
 
-- The Government reportedly had cut off power to a 
pro-democracy TV station, OBN, just a day or two before Nov. 
16.  OBN had been providing a near-constant forum for Pohiva 
and pro-democracy leaders, in contrast to the Government's 
Tonga TV that had reportedly given very little coverage to 
the pro-democracy movement but had accented the Government's 
stance.  The official reason for cutting off OBN was that the 
managers had no license to broadcast and no right to the land 
on which the station was built.  The facts are complicated 
and relate back to the late King, who had "given" the land 
without paperwork to an American religious broadcaster who 
had a license.  The American later transferred his rights to 
OBN's current religious-based team.  The issues were in 
litigation and had not been resolved as of the power cut.  We 
hear a group of OBN supporters were among those who marched 
to Pangai Si'i Nov. 16. 
 
-- Also, one of PM Sevele's pet projects was a clean-up of 
Tonga customs.  He appointed a committee that recommended 
shutting down all bonded warehouses to be replaced by one or 
two new bonded warehouses.  A small-business group strongly 
objected, alleging that members of the PM's committee were 
planning to control the new warehouse businesses, a shift of 
graft, not a clean-up.  The small-business group also was 
very irritated by a major influx of ethnic-Chinese retail 
shops in Nuku'alofa.  The small-business group is alleged to 
have trucked in young men from rural areas, primed them with 
alcohol, and aimed them toward destruction.  Some witnesses 
allege molotov cocktails were at the ready. 
 
SUVA 00000061  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
Mini-Cabinet meeting under pressure 
----------------------------------- 
9. (C) Accounts differ on just what spark set off the riot 
and whether that spark was lit before or after the PM's 
mini-Cabinet meeting began.  Pro-democracy leaders say they 
went to Sevele's office in good faith and asked in reasonable 
tones for a written decision supporting a fully elected 
Parliament.  With that, they said they would do their best to 
calm the volatile crowd outside.  Government participants 
describe Pohiva as shouting demands in "or else" terms.  The 
initial response was inaction.  In fact, Edwards said, the AG 
spent a crucial half hour or more loudly praying for divine 
guidance (not an unusual occurrence in Tonga).  Eventually, 
the pro-democracy leaders departed, only to be begged back at 
the office gate by the PM's advisor Senitule. 
 
Victory?  Too late 
------------------ 
10. (C) By that time, the crowd outside the PM's office 
building was casting stones, breaking windows, and seemingly 
losing control.  By some accounts, Pohiva tried to calm the 
nearest members of the throng from stoning Senitule before 
the two re-entered the building to receive a statement, 
signed by Sevele, agreeing to a fully elected Parliament for 
the 2008 elections.  (Sevele since has noted that the 
statement was made under duress and in any case would need 
formal approval of Parliament and the King to be valid.) 
With the written statement in hand, Pohiva, Edwards, Pulu, 
and others returned to the crowd, gained access to the media, 
declared "We have won," and pleaded with the crowd to go home 
since their objective had been achieved. 
 
A riot in phases 
---------------- 
11. (C) However, by then, the riot was in full gear. 
Initially, demonstrators stoned government offices near the 
park, breaking windows, including at the PM's office and the 
Treasury.  Then a group of 500 or so rioters headed for the 
business district.  Several eye-witnesses say the riot built 
in stages.  Initially, there appeared to be simultaneous, 
perhaps planned attacks to trash targeted, politically 
relevant businesses: the PM's grocery store; the King's 
Shoreline building; the Princess's duty-free store; the 
King's Indian cronies' hotel.  Rioters snatched alcohol from 
shops, becoming more unruly.  Some rioters then started 
setting fires to the targeted buildings they had earlier 
trashed, beginning with Shoreline.  With that, hundreds of 
people who had merely been avid spectators began stealing 
everything not nailed down.  Some rioters turned their 
attention to small shops owned by ethnic-Chinese.  As the day 
was windy and dry, flames quickly devastated most of the CBD. 
 
Instigators?  Pro-democracy personal ambition? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
12. (C) The PM and AG are convinced the pro-democracy MPs 
must bear the blame.  At the least, they fired up the mob 
with incendiary political rhetoric.  Allegedly they plotted 
destruction.  Asked what possible advantage the pro-democracy 
movement could perceive from devastating Nuku'alofa, the PM 
suggested the intent was to convince the King to remove the 
Sevele Government for horribly misjudging the public mood and 
to install a true pro-democracy PM, in effect to engineer a 
coup.  People's Rep. Edwards scoffed at that suggestion, 
saying if activists had intended a coup, they would have 
carefully designed one.  Another, related theory is that 
Pohiva and other long-time pro-democracy leaders deeply 
resented the King's selection of Sevele, a pro-democracy 
activist with lesser and shorter credentials, to be the first 
modern-day "commoner" PM.  Thus, the argument goes, crassly 
personal political ambition was the driving force.  A 
long-time pro-democracy activist said he and Sevele had opted 
to take a different path from Pohiva's "socialist agenda." 
Some argue that Sevele's proposal for people's reps to be 
elected from single-member rather than island-wide districts 
triggered political angst, particularly among the Tonga'tapu 
people's reps.  Single-member districts would leave 
Nuku'alofa with only one constituency; but all three current 
Tonga'tapu people's reps, plus Sevele, reside in the capital. 
 
Small business grudges? 
----------------------- 
13. (C) Another theory for the riot is that the 
small-business activists, incensed about the bonded warehouse 
scam, infiltrated criminal thugs and young toughs into the 
 
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crowd, and then activated them to target enemy businesses for 
destruction.  People point to the burning of a Jones Co. 
store well outside the CBD as particularly relevant evidence. 
 Mr. Jones is one of the members of PM Sevele's committee who 
allegedly was to profit from the new bonded-warehouse 
arrangement.  A number of stores torched in the CBD, and 
particularly the Chinese shops, could also fit this theory. 
A prominent businesswoman who was recently arrested on riot 
charges is an active member of the small-business 
organization. 
 
A modest plan that exploded? 
---------------------------- 
14. (C) A cabinet minister suggested that Pohiva's effort to 
force a vote in Parliament on political reforms was 
illuminating.  The theory goes that Pohiva had to know the 
People's Reps would lose any vote, as usual, since Cabinet 
and Nobles combined have an overwhelming majority.  Thus, the 
presumed aim was to trigger mob action in the streets.  Some 
witnesses say pro-democracy speakers in the lead-up to the 
riot publicly counted down the days to the 16th.   Perhaps 
Pohiva was pessimistically recalling a past instance when a 
land commission, set up with fanfare, consulted widely and 
put forth proposals, only to be ignored.  Perhaps angry 
radicals who burned a few cars and an abandoned royal 
residence in a rural area during political tensions in 
August-September 2005 were intending to take out frustration 
on political opponents, the PM and royal family, for the 
history of such failed expectations.  Activists might have 
intended another modest demonstration of public frustration, 
a few trashed buildings to catch the elite's attention, not 
anticipating that a boozed-up mob, access to a petrol 
station, and high winds would whip up a conflagration. 
 
Counter theories: blame the PM? 
------------------------------- 
15. (C) Two prominent members of the NCPR have publicly 
blamed PM Sevele for precipitating the crisis.  Ref D 
reported on the view of Sitiveni Halapua, head of the Pacific 
Island Development Program (PIDP) in Honolulu and chief 
drafter of the NCPR report.  Halapua placed major blame on 
Sevele for putting forward his own reform proposal that 
unnecessarily created confusion in the reform process, moving 
discussion from Parliament to Cabinet thereby raising alarms 
in the streets, and failing to have adequate security plans 
in place.  Ana Taufe'ulungaki, a University of the South 
Pacific academic and NCPR member, was similarly critical of 
Sevele's role in an analysis she wrote just after the riot. 
 
Blame the King and/or Cabinet? 
------------------------------ 
16. (C) Ever since the Palace (the then-Crown Prince via the 
late King) appointed Sevele the first modern-era "commoner" 
PM, Sevele has said the Palace accepts the need for political 
reform.  Our own past conversations with now-King George V 
suggest the monarch will gladly cede much power to 
Parliament, though he wants to ensure he can continue to have 
decisive influence on at least some important issues.  Sevele 
has not admitted it, but it is certainly possible that the 
King and PM were in league to permit meaningful reform, by 
Tonga standards, but to ensure retention of royal 
prerogatives.  Also, most members of the current Cabinet were 
appointed to their positions.  It was only in the past two 
years, in a reform move, that the King appointed two people's 
reps and two Nobles from Parliament into Cabinet.  Most of 
the un-elected Cabinet members reportedly see no future for 
themselves in an all-elected Parliament.  Some may not mind 
returning to private lives; others may have encouraged the 
Palace and PM to propose adjustments to the NCPR 
recommendations to retain sufficient appointed members of 
Parliament to form a majority with the Nobles reps. 
 
Blame the police? 
----------------- 
17. (C) By nearly all accounts, the Tonga Police Force did a 
poor job of attempting to control a volatile situation in 
mid-November.  We hear Sevele believes some in senior police 
positions were actively colluding with pro-democracy leaders 
in the lead-up to the riot.  Police were present on Nov. 16. 
They attempted to separate competing crowds and to be a 
buffer between the crowds and public buildings; however, once 
the riot exploded, the police were totally overwhelmed.  We 
hear Australian and New Zealand police who arrived in 
following days believe Tonga police judged rightly that 
attempting, unarmed, to stop the rioting would have been 
 
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nonsensical. 
 
Praise the TDS? 
--------------- 
18. (C) Two factors brought the situation under control. 
First, after nightfall, rioters became exhausted, too drunk 
or too burdened with looted items to continue.  Second, PM 
Sevele called the armed TDS into the streets.  We are told 
that the TDS was a decisive element on Nov. 17 and 18 when 
some elements attempted to resume destructive acts, including 
by using heavy construction equipment to shield their 
movements.  TDS soldiers cocked their weapons and reportedly 
fired into the air, causing the potential rioters to retreat. 
 The TDS also set up armed check points that controlled 
traffic and subdued any potential crowds.  Perhaps inevitably 
when a military force trained for warfare is called on to do 
policing, some reports of arbitrary or unnecessary use of 
force have surfaced.  In general, though, most sources were 
reasonably complimentary of TDS performance at a troubled 
time. 
 
Comment 
------- 
19. (C) PM Sevele's management of the reform process 
undoubtedly raised alarms in the pro-democracy movement. 
Sevele's reform counter-proposal and his shift of venue from 
Parliament to Cabinet were surely intended to slow the pace 
of electoral reform and to engineer a result that, in line 
with Tonga tradition, would allow the King, if he so wishes, 
to retain a majority coalition in Parliament via his own 
Cabinet appointments plus the votes of the Nobles.  That 
outcome would frustrate the pro-democracy movement's goal to 
ensure, via an all-elected Parliament with an absolute 
majority of people's reps, that the King could no longer 
dominate Tonga politics.  Those stakes are important 
politically, so it is no surprise that the democracy movement 
energized people-power pressure. 
 
20. (C) It strikes us that none of the supposed instigators 
of the riot could have intended the full scope of what took 
place.  Certainly, some pro-democracy activists might have 
wanted to vividly illustrate public outrage at perceived 
efforts by Palace and PM to manipulate reform.  They might 
have judged that trashing a few politically targeted 
businesses was one more useful exercise of pressure. 
Certainly, the small business activists may have seen an 
opportunity to strike back at larger opponents.  It is 
possible, though it strikes us as unlikely, that the 
pro-democracy leadership somehow believed street violence 
could split the King from the PM and bring about a "coup." 
It seems clear Sevele did misjudge the political atmosphere 
and how much room he had to maneuver for his preferred pace 
and degree of reform.  In the end, Mother Nature's winds 
turned a nasty, targeted riot, into a major political, 
economic, and cultural disaster for Tonga. 
 
21. (C) It appears all players deserve some blame. 
Inevitably, and understandably, much attention in the two 
months since the riot has been focused on finding and 
prosecuting perpetrators.  With that process proceeding, 
significant attention also must focus forward, on rebuilding 
economic infrastructure, re-energizing political reform, and 
finding ways to promote reconciliation.  Septel discusses the 
way ahead. 
DINGER